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Journal of Financial Intermediation最新文献

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Stiffing the creditor: Asset verifiability and bankruptcy 强化债权人：资产可验证性与破产
IF 5.2 1区 经济学
Journal of Financial Intermediation Pub Date : 2022-10-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.jfi.2022.100962
Erasmo Giambona , Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes , Rafael Matta
{"title":"Stiffing the creditor: Asset verifiability and bankruptcy","authors":"Erasmo Giambona ,&nbsp;Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes ,&nbsp;Rafael Matta","doi":"10.1016/j.jfi.2022.100962","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jfi.2022.100962","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Evidence suggests that asset pledgeability, debt complexity, and control rights of dispersed debt influence financial distress resolution. We model how courts’ imperfect verifiability<span> of assets and valuable control of misaligned creditors shape firms’ debt structure and create coordination problems that determine distress outcomes and financing. A key result is that an increase in verifiability allows financially constrained firms to fund projects by pledging more assets to misaligned creditors, making contract renegotiation in distress times more difficult and increasing the probability of bankruptcy. Since equity receives less in the event of distress, constrained firms choose riskier projects with higher returns. Consistent with our model, bankruptcy filings increase after the U.S. Supreme Court decision imposing a “market test” to assess the value of stockholders’ interest in debtor proposals. The effect is stronger for firms with low asset verifiability. These firms also experienced an increase in recovery rates, debt capacity, and risk-taking. Our findings suggest that reforms improving the verifiability of assets substantially impact credit access. However, our results also point out that improving asset verifiability may be insufficient for constrained firms with aligned creditors. Therefore, complementary reforms that facilitate firms’ access to creditors from different market segments may be necessary.</span></p></div>","PeriodicalId":51421,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Financial Intermediation","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":5.2,"publicationDate":"2022-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49455481","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Private deposit insurance, deposit flows, bank lending, and moral hazard 私人存款保险、存款流动、银行贷款和道德风险
IF 5.2 1区 经济学
Journal of Financial Intermediation Pub Date : 2022-10-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.jfi.2022.100967
Piotr Danisewicz , Chun Hei Lee , Klaus Schaeck
{"title":"Private deposit insurance, deposit flows, bank lending, and moral hazard","authors":"Piotr Danisewicz ,&nbsp;Chun Hei Lee ,&nbsp;Klaus Schaeck","doi":"10.1016/j.jfi.2022.100967","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jfi.2022.100967","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>We examine the role of private unlimited deposit insurance as a complement to federal deposit insurance for deposit flows, bank lending, and moral hazard during a crisis. We find that banks whose deposits are federally and privately fully insured obtain more deposits and expand lending, in contrast to banks whose deposits are only federally insured. We also document that privately insured banks remain prudent in the loan origination process during the subprime crisis. Our results offer novel insights into depositor and bank behavior in the presence of multiple deposit insurance schemes with differential design features. They also illustrate how private sector solutions incentivize prudent bank behavior to strengthen the financial safety net.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":51421,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Financial Intermediation","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":5.2,"publicationDate":"2022-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47370576","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 2
The dark side of liquidity regulation: Bank opacity and funding liquidity risk 流动性监管的黑暗面：银行不透明和融资流动性风险
IF 5.2 1区 经济学
Journal of Financial Intermediation Pub Date : 2022-10-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.jfi.2022.100990
Arisyi F. Raz, Danny McGowan, Tianshu Zhao
{"title":"The dark side of liquidity regulation: Bank opacity and funding liquidity risk","authors":"Arisyi F. Raz,&nbsp;Danny McGowan,&nbsp;Tianshu Zhao","doi":"10.1016/j.jfi.2022.100990","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jfi.2022.100990","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>We evaluate how the liquidity coverage rule affects US banks’ opacity and funding liquidity risk. Banks subject to the rule become significantly more opaque and funding liquidity risk increases by $245 million per quarter. Higher funding liquidity risk is more pronounced among banks that are subject to the rule’s more stringent liquidity buffers, and systemically riskier banks. Rising opacity reflects an increase in banks’ holdings of complex assets whose value is difficult to communicate to investors. The evidence highlights the unintended consequences of liquidity regulation and is consistent with theoretical models’ predictions of a trade-off between liquidity buffers and bank opacity that exacerbates funding liquidity risk.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":51421,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Financial Intermediation","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":5.2,"publicationDate":"2022-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1042957322000432/pdfft?md5=6a917d71a28439412ddba4003a5b5b8c&pid=1-s2.0-S1042957322000432-main.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47894222","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 8
