Columbia Law Review最新文献_第8页

The Meaning of Professional Independence 职业独立的意义

IF 2.9 2区社会学

Columbia Law Review Pub Date : 2003-06-01 DOI: 10.2307/1123837

E. Davis

引用次数: 4

Transforming Islamic Family Law: State Responsibility and the Role of Internal Initiative 伊斯兰家庭法的转型:国家责任与内部主动性的作用

IF 2.9 2区社会学

Columbia Law Review Pub Date : 2003-06-01 DOI: 10.2307/1123833

Andra Nahal Behrouz

引用次数: 14

Engaging Facts and Policy: A Multi-Institutional Approach to Patent System Reform 参与事实和政策:专利制度改革的多机构方法

IF 2.9 2区社会学

Columbia Law Review Pub Date : 2003-06-01 DOI: 10.2307/1123832

A. Rai

引用次数: 45

No-Citation Rules as a Prior Restraint on Attorney Speech 不引用规则对律师言论的先行约束

IF 2.9 2区社会学

Columbia Law Review Pub Date : 2003-06-01 DOI: 10.2307/1123835

Marla Brooke Tusk

引用次数: 3

Square Pegs and round Holes: Substantive Due Process, Procedural Due Process, and the Bill of Rights 方钉与圆孔:实质正当程序、程序正当程序与权利法案

IF 2.9 2区社会学

Columbia Law Review Pub Date : 2003-05-01 DOI: 10.2307/1123779

Peter J. Rubin

引用次数: 13

Prosecutors and Their Agents - Agents and Their Prosecutors 检察官和他们的代理人-代理人和他们的检察官

IF 2.9 2区社会学

Columbia Law Review Pub Date : 2003-05-01 DOI: 10.2139/SSRN.316144

D. Richman

引用次数: 42

The Business Judgment Rule: Should It Protect Nonprofit Directors? 商业判断规则:是否应该保护非营利组织董事?

IF 2.9 2区社会学

Columbia Law Review Pub Date : 2003-05-01 DOI: 10.2307/1123781

Denise Lee

引用次数: 6

The Sentences That Bind (The States) 约束语句(各州)

IF 2.9 2区社会学

Columbia Law Review Pub Date : 2003-05-01 DOI: 10.2307/1123782

James J. Sample

引用次数: 0

The Attorney as Gatekeeper: An Agenda for the Sec 作为看门人的律师:Sec的议程

IF 2.9 2区社会学

Columbia Law Review Pub Date : 2003-04-01 DOI: 10.2139/SSRN.395181

J. Coffee, J. Coffee

{"title":"The Attorney as Gatekeeper: An Agenda for the Sec","authors":"J. Coffee, J. Coffee","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.395181","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.395181","url":null,"abstract":"Section 307 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act authorizes the SEC to prescribe \"minimum standards of professional conduct\" for attorneys \"appearing or practicing\" before it. This brief statutory provision frames a much larger question: What is the role of the corporate attorney in securities transactions in the public markets? Is the attorney's role that of (a) an advocate, (b) a transaction cost engineer, or, more broadly, (c) a gatekeeper - that is, a reputational intermediary with some responsibility to monitor the accuracy of corporate disclosures? The bar has long divided over this question, with the bar associations resisting any such obligation. Yet, Section 307 now \"federalizes\" this issue. Skeptics of a gatekeeper role for attorneys have long argued that (a) such a role conflicts with the traditional obligations of loyalty that the attorney owe their clients; and (b) imposing gatekeeping obligations on attorneys will chill attorney/client communications and thereby reduce law compliance. Thus, they have resisted a pending SEC proposal that would require an attorney to make a \"noisy withdrawal\" when the attorney is unable to stop or prevent certain ongoing material violations of law by the corporate client. This comment examines these arguments that attorneys make inferior gatekeepers and replies that (i) securities attorneys can and do perform a \"gatekeeping\" function; (ii) the differences between attorneys and auditors are less fundamental than bar associations maintain; (iii) in some respects, it is easier to impose gatekeeper obligations on attorneys than on auditors; and (iv) imposing such obligations on attorney should neither chill socially desirable client communications nor reduce the attorney's influence over the client (and probably will increase that leverage). Finally, this comments examines specific standards and obligations that the SEC might adopt to recognize the securities attorney's role as a gatekeeper. Going beyond the narrow \"noisy withdrawal\" issue, it proposes both limited certification and independence standards.","PeriodicalId":51408,"journal":{"name":"Columbia Law Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.9,"publicationDate":"2003-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"68670503","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 60

Does Federalism Constrain the Treaty Power 联邦制是否限制了条约权力

IF 2.9 2区社会学

Columbia Law Review Pub Date : 2003-04-01 DOI: 10.2307/1123717

E. Swaine

{"title":"Does Federalism Constrain the Treaty Power","authors":"E. Swaine","doi":"10.2307/1123717","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2307/1123717","url":null,"abstract":"The Supreme Court's revival of federalism casts doubt on the previously unimpeachable power of the national government to bind its states by treaty, suggesting potential subject-matter, anti-commandeering, and sovereign immunity limits that could impair U.S. obligations under vital trade and human rights treaties. Existing scholarship treats these principles separately and considers them in originalist or other terms, without definitive result. This Article takes a different approach. By assessing all of the doctrines with equal care, but not at daunting length, it permits insight into the common issues involved in determining whether they should be extended to the treaty power. It also demonstrates that international law and constitutional law are not estranged on these questions. Not only does international law require federal states to interpret their constitutions so as to permit adhering to treaties, but the new federalism doctrines show a sensitivity toward preserving adequate means to pursue national and international ends like the treaty power, especially where those means turn on state consent. Finally, the Article develops a treaty-compact device as an innovative tool for dissolving federalism's constraints. Taking advantage of parallel doctrinal developments that liberate state and national authority relating to foreign and interstate compacts, it demonstrates that combining the use of compacts with treaties offers solutions on each of the new federalism's fronts. The answer, then, is that federalism does not constrain the treaty power, when the Constitution is read as an organic whole, and interpreted in a fashion in keeping both with international law and the new federalism itself.","PeriodicalId":51408,"journal":{"name":"Columbia Law Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.9,"publicationDate":"2003-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.2307/1123717","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"68284316","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 18