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Worldly Indeterminacy and the Provisionality of Language 世俗的不确定性与语言的临时性
IF 1 2区 哲学
AUSTRALASIAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2024-03-21 DOI: 10.1080/00048402.2024.2326430
Chien-hsing Ho
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引用次数: 0
Avowing the Avowal View 宣誓观
IF 1 2区 哲学
AUSTRALASIAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2024-03-07 DOI: 10.1080/00048402.2024.2319781
Elizabeth Schechter
{"title":"Avowing the Avowal View","authors":"Elizabeth Schechter","doi":"10.1080/00048402.2024.2319781","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/00048402.2024.2319781","url":null,"abstract":"This paper defends the avowal view of self-deception, according to which the self-deceived agent has been led by the evidence to believe that ¬p and yet is sincere in asserting that p. I argue that...","PeriodicalId":51459,"journal":{"name":"AUSTRALASIAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2024-03-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140064294","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Against the Pathology Argument for Self-Acquaintance 反对自我认识的病理学论证
IF 1 2区 哲学
AUSTRALASIAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2024-03-03 DOI: 10.1080/00048402.2024.2320841
Adam Bradley
{"title":"Against the Pathology Argument for Self-Acquaintance","authors":"Adam Bradley","doi":"10.1080/00048402.2024.2320841","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/00048402.2024.2320841","url":null,"abstract":"Are we acquainted with the self in experience? It may seem so. After all, we tend to be confident in our own existence. A natural explanation for this confidence is that the self somehow shows up i...","PeriodicalId":51459,"journal":{"name":"AUSTRALASIAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2024-03-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140026683","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Serious Actualism and Nonexistence 严肃的现实主义与不存在
IF 1 2区 哲学
AUSTRALASIAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2024-03-03 DOI: 10.1080/00048402.2024.2310190
Christopher James Masterman
{"title":"Serious Actualism and Nonexistence","authors":"Christopher James Masterman","doi":"10.1080/00048402.2024.2310190","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/00048402.2024.2310190","url":null,"abstract":"Serious actualism is the view that it is metaphysically impossible for an entity to have a property, or stand in a relation, and not exist. Fine (1985) and Pollock (1985) influentially argue that t...","PeriodicalId":51459,"journal":{"name":"AUSTRALASIAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2024-03-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140043541","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Moorean Paradox in Practice: How Knowledge of Action Can Be First-Personal 实践中的摩尔悖论：行动知识如何成为第一个人知识
IF 1 2区 哲学
AUSTRALASIAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2024-03-03 DOI: 10.1080/00048402.2024.2319778
Alec Hinshelwood
{"title":"Moorean Paradox in Practice: How Knowledge of Action Can Be First-Personal","authors":"Alec Hinshelwood","doi":"10.1080/00048402.2024.2319778","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/00048402.2024.2319778","url":null,"abstract":"We know our own intentional actions in a distinctively first-personal way. Many accounts of knowledge of intentionally doing something, A, assume that grounds for the knowledge would have to establ...","PeriodicalId":51459,"journal":{"name":"AUSTRALASIAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2024-03-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140043555","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Can Moral Anti-Realists Theorize? 道德反现实主义者能理论化吗？
IF 1 2区 哲学
AUSTRALASIAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2024-02-21 DOI: 10.1080/00048402.2024.2312166
Michael Zhao
{"title":"Can Moral Anti-Realists Theorize?","authors":"Michael Zhao","doi":"10.1080/00048402.2024.2312166","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/00048402.2024.2312166","url":null,"abstract":"Call ‘radical moral theorizing’ the project of developing a moral theory that not only tries to conform to our existing moral judgments, but also manifests various theoretical virtues: consistency,...","PeriodicalId":51459,"journal":{"name":"AUSTRALASIAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2024-02-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139917202","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
The Grounds of a Critique of Pure Reason 纯粹理性批判的基础
IF 1 2区 哲学
AUSTRALASIAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2024-02-20 DOI: 10.1080/00048402.2023.2248476
Joe Stratmann
{"title":"The Grounds of a Critique of Pure Reason","authors":"Joe Stratmann","doi":"10.1080/00048402.2023.2248476","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/00048402.2023.2248476","url":null,"abstract":"For the realist metaphysician, certain notions in metaphysics are objectively theory-guiding. But what makes them so? Echoing others, Dasgupta (2018) suggests that the realist metaphysician faces t...","PeriodicalId":51459,"journal":{"name":"AUSTRALASIAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2024-02-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139909099","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Ambiguity Tests, Polysemy, and Copredication 歧义测试、多义词和同源词
IF 1 2区 哲学
AUSTRALASIAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2024-02-19 DOI: 10.1080/00048402.2024.2310193
David Liebesman, Ofra Magidor
{"title":"Ambiguity Tests, Polysemy, and Copredication","authors":"David Liebesman, Ofra Magidor","doi":"10.1080/00048402.2024.2310193","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/00048402.2024.2310193","url":null,"abstract":"A family of familiar linguistic tests purport to help identify when a term is ambiguous. These tests are philosophically important: a familiar philosophical strategy is to claim that some phenomeno...","PeriodicalId":51459,"journal":{"name":"AUSTRALASIAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2024-02-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139909052","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
The Metaphysics of Sensory Experience 感官体验的形而上学
IF 1 2区 哲学
AUSTRALASIAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2024-02-19 DOI: 10.1080/00048402.2024.2313075
Benj Hellie
{"title":"The Metaphysics of Sensory Experience","authors":"Benj Hellie","doi":"10.1080/00048402.2024.2313075","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/00048402.2024.2313075","url":null,"abstract":"Published in Australasian Journal of Philosophy (Ahead of Print, 2024)","PeriodicalId":51459,"journal":{"name":"AUSTRALASIAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2024-02-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139909123","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Bad Beliefs: Why they Happen to Good People 坏信念：为什么好人会有坏信念
IF 1 2区 哲学
AUSTRALASIAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2024-02-15 DOI: 10.1080/00048402.2024.2313078
David Coady
{"title":"Bad Beliefs: Why they Happen to Good People","authors":"David Coady","doi":"10.1080/00048402.2024.2313078","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/00048402.2024.2313078","url":null,"abstract":"Published in Australasian Journal of Philosophy (Ahead of Print, 2024)","PeriodicalId":51459,"journal":{"name":"AUSTRALASIAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2024-02-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139750298","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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