Bank CEO careers after bailouts: The effects of management turnover on bank risk 救助后银行首席执行官的职业生涯：管理层更替对银行风险的影响
IF 5.2 1区 经济学
Journal of Financial Intermediation Pub Date : 2022-10-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.jfi.2022.100995
Pramuan Bunkanwanicha , Alberta Di Giuli , Federica Salvade
{"title":"Bank CEO careers after bailouts: The effects of management turnover on bank risk","authors":"Pramuan Bunkanwanicha ,&nbsp;Alberta Di Giuli ,&nbsp;Federica Salvade","doi":"10.1016/j.jfi.2022.100995","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jfi.2022.100995","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>We study whether bank bailouts affect CEO turnover and its subsequent impact on bank risk. Exploiting the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) of 2008, we find that TARP funds temporarily decreased the likelihood of bank CEO turnover during the crisis (2008–2010) but significantly increased CEO changes afterwards. Our results show that replacing TARP CEOs reduced individual bank's risk as well as the bank's contributions to the systemic risk. Finally, we find that TARP CEO turnover was mainly driven by a decrease in the bank's political capital. Overall we provide evidence that bank bailouts have important implications for banks’ risk-taking and systemic risk, insofar as bailouts affect bank CEO turnover.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":51421,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Financial Intermediation","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":5.2,"publicationDate":"2022-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49244020","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
What do we learn from ratings about corporate social responsibility? New evidence of uninformative ratings 我们从企业社会责任评级中学到了什么?缺乏信息的评级的新证据
IF 5.2 1区 经济学
Journal of Financial Intermediation Pub Date : 2022-10-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.jfi.2022.100994
Ruoke Yang
{"title":"What do we learn from ratings about corporate social responsibility? New evidence of uninformative ratings","authors":"Ruoke Yang","doi":"10.1016/j.jfi.2022.100994","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jfi.2022.100994","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>The rise of investments professionally managed with a socially responsible mandate has generated growing interest in environmental and social ratings. However, it is not clear how informative these ratings are or whether they are distorted by greenwashing. Based on the ratings of the leading provider, I offer the first evidence linking greenwashing to ratings inflation. Better ratings do not predict less future corporate bad behavior. This is of concern because it undermines the signaling value of these ratings. To understand these results, I develop a model where the rating agency may underinvest in greenwashing detection while firms have incentives to window dress and engage in greenwashing. Finally, controlling for greenwashing improves ratings predictive quality.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":51421,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Financial Intermediation","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":5.2,"publicationDate":"2022-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"55000864","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 7
Asset scarcity and collateral rehypothecation 资产稀缺和抵押品再抵押
IF 5.2 1区 经济学
Journal of Financial Intermediation Pub Date : 2022-10-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.jfi.2022.100992
Vincent Maurin
{"title":"Asset scarcity and collateral rehypothecation","authors":"Vincent Maurin","doi":"10.1016/j.jfi.2022.100992","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jfi.2022.100992","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>This paper introduces collateral rehypothecation, a widespread practice in derivatives, swaps, and repo markets, in a general equilibrium model with default. Rehypothecation frees up collateral because it allows lenders to resell or repledge assets pledged by borrowers. The risk that lenders will not return the asset, however, limits gains from rehypothecation. Still, when markets are contractually incomplete or decentralized, rehypothecation can achieve a superior use of scarce collateral. These results have implications for the repo market and suggest that limits to rehypothecation can cause price fragmentation.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":51421,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Financial Intermediation","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":5.2,"publicationDate":"2022-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1042957322000456/pdfft?md5=222412f4148404fb9738805b50f8011f&pid=1-s2.0-S1042957322000456-main.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44843110","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 2
The countercyclical capital buffer and the composition of bank lending 逆周期资本缓冲与银行贷款构成
IF 5.2 1区 经济学
Journal of Financial Intermediation Pub Date : 2022-10-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.jfi.2022.100965
Raphael Auer , Alexandra Matyunina , Steven Ongena
