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Mental Causation for Standard Dualists 标准二元论者的心理因果关系
IF 1 2区 哲学
AUSTRALASIAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2024-04-18 DOI: 10.1080/00048402.2024.2335325
Bram Vaassen
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引用次数: 0
Philosophy Moves 理念之举
IF 1 2区 哲学
AUSTRALASIAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2024-03-24 DOI: 10.1080/00048402.2024.2326432
David Kelley
{"title":"Philosophy Moves","authors":"David Kelley","doi":"10.1080/00048402.2024.2326432","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/00048402.2024.2326432","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper, I introduce the notion of ‘philosophy moves’: prominent tropes featured in contemporary academic philosophy. Moves are more than patterns—they are tools for advancing and enriching p...","PeriodicalId":51459,"journal":{"name":"AUSTRALASIAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":"33 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2024-03-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140317233","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Causation and the Time-Asymmetry of Knowledge 因果关系与知识的时间不对称性
IF 1 2区 哲学
AUSTRALASIAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2024-03-24 DOI: 10.1080/00048402.2024.2328629
Thomas Blanchard
{"title":"Causation and the Time-Asymmetry of Knowledge","authors":"Thomas Blanchard","doi":"10.1080/00048402.2024.2328629","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/00048402.2024.2328629","url":null,"abstract":"This paper argues that the knowledge asymmetry (the fact that we know more about the past than the future) can be explained as a consequence of the causal Markov condition. The causal Markov condit...","PeriodicalId":51459,"journal":{"name":"AUSTRALASIAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":"27 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2024-03-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140209730","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Worldly Indeterminacy and the Provisionality of Language 世俗的不确定性与语言的临时性
IF 1 2区 哲学
AUSTRALASIAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2024-03-21 DOI: 10.1080/00048402.2024.2326430
Chien-hsing Ho
{"title":"Worldly Indeterminacy and the Provisionality of Language","authors":"Chien-hsing Ho","doi":"10.1080/00048402.2024.2326430","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/00048402.2024.2326430","url":null,"abstract":"Theorists who advocate worldly (metaphysical or ontological) indeterminacy—the idea that the world itself is indeterminate in one or more respects—should address how we understand the signifying na...","PeriodicalId":51459,"journal":{"name":"AUSTRALASIAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":"57 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2024-03-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140192750","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Avowing the Avowal View 宣誓观
IF 1 2区 哲学
AUSTRALASIAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2024-03-07 DOI: 10.1080/00048402.2024.2319781
Elizabeth Schechter
{"title":"Avowing the Avowal View","authors":"Elizabeth Schechter","doi":"10.1080/00048402.2024.2319781","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/00048402.2024.2319781","url":null,"abstract":"This paper defends the avowal view of self-deception, according to which the self-deceived agent has been led by the evidence to believe that ¬p and yet is sincere in asserting that p. I argue that...","PeriodicalId":51459,"journal":{"name":"AUSTRALASIAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":"2014 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2024-03-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140064294","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Against the Pathology Argument for Self-Acquaintance 反对自我认识的病理学论证
IF 1 2区 哲学
AUSTRALASIAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2024-03-03 DOI: 10.1080/00048402.2024.2320841
Adam Bradley
{"title":"Against the Pathology Argument for Self-Acquaintance","authors":"Adam Bradley","doi":"10.1080/00048402.2024.2320841","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/00048402.2024.2320841","url":null,"abstract":"Are we acquainted with the self in experience? It may seem so. After all, we tend to be confident in our own existence. A natural explanation for this confidence is that the self somehow shows up i...","PeriodicalId":51459,"journal":{"name":"AUSTRALASIAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":"24 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2024-03-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140026683","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Serious Actualism and Nonexistence 严肃的现实主义与不存在
IF 1 2区 哲学
AUSTRALASIAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2024-03-03 DOI: 10.1080/00048402.2024.2310190
Christopher James Masterman
{"title":"Serious Actualism and Nonexistence","authors":"Christopher James Masterman","doi":"10.1080/00048402.2024.2310190","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/00048402.2024.2310190","url":null,"abstract":"Serious actualism is the view that it is metaphysically impossible for an entity to have a property, or stand in a relation, and not exist. Fine (1985) and Pollock (1985) influentially argue that t...","PeriodicalId":51459,"journal":{"name":"AUSTRALASIAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":"139 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2024-03-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140043541","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Moorean Paradox in Practice: How Knowledge of Action Can Be First-Personal 实践中的摩尔悖论：行动知识如何成为第一个人知识
IF 1 2区 哲学
AUSTRALASIAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2024-03-03 DOI: 10.1080/00048402.2024.2319778
Alec Hinshelwood
{"title":"Moorean Paradox in Practice: How Knowledge of Action Can Be First-Personal","authors":"Alec Hinshelwood","doi":"10.1080/00048402.2024.2319778","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/00048402.2024.2319778","url":null,"abstract":"We know our own intentional actions in a distinctively first-personal way. Many accounts of knowledge of intentionally doing something, A, assume that grounds for the knowledge would have to establ...","PeriodicalId":51459,"journal":{"name":"AUSTRALASIAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":"139 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2024-03-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140043555","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Can Moral Anti-Realists Theorize? 道德反现实主义者能理论化吗？
IF 1 2区 哲学
AUSTRALASIAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2024-02-21 DOI: 10.1080/00048402.2024.2312166
Michael Zhao
{"title":"Can Moral Anti-Realists Theorize?","authors":"Michael Zhao","doi":"10.1080/00048402.2024.2312166","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/00048402.2024.2312166","url":null,"abstract":"Call ‘radical moral theorizing’ the project of developing a moral theory that not only tries to conform to our existing moral judgments, but also manifests various theoretical virtues: consistency,...","PeriodicalId":51459,"journal":{"name":"AUSTRALASIAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":"63 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2024-02-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139917202","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
The Grounds of a Critique of Pure Reason 纯粹理性批判的基础
IF 1 2区 哲学
AUSTRALASIAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2024-02-20 DOI: 10.1080/00048402.2023.2248476
Joe Stratmann
{"title":"The Grounds of a Critique of Pure Reason","authors":"Joe Stratmann","doi":"10.1080/00048402.2023.2248476","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/00048402.2023.2248476","url":null,"abstract":"For the realist metaphysician, certain notions in metaphysics are objectively theory-guiding. But what makes them so? Echoing others, Dasgupta (2018) suggests that the realist metaphysician faces t...","PeriodicalId":51459,"journal":{"name":"AUSTRALASIAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":"24 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2024-02-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139909099","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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