University of Chicago Law Review最新文献

{"title":"The Concepts of Law","authors":"Thomas B. Ginsburg, N. Stephanopoulos","doi":"10.4324/9781315573298","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315573298","url":null,"abstract":"Concepts are the building blocks of legal doctrine. All legal rules and standards, in fact, are formed by combining concepts in different ways. But despite their centrality, legal concepts are not well understood. There is no agreement as to what makes a legal concept useful or ineffective—worth keeping or in need of revision. Social scientists, however, have developed a set of criteria for successful concepts. Of these, the most important is measurability: the ability, at least in principle, to assess a concept with data. In this Essay, we apply the social scientific criteria to a number of concepts and conceptual relationships in American constitutional law. We show that this field includes both poor and effective concepts and conceptual links. We also explain how the examples of poor concepts could be improved.","PeriodicalId":51436,"journal":{"name":"University of Chicago Law Review","volume":"15 1","pages":"147"},"PeriodicalIF":2.0,"publicationDate":"2017-05-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"88168010","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"The Unexpected Role of Tax Salience in State Competition for Businesses","authors":"H. Holderness","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2843567","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2843567","url":null,"abstract":"Competition among the states for mobile firms and the jobs and infrastructure they can bring is a well-known phenomenon. However, in recent years, a handful of states have added a mysterious new tool to their kit of incentives used in this competition. Unlike more traditional incentives, these new incentives — which this Article brands “customer-based incentives” — offer tax relief to a firm’s customers rather than directly to the firm. The puzzle underling customer-based incentives is that tax relief provided to the firm’s customers would seem more difficult for the firm to capture than relief provided directly to the firm — strange, as a state’s primary goal is to subsidize the firm’s investment in the state.After examining the emergence of this new form of incentive, this Article offers a novel explanation for their use and potential for success. Specifically, it argues that the effects of predictable consumer biases, particularly with respect to the salience of the tax relief provided by the incentives to consumers, cause customer-based incentives to differ substantively from traditional incentives in ways that are beneficial to both firms and states. Customer-based incentives thus present an example of how taxpayer behavior can influence the substantive effects of tax provisions, even causing two provisions with the same substantive goal to differ on the ground. Taking these behavioral effects into account provides opportunities to increase the effectiveness of tax provisions.","PeriodicalId":51436,"journal":{"name":"University of Chicago Law Review","volume":"53 1","pages":"1091"},"PeriodicalIF":2.0,"publicationDate":"2016-12-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"84212805","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Due Process, Fair Play, and Excessive Partisanship: A New Principle for Judicial Review of Election Laws","authors":"E. Foley","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2815892","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2815892","url":null,"abstract":"American democracy is plagued by excessive partisanship, and yet constitutional law thus far has been incapable of redressing this ill. Gerrymandering is one clear example: the partisan distortion of legislative districts has accelerated dramatically in the last several decades, yet the federal judiciary has been unable to develop a constitutional standard for curbing this egregiously anti-democratic behavior. Likewise, state legislatures around the country in the last decade have been enacting statutes to cut back voting opportunities, and federal courts have struggled with articulating appropriate standards for evaluating the constitutionality of these rollback laws. A main reason for this struggle has been the judicial unwillingness to tackle directly the transparently partisan motives underlying these legislative cutbacks in voting opportunities. This judicial difficulty with curtailing excessive partisanship stems from an attempt to rely on equal protection as the relevant constitutional standard for judicial review of election laws. Invocation of equal protection is understandable given the initial success of Warren Court precedents, like Reynolds v. Sims and Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections, in using equal protection to protect equal voting rights. But as the courts have subsequently discovered, equal protection is ill-suited to the problems of gerrymander or legislation that cuts back voting opportunities for all voters. This Article offers a previously undeveloped alternative to equal protection: due process. In a wide range of areas, including civil and criminal procedure, the Supreme Court has long recognized that due process encompasses a principle of fair play. This fair play principle, well understood to apply in society to athletic competition, is suitable in the domain of politics for constraining excessive partisanship in electoral competition. In fact, the history of the Fourteenth Amendment’s ratification reveals that this fair play principle played an essential role in constraining excessive partisanship that threatened to destabilize the Republic at the time the amendment’s ratification was under consideration in Congress. Once the significance of this history is recognized, the Fourteenth Amendment’s due process clause is properly construed as constraining partisan overreaching that currently threatens to undermine American democracy. In this way, the federal judiciary appropriately can invoke due process to directly redress excessive partisanship in the form of gerrymandering or rollbacks in voting opportunities.","PeriodicalId":51436,"journal":{"name":"University of Chicago Law Review","volume":"34 1","pages":"3"},"PeriodicalIF":2.0,"publicationDate":"2016-08-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"73908110","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Courts of Good and Ill Repute: Garoupa and Ginsburg's