{"title":"What is philosophy of education? Overlaps and contrasts between different conceptions","authors":"John White","doi":"10.1093/jopedu/qhae019","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/jopedu/qhae019","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Various conceptions of philosophy of education have been mooted over the last sixty years. The paper looks at five of these, associated particularly with R. S. Peters, D. W. Hamlyn, David Bakhurst, Philip Kitcher and Harvey Siegel. It shows differences and sometimes overlaps among these, to do with whether or not philosophy of education should be seen as a branch of philosophy, as central to philosophy as a whole, or as a form of applied philosophy. The paper puts most weight on the last of these while recognizing the importance of work on the enculturation of young human beings as exemplified in Hamlyn’s and Bakhurst’s writings.","PeriodicalId":506406,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Philosophy of Education","volume":"43 12","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-02-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140440767","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Challenge of Boredom in Education","authors":"Campbell F Scribner","doi":"10.1093/jopedu/qhae018","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/jopedu/qhae018","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 This essay explores the relationship between boredom, leisure, selfhood, and education in Kevin Hood Gary’s book, Why Boredom Matters, paying particular attention to connections between Aristotelian and existentialist approaches to the subject.","PeriodicalId":506406,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Philosophy of Education","volume":"17 14","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-02-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140442607","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Langer and the Claim for the Social Value of Art","authors":"Dorit Barchana-Lorand","doi":"10.1093/jopedu/qhae015","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/jopedu/qhae015","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Susanne Langer sees the ‘the public importance of art’ as one of ‘the ultimate questions in a philosophy of art’. Indeed, Langer is often referred to as an authority on the justification of art education and is cited as providing good reasons for incorporating the arts in the curriculum. It is therefore surprising to note, as Elliot Eisner does, that Langer’s theory has had little influence on actual art education. For while many theoreticians in the social sciences and education have found Langer’s contribution to the understanding of the arts highly significant, Eisner laments that ‘alas, the lesson Susanne Langer was trying to teach … in her remarkable book, never took hold in … American public schools’. It seems that policy makers outside of art education circles remain sceptical regarding the need for art education. The substantiation of art education requires firm ground against scepticism. It is therefore important to understand the ways in which Langer’s project fails to fulfil its promise. In examining Langer’s aesthetic theory, I will show that despite its philosophical acuity, Langer’s argument fails to persuade the art education sceptic who believes that art occupies a minor role in education and should therefore remain marginal in the school curriculum.","PeriodicalId":506406,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Philosophy of Education","volume":"119 24","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-02-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139963477","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Philosophical presuppositions in “Computational thinking” – old wine in new bottles?","authors":"Nina Bonderup Dohn","doi":"10.1093/jopedu/qhae016","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/jopedu/qhae016","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 ‘Computational thinking’ is highlighted in research literature, societal debates and educational policies alike as of prime significance in the 21st century. It is currently being introduced into K–12 curricula around the world. However, there is no consensus on what exactly ‘computational thinking’ consists of, which skills it involves, and how it relates to programming. This article pinpoints four competing claims as to what constitutes the defining traits of computational thinking. For each of the four claims, inherent philosophical presuppositions are identified concerning the nature of thinking, problem-solving, and human-computer relationships. It is argued that most of these philosophical presuppositions are very similar to ones that Hubert Dreyfus and Donald Schön addressed 40–50 years ago. Therefore, claims about the power of computational thinking raise old discussions in a new disguise. Dreyfus and Schön argued that the presuppositions were wrong. Do their arguments hold and thus defeat contemporary claims about computational thinking? Alternatively, has the technological development since the time of their writings proven them wrong? The article argues that it is necessary to heed the arguments of Dreyfus, Schön and—later—Bent Flyvbjerg to ensure that computational thinking curricula are built in accord with the value-rational nature of human practice, rather than on misconceived rationalizations of problem-solving, computer use, and computational aspects in the world. However, the pervasive integration of information technology in today’s world raises new issues concerning human-machine collaborations that side-track the arguments of Dreyfus and Schön. A revised view of computational thinking is required which focusses on articulating how humans can design for, partake in, and critically appraise human-machine collaborations.","PeriodicalId":506406,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Philosophy of Education","volume":"16 1-2","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-02-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139853767","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Philosophical presuppositions in “Computational thinking” – old wine in new bottles?","authors":"Nina Bonderup Dohn","doi":"10.1093/jopedu/qhae016","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/jopedu/qhae016","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 ‘Computational thinking’ is highlighted in research literature, societal debates and educational policies alike as of prime significance in the 21st century. It is currently being introduced into K–12 curricula around the world. However, there is no consensus on what exactly ‘computational thinking’ consists of, which skills it involves, and how it relates to programming. This article pinpoints four competing claims as to what constitutes the defining traits of computational thinking. For each of the four claims, inherent philosophical presuppositions are identified concerning the nature of thinking, problem-solving, and human-computer relationships. It is argued that most of these philosophical presuppositions are very similar to ones that Hubert Dreyfus and Donald Schön addressed 40–50 years ago. Therefore, claims about the power of computational thinking raise old discussions in a new disguise. Dreyfus and Schön argued that the presuppositions were wrong. Do their arguments hold and thus defeat contemporary claims about computational thinking? Alternatively, has the technological development since the time of their writings proven them wrong? The article argues that it is necessary to heed the arguments of Dreyfus, Schön and—later—Bent Flyvbjerg to ensure that computational thinking curricula are built in accord with the value-rational nature of human practice, rather than on misconceived rationalizations of problem-solving, computer use, and computational aspects in the world. However, the pervasive integration of information technology in today’s world raises new issues concerning human-machine collaborations that side-track the arguments of Dreyfus and Schön. A revised view of computational thinking is required which focusses on articulating how humans can design for, partake in, and critically appraise human-machine collaborations.","PeriodicalId":506406,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Philosophy of