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No reliance on guidance: counter‐signaling in management forecasts 不依赖指导:管理预测中的反信号
IF 2.3 3区 经济学
Rand Journal of Economics Pub Date : 2021-03-01 DOI: 10.1111/1756-2171.12367
Cyrus Aghamolla, Carlos Corona, Rong Zheng
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引用次数: 4
Free ad(vice): internet influencers and disclosure regulation 免费广告(副):网络影响者和信息披露监管
IF 2.3 3区 经济学
Rand Journal of Economics Pub Date : 2021-02-25 DOI: 10.1111/1756-2171.12359
M. Mitchell
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引用次数: 21
Simulating mergers in a vertical supply chain with bargaining 用议价模拟垂直供应链中的合并
IF 2.3 3区 经济学
Rand Journal of Economics Pub Date : 2021-01-01 DOI: 10.1111/1756-2171.12385
Gloria Sheu, Charles S. Taragin
{"title":"Simulating mergers in a vertical supply chain with bargaining","authors":"Gloria Sheu, Charles S. Taragin","doi":"10.1111/1756-2171.12385","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/1756-2171.12385","url":null,"abstract":"We model a two-level supply chain where Nash bargaining occurs upstream, while firms compete in a differentiated products logit setting downstream. The parameters of this model can be calibrated with a discrete set of data on prices, margins, and market shares. Using a series of numerical experiments, we illustrate how the model can simulate the outcome of both horizontal and vertical mergers. In addition, we extend the framework to allow for downstream competition via a second score auction.","PeriodicalId":51342,"journal":{"name":"Rand Journal of Economics","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2021-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1111/1756-2171.12385","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"63249175","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 21
Correction to “Attribute substitution in household vehicle portfolios” 更正“家用车辆投资组合的属性替代”
IF 2.3 3区 经济学
Rand Journal of Economics Pub Date : 2021-01-01 DOI: 10.1111/1756-2171.12358
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引用次数: 0
Issue Information 问题信息
IF 2.3 3区 经济学
Rand Journal of Economics Pub Date : 2020-12-01 DOI: 10.1111/1756-2171.12285
{"title":"Issue Information","authors":"","doi":"10.1111/1756-2171.12285","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/1756-2171.12285","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":51342,"journal":{"name":"Rand Journal of Economics","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2020-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1111/1756-2171.12285","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43049917","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Screening soft information: evidence from loan officers 筛选软信息:来自信贷员的证据
IF 2.3 3区 经济学
Rand Journal of Economics Pub Date : 2020-12-01 DOI: 10.1111/1756-2171.12357
James Wang
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引用次数: 0
Information acquisition and voting with heterogeneous experts 异质专家的信息获取和投票
IF 2.3 3区 经济学
Rand Journal of Economics Pub Date : 2020-11-29 DOI: 10.1111/1756-2171.12350
Xu Tan, Quan Wen
{"title":"Information acquisition and voting with heterogeneous experts","authors":"Xu Tan, Quan Wen","doi":"10.1111/1756-2171.12350","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/1756-2171.12350","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":51342,"journal":{"name":"Rand Journal of Economics","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2020-11-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1111/1756-2171.12350","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41547530","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 2
Best practices for differentiated products demand estimation with PyBLP 使用PyBLP进行差异化产品需求评估的最佳实践
IF 2.3 3区 经济学
Rand Journal of Economics Pub Date : 2020-11-26 DOI: 10.1111/1756-2171.12352
Christopher T. Conlon, J. Gortmaker
{"title":"Best practices for differentiated products demand estimation with PyBLP","authors":"Christopher T. Conlon, J. Gortmaker","doi":"10.1111/1756-2171.12352","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/1756-2171.12352","url":null,"abstract":"Differentiated products demand systems are a workhorse for understanding the price effects of mergers, the value of new goods, and the contribution of products to seller networks. Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes (1995) provide a flexible random coefficients logit model which accounts for the endogeneity of prices. This article reviews and combines several recent advances related to the estimation of BLP-type problems and implements an extensible generic interface via the PyBLP package. Monte Carlo experiments and replications suggest different conclusions than the prior literature: multiple local optima appear to be rare in well-identified problems; good performance is possible even in small samples, particularly when “optimal instruments” are employed along with supply-side restrictions. If Python is installed on your computer, PyBLP can be installed with the following command: pip install pyblp Up-to-date documentation for the package is available at https://pyblp.readthedocs.io. ∗Thanks to Steve Berry, Jeremy Fox, Phil Haile, Mathias Reynaert, and Frank Verboven and seminar participants at NYU, Rochester, and the 2019 IIOC conference. Thanks to the editor Marc Rysman and to three anonymous referees. Daniel Stackman provided excellent research assistance. Any remaining errors are our own. †New York University, Stern School of Business: cconlon@stern.nyu.edu ‡Harvard University: jgortmaker@g.harvard.edu","PeriodicalId":51342,"journal":{"name":"Rand Journal of Economics","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2020-11-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1111/1756-2171.12352","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45629612","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 82
Trade associations and collusion among many agents: evidence from physicians 行业协会与众多代理人之间的勾结：来自医生的证据
IF 2.3 3区 经济学
Rand Journal of Economics Pub Date : 2020-11-20 DOI: 10.1111/1756-2171.12354
Jorge Alé-Chilet, J. Atal
{"title":"Trade associations and collusion among many agents: evidence from physicians","authors":"Jorge Alé-Chilet, J. Atal","doi":"10.1111/1756-2171.12354","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/1756-2171.12354","url":null,"abstract":"We study a recent case where most gynecologists in one city formed a trade association to bargain for better rates with insurance companies. After unsuccessful negotiations, the physicians jointly terminated their insurer contracts and set a minimum price. We find that subsequent realized prices coincided with Nash-Bertrand prices, and that the minimum price was barely binding. We show that these actions ensured the association’s stability and increased profits. Our findings shed light on the role of trade association in collusion among a large number of heterogeneous agents, and provide insights for the antitrust analysis of trade associations.","PeriodicalId":51342,"journal":{"name":"Rand Journal of Economics","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2020-11-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1111/1756-2171.12354","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41715317","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 9
Insurance law and incomplete contracts 保险法与不完全合同
IF 2.3 3区 经济学
Rand Journal of Economics Pub Date : 2020-11-19 DOI: 10.1111/1756-2171.12356
Jean-Marc Bourgeon, P. Picard
{"title":"Insurance law and incomplete contracts","authors":"Jean-Marc Bourgeon, P. Picard","doi":"10.1111/1756-2171.12356","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/1756-2171.12356","url":null,"abstract":"Under moral hazard, most insurance contracts are incomplete, to the extent that they condition the coverage neither on the contingencies under which policyholders choose their behavior, nor on the circumstances of the loss. This incompleteness can be explained by underwriting and auditing costs borne by insurers, by policyholders cognitive costs, and by the limits of market regulation. It opens the door to controversies and disputes between insured and insurer. In this context, we analyze how insurance law can mitigate moral hazard, by allowing insurers to cut indemnities in some circumstances, while preventing them from excessive nitpicking. We also highlight conditions under which the burden of proof should be on the policyholders, provided that insurers are threatened by bad faith penalties.","PeriodicalId":51342,"journal":{"name":"Rand Journal of Economics","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2020-11-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1111/1756-2171.12356","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47035605","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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