{"title":"The countercyclical capital buffer and the composition of bank lending","authors":"Raphael Auer ,&nbsp;Alexandra Matyunina ,&nbsp;Steven Ongena","doi":"10.1016/j.jfi.2022.100965","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfi.2022.100965","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Do targeted macroprudential measures impact non-targeted sectors too? We investigate the compositional changes in the supply of credit by Swiss banks, exploiting their differential exposure to the activation in 2013 of the countercyclical capital buffer (CCyB) which targeted banks’ exposure to residential mortgages. We find that the additional capital requirements resulting from the activation of the CCyB are associated with higher growth in banks’ commercial lending. While banks are lending more to all types of businesses, the new macroprudential policy benefits smaller and riskier businesses the most. However, the interest rates and other costs of obtaining credit for these firms rise as well.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":51421,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Financial Intermediation","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":5.2,"publicationDate":"2022-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1042957322000183/pdfft?md5=bc55ade64389ef9918d8c50befe4cf64&pid=1-s2.0-S1042957322000183-main.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"71788335","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Implicit benefits and financing 隐性利益与融资
IF 5.2 1区 经济学
Journal of Financial Intermediation Pub Date : 2022-10-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.jfi.2022.101000
Franklin Allen , Meijun Qian , Jing Xie
{"title":"Implicit benefits and financing","authors":"Franklin Allen ,&nbsp;Meijun Qian ,&nbsp;Jing Xie","doi":"10.1016/j.jfi.2022.101000","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfi.2022.101000","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Social relationship and business connections create implicit benefits between borrowers and lenders. We model how implicit benefits and repayment enforcement costs influence credit allocation, cost, and renegotiation. The optimal solution illustrates that financing with implicit benefits may achieve lower financing costs, higher managerial effort, and better outcomes for both borrowers and lenders. This result is consistent with the continuing expansion of alternative financing despite formal financial intermediation, the rise of corporate insider debt, and joint ownership of debt and equity. The growing size and complexity of projects and changes in community relationships can explain expansion of financing with standard intermediation.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":51421,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Financial Intermediation","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":5.2,"publicationDate":"2022-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1042957322000535/pdfft?md5=9536f01e103ceb4784a29d717ed15d97&pid=1-s2.0-S1042957322000535-main.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"71788339","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Ethics, capital and talent competition in banking 银行业的道德、资本与人才竞争
IF 5.2 1区 经济学
Journal of Financial Intermediation Pub Date : 2022-10-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.jfi.2022.100963
Fenghua Song , Anjan Thakor
{"title":"Ethics, capital and talent competition in banking","authors":"Fenghua Song ,&nbsp;Anjan Thakor","doi":"10.1016/j.jfi.2022.100963","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jfi.2022.100963","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>We model optimal ethical standards, capital requirements and talent allocation in banking. Banks with varying safety-net protections, including depositories and shadow banks, innovate products and compete for talent. Managers dislike unethical behavior, but banks heed it only because detection imposes costs. We find: (i) higher capital induces higher ethical standards, but socially optimal capital requirements may tolerate some unethical behavior; (ii) managerial ethics <em>fails</em> to raise banks’ ethical standards; (iii) banks with lower ethical standards attract better talent and innovate more; and (iv) it is socially optimal to allocate better talent to shadow banks instead of depositories, and this allocation results in higher capital requirements and ethical standards for depositories. Consequently, with capital capacity constraints, the shadow banking sector is larger than the depository sector; talent competition induces a race to the bottom in ethical standards, and the regulator responds by setting capital requirements to <em>magnify</em> this size difference.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":51421,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Financial Intermediation","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":5.2,"publicationDate":"2022-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49582595","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 2
Political influence and banks: Evidence from mortgage lending 政治影响与银行：来自抵押贷款的证据
IF 5.2 1区 经济学
Journal of Financial Intermediation Pub Date : 2022-10-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.jfi.2022.100982
Yongqiang Chu , Tim Zhang
{"title":"Political influence and banks: Evidence from mortgage lending","authors":"Yongqiang Chu ,&nbsp;Tim Zhang","doi":"10.1016/j.jfi.2022.100982","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jfi.2022.100982","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>We show that banks expand mortgage lending in the home states of Senate Banking Committee chairs, and the effect is more pronounced in counties where the incumbent senator faces a competitive re-election race. Banks strategically target politically active borrowers. Consequently, banks’ profitability increases after favoring the incumbent politicians’ constituents, but they suffer a deterioration in mortgage asset quality in the long run. Our findings imply that political power could distort private capital allocation beyond conventional political contribution channels.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":51421,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Financial Intermediation","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":5.2,"publicationDate":"2022-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43093070","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 4
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