Rand Journal of Economics最新文献_第4页

Learning and investment under demand uncertainty in container shipping 集装箱运输需求不确定性下的学习与投资

IF 2.3 3区经济学

Rand Journal of Economics Pub Date : 2022-01-29 DOI: 10.1111/1756-2171.12406

Jihye Jeon

引用次数: 15

Matching auctions 匹配拍卖

IF 2.3 3区经济学

Rand Journal of Economics Pub Date : 2022-01-21 DOI: 10.1111/1756-2171.12399

Daniel Fershtman, A. Pavan

{"title":"Matching auctions","authors":"Daniel Fershtman, A. Pavan","doi":"10.1111/1756-2171.12399","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/1756-2171.12399","url":null,"abstract":"This paper is about (platform) mediated matching in markets in which valuations evolve over time. We introduce and then study a class of dynamic matching auctions where, in each period, agents from two sides of a market submit multiple bids, one for each possible partner. Each match receives a “score” that is a weighted average of the involved agents’ reciprocal bids, net of the platform’s match-specific costs. The weights are determined by the agents’ membership statuses and vary with the platform’s objectives. In each period, the matches that maximize the sum of the bilateral scores subject to individual and aggregate capacity constraints are implemented. We show that, under appropriate conditions, this class includes both welfareand profit-maximizing mechanisms. When match values are positive and none of the capacity constraints binds, profit maximization results in fewer interactions than welfare maximization, in each period. This conclusion need not extend to markets in which individual and/or aggregate capacity constraints bind and/or agents dislike certain interactions. Finally, we discuss how similar auctions but with forward-looking “index scores” can be used in markets where match values depend on past interactions, for example due to experimentation, a preference for variety, or habit formation. JEL Classification Numbers: D82, C73, L1.","PeriodicalId":51342,"journal":{"name":"Rand Journal of Economics","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2022-01-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49588046","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 13

Measuring long‐run gasoline price elasticities in urban travel demand 衡量城市出行需求中的长期汽油价格弹性

IF 2.3 3区经济学

Rand Journal of Economics Pub Date : 2021-12-13 DOI: 10.1111/1756-2171.12397

J. Donna

引用次数: 2

Market‐expanding or Market‐stealing? Competition with network effects in bike‐sharing 市场扩张还是市场窃取?共享单车与网络效应的竞争

IF 2.3 3区经济学

Rand Journal of Economics Pub Date : 2021-12-05 DOI: 10.1111/1756-2171.12391

Guangyu Cao, G. Jin, Xi Weng, Li-an Zhou

{"title":"Market‐expanding or Market‐stealing? Competition with network effects in bike‐sharing","authors":"Guangyu Cao, G. Jin, Xi Weng, Li-an Zhou","doi":"10.1111/1756-2171.12391","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/1756-2171.12391","url":null,"abstract":"The recent rise of dockless bike-sharing is dominated by two firms in China: one started first in 82 cities, 59 of which were subsequently entered by the second firm. Using these variations, we study how the entrant affects the incumbent's market performance. To our surprise, the entry expands the market for the incumbent. Not only does the entry boost its total number of trips and encourage more bike investment, it but also allows the incumbent to achieve higher revenue per trip, improve bike utilization rate, and form a wider and more evenly distributed network. The market expansion effect on new users dominates a significant market-stealing effect on the incumbent's old users. These findings, together with a theoretical model that highlights consumer search and network effects, suggest that a market with positive network effects is not necessarily winner-takes-all, especially when users multi-home across compatible networks. Guangyu Cao Guanghua School of Management Guanghua-ofo Center for Sharing Economy Resarch Peking University Beijing 100871 China cgy1117@pku.edu.cn Ginger Zhe Jin University of Maryland Department of Economics 3115F Tydings Hall College Park, MD 20742-7211 and NBER jin@econ.umd.edu Xi Weng Room 304, Guanghua New Bldg Peking University Beijing, China wengxi125@gsm.pku.edu.cn Li-An Zhou Guanghua School of Management Peking University Beijing 100871 CHINA zhoula@gsm.pku.edu.cn","PeriodicalId":51342,"journal":{"name":"Rand Journal of Economics","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2021-12-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45581257","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 17

Private contracts in two‐sided platforms 双边平台上的私人合同

IF 2.3 3区经济学

Rand Journal of Economics Pub Date : 2021-12-03 DOI: 10.1111/1756-2171.12392

Gastón Llanes, Francisco Ruiz-Aliseda

引用次数: 3

Issue Information 问题信息

IF 2.3 3区经济学

Rand Journal of Economics Pub Date : 2021-12-01 DOI: 10.1111/1756-2171.12334

引用次数: 0

Divide and conquer in two‐sided markets: A potential‐game approach 双方市场的分而治之：一种潜在的博弈方法

IF 2.3 3区经济学