Judicial Reputation: A Comparative Theory","authors":"Tracey E. George, G. Gulati","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2783433","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2783433","url":null,"abstract":"Nuno Garoupa and Tom Ginsburg have published an ambitious book that seeks to account for the great diversity of judicial systems based, in part, on how courts are designed to marshal the power of a high public opinion of the judiciary. Judges, the book posits, care deeply about their reputations both inside and outside the courts. Courts are designed to capitalize on judges’ desire to maximize their reputation, and judges’ existing stock of reputation can affect the design of the courts which they serve. We find much to like in this book, ranging from its intriguing and ambitious positive claims to its masterful use of comparative case studies from around the globe. However, we also have questions about the ability of the theory to hang together in a unified manner and to do the work assigned to it.","PeriodicalId":51436,"journal":{"name":"University of Chicago Law Review","volume":"18 1","pages":"1683-1715"},"PeriodicalIF":2.0,"publicationDate":"2016-05-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"78910610","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"The Unbearable Rightness of Auer","authors":"C. Sunstein, Adrian Vermeule","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2716737","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2716737","url":null,"abstract":"For more than seventy years, courts have deferred to reasonable agency interpretations of ambiguous regulations. The Auer principle, as is it is now called, has attracted academic criticism and some skepticism within the Supreme Court. But the principle is entirely correct. In the absence of a clear congressional direction, courts should assume that because of their specialized competence, and their greater accountability, agencies are in the best position to decide on the meaning of ambiguous terms. The recent challenges to the Auer principle rest on fragile foundations, including an anachronistic understanding of the nature of interpretation, an overheated argument about the separation of powers, and an empirically unfounded and logically weak argument about agency incentives, which exemplifies what we call \"the sign fallacy.\"","PeriodicalId":51436,"journal":{"name":"University of Chicago Law Review","volume":"43 1","pages":"14"},"PeriodicalIF":2.0,"publicationDate":"2016-05-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"79403880","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Speedy Justice and Timeless Delays: The Validity of Open-Ended \"Ends-of-Justice\" Continuances under the Speedy Trial Act","authors":"Greg Ostfeld","doi":"10.2307/1600319","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2307/1600319","url":null,"abstract":"The federal district courts of the United States face a peculiar time crunch each time they confront a new criminal prosecution. Every year, federal judges must cope with tens of thousands of criminal cases which have become increasingly complex and time-consuming.' At the same time, the courts are procedurally constrained in terms of the amount of time they are permitted to devote to each new case. The Speedy Trial Act2 (\"STA\") mandates dismissal of any federal criminal case in which an indictment is not issued within thirty days of arrest or in which a trial does not begin within seventy days of indictment or arraignment. Designed by Congress to reduce recidivism and increase deterrence through the efficient administration of justice, the STA paradoxically threatens to thwart its own objectives whenever a complex and time-consuming prosecution comes before the courts. The drafters of the STA were cognizant of this danger and constructed the statute to accommodate it. Recognizing the practical need to reconcile the STA with the many unavoidable delays intrinsic to the criminal process, the drafters enumerated nine specific exclusions that toll the STA's time limits.3 Eight of the exclusions are specifically targeted to common sources of delay such as pretrial motions and joining of new codefendants. The ninth confers discretion upon judges to grant a continuance when necessary to serve the \"ends of justice.\"4 These exclusions, espe-","PeriodicalId":51436,"journal":{"name":"University of Chicago Law Review","volume":"5 1","pages":"9"},"PeriodicalIF":2.0,"publicationDate":"2016-02-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"86937688","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Reconsidering Substantive Canons","authors":"Anita S. Krishnakumar","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2724054","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2724054","url":null,"abstract":"This paper provides the first empirical study of the Roberts Court’s use of substantive canons in its statutory interpretation cases. Based on data from 295 statutory interpretation cases decided by the Roberts Court during its first six-and-a-half terms, the paper argues that much of the conventional wisdom about substantive canons of statutory construction is wrong, or at least overstated with respect to the modern Supreme Court. Substantive canons — such as the rule of lenity, the avoidance canon, or the presumption against extraterritorial application of domestic laws — have long been criticized as undemocratic judge-made rules that defeat congressional intent, afford willful judges a convenient vehicle for massaging different meanings out of the same text, and make statutory interpretation unpredictable, because judges invent new canons and reject old ones to suit their changing tastes. Scholars have bemoaned the amount of work that substantive canons perform in statutory interpretation cases and several have charged that textualist judges, in particular, overuse such canons.Whereas most previous studies have focused on the Rehnquist Court, this paper reconsiders the substantive canons in light of new data collected from the Roberts Court. The data show that contrary to the conventional wisdom, substantive canons are infrequently invoked on the modern Court — and that, even when invoked, they rarely play an outcome-determinative role in the Court’s statutory constructions. Indeed substantive canons often are referenced as an afterthought, or add-on argument supplying minimal additional support to an interpretation reached primarily through other interpretive tools. Perhaps most surprisingly, textualist Justices rarely invoke substantive canons in the opinions they author; indeed, intentionalist Justice Stevens leads the Roberts Court in references to such canons.The paper also challenges scholars’ gloomy warnings that Justices in the modern, New-Textualism-influenced era have replaced legislative history with substantive canons as the go-to resource for deciphering ambiguous statutory text. Rather, the data from the Roberts Court show that most of the Justices referenced legislative history at slightly, or even substantially, higher rates than they referenced substantive canons. Moreover, the Court’s own precedents, followed by practical-consequences-based reasoning — rather than substantive canons or legislative history — seem to be the unsung gap-filling mechanisms that the Justices turn to when confronted with unclear statutory text. The paper first reports the findings from my study of 295 Roberts Court cases and then explores the theoretical implications of these findings for several leading statutory interpretation theories and debates.","PeriodicalId":51436,"journal":{"name":"University of Chicago Law Review","volume":"45 1","pages":"825"},"PeriodicalIF":2.0,"publicationDate":"2016-01-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"88079789","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Territoriality, Technology, and National Security","authors":"Z. Clopton","doi":"10.31228/osf.io/gcfbe","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.31228/osf.io/gcfbe","url":null,"abstract":"Across various contexts, parties and courts have pressed for territorial rules in cases implicating technology and national security. This Essay suggests that presumptively territorial approaches to these questions are misguided. Territorial rules do not track the division of authority or capacity among the branches, nor are they effective proxies for the important interests of regulators or regulatees. On issues of technology and national security, territorial rules seem particularly ill suited: territorial rules aspire to certainty, but technology makes it harder to define “territoriality” in a consistent and predictable way; technology weakens territoriality as a proxy for policy goals because data often move in ways disconnected with the interests of users and lawmakers; and technology makes it easier for public or private actors to circumvent territorial rules (often without detection), thus interfering with the existing allocation of policymaking authority. This Essay explores these themes with respect to the Stored Communications Act, electronic surveillance law, and court-access doctrines in criminal and civil litigation. The conclusion is that territorial approaches in such cases may have been wrong when first adopted or may have succumbed to desuetude in the intervening years.","PeriodicalId":51436,"journal":{"name":"University of Chicago Law Review","volume":"1 1","pages":"3"},"PeriodicalIF":2.0,"publicationDate":"2015-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"73181053","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"A Fresh Look at Plausibility Pleading","authors":"William H. J. Hubbard","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2360723","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2360723","url":null,"abstract":"The plausibility pleading regime of Twombly and Iqbal has generated continuing controversy and concern over its effects on the ability of plaintiffs, particularly certain categories of civil rights plaintiffs, to bring cases in federal court. I assess the effects of plausibility pleading by undertaking a novel thought experiment: What would a plaintiff’s filing and pleading decisions look like in a world with no pleading standard at all? In other words, what if there were no motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim, and every filed case could reach discovery? I show that in this hypothetical world, with few exceptions plaintiffs file factually detailed, plausible complaints or do not file at all. In short, pleading standards rarely matter. Perhaps most surprisingly, this is true even for cases in which asymmetries of information favor the defendant. Plaintiffs’ attorneys, not judges, are the gatekeepers to court, and pleading practices are driven not by doctrine but by settlement strategy. This analysis generates empirical predictions, which find support in a wide range of qualitative (though hardly conclusive) evidence. Further, this thought experiment may turn the normative critique of Twombly and Iqbal on its head: plausibility pleading may advance, rather than undermine, the “liberal ethos” of the Federal Rules.","PeriodicalId":51436,"journal":{"name":"University of Chicago Law Review","volume":"57 1","pages":"693"},"PeriodicalIF":2.0,"publicationDate":"2015-03-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"87741466","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"The Law of Police","authors":"Richard Mcadams, Dhammika Dharmapala, Nuno Garoupa","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2561497","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2561497","url":null,"abstract":"Some Fourth Amendment doctrines distinguish between searches executed by police and others, being more demanding of the former. We explore these distinctions by offering a simple theory for how “police are different,” focusing on self-selection. Those most attracted to the job of policing include those who feel the most intrinsic satisfaction from facilitating the punishment of wrongdoers. Thus, we expect police to have more intensely punitive preferences, on average, than the public or other governmental actors. Some experimental evidence supports this prediction. In turn, stronger punishment preferences logically lower one’s threshold of doubt — the perceived probability of guilt at which one would search or seize a suspect. That police have a lower threshold of doubt plausibly justifies more judicial scrutiny of police searches than of nonpolice searches (as well as more-permissive rules when police perform tasks outside the scope of law enforcement). We also consider and critique Bill Stuntz’s alternative explanation of the relevant doctrine.","PeriodicalId":51436,"journal":{"name":"University of Chicago Law Review","volume":"46 1","pages":"135-158"},"PeriodicalIF":2.0,"publicationDate":"2015-02-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"81255626","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}