Philosophical Perspectives最新文献_第5页

IF 2 1区哲学

Philosophical Perspectives Pub Date : 2021-10-23 DOI: 10.1111/phpe.12156

Kevin Dorst, B. Levinstein, Bernhard Salow, B. Husic, Branden Fitelson

{"title":"Deference Done Better","authors":"Kevin Dorst, B. Levinstein, Bernhard Salow, B. Husic, Branden Fitelson","doi":"10.1111/phpe.12156","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/phpe.12156","url":null,"abstract":"*K.D., B.A.L., andB.S. contributed equally—they jointly proved the theorems andwrote thepaper. †B.E.H. andB.F. pioneered the computationalmethods and located thekey counterexample (Fact 2.1); together, thesemade the rest of the paper possible. Abstract There are many things—call them ‘experts’—that you should defer to in forming your opinions. The trouble is, many experts are modest: they’re less than certain that they are worthy of deference. When this happens, the standard theories of deference break down: the most popular (“Reflection”-style) principles collapse to inconsistency, while their most popular (“New-Reflection”style) variants allow you to defer to someone while regarding them as an anti-expert. We propose a middle way: deferring to someone involves preferring to make any decision using their opinions instead of your own. In a slogan, deferring opinions is deferring decisions. Generalizing the proposal of Dorst (2020a), we first formulate a new principle that shows exactly how your opinions must relate to an expert’s for this to be so. We then build off the results of Levinstein (2019) and CampbellMoore (2020) to show that this principle is also equivalent to the constraint that you must always expect the expert’s estimates to be more accurate than your own. Finally, we characterize the conditions an expert’s opinions must meet to be worthy of deference in this sense, showing how they sit naturally between the too-strong constraints of Reflection and the too-weak constraints of New Reflection.","PeriodicalId":51519,"journal":{"name":"Philosophical Perspectives","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.0,"publicationDate":"2021-10-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46816564","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 6

Epistemological solipsism as a route to external world skepticism 认识论唯我论是通向外部世界怀疑主义的途径

IF 2 1区哲学

Philosophical Perspectives Pub Date : 2021-10-23 DOI: 10.1111/phpe.12146

Grace Helton

{"title":"Epistemological solipsism as a route to external world skepticism","authors":"Grace Helton","doi":"10.1111/phpe.12146","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/phpe.12146","url":null,"abstract":"There are almost 8 billion human beings on the planet. Some of these I know personally. They are my colleagues, neighbors, friends, and family members. Others are distant strangers, most of whom I will never meet. I take it for granted that all of these beings are, like myself, sentient. I presume that they have opinions and aspirations, hopes and dreads; that they experience intense pleasures and sharp pains, along with dull aches, surprise, simple satisfaction, ennui, and deep longing; that they can reflect, contemplate, learn, interpret the world and themselves, and act on those interpretations. Certainly, I do not think my fellow humans are mere automata, mindless entities that somehow manage to give off the appearance of sentience. In fact, psychologically speaking, it is extraordinarily difficult for me to take seriously, even as a remote possibility, that these others might somehow fail to be sentient. Still, I can ask: Do I know that these others are sentient? Do I know that I am not alone in the universe?1 Epistemological solipsism (sometimes abbreviated to solipsism) is the view that I do not know that other minds exist. One way of motivating this view draws from the possibility that others might appear to be sentient whilst altogether lacking a mental life. On one line of reasoning, if I cannot rule out that this possibility obtains, then I do not know that other minds exist, even if the others around me are in fact sentient.2 Epistemological solipsism does not enjoy a central place in contemporary philosophical theorizing.3 The reasons for this are no doubt complex, but I would conjecture that the following is one contributing factor: epistemological solipsism is presumed to be easily refutable, for instance, on broadly abductive grounds. For presumably the best explanation of why others seem to be sentient is that they are sentient.4 If solipsism can be ruled out this easily, then perhaps solipsism doesn’t warrant a central position in philosophical theorizing. I would conjecture than an additional factor which contributes to solipsism’s neglected status is the fact that solipsism is sometimes taken to be merely a special instance of external world skepticism. External world skepticism is, at a minimum, the view that vast swathes of your empirical beliefs about the world outside your mind fail to amount to knowledge. Unlike solipsism, external world skepticism enjoys a highly central place in contemporary epistemology; indeed, its refutation is sometimes taken to be the raison d’être of epistemological theorizing.5 If solipsism’s","PeriodicalId":51519,"journal":{"name":"Philosophical Perspectives","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.0,"publicationDate":"2021-10-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45383012","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 3

Risky business 高风险业务

IF 2 1区哲学

Philosophical Perspectives Pub Date : 2021-10-19 DOI: 10.1111/phpe.12147

A. Hájek

引用次数: 1

The rationality of epistemic akrasia 认知缺失的合理性

IF 2 1区哲学

Philosophical Perspectives Pub Date : 2021-10-15 DOI: 10.1111/phpe.12144

J. Hawthorne, Yoaav Isaacs, Maria Lasonen-Aarnio

引用次数: 3

Divine hiddenness: An evidential argument 神的隐藏:一个证据性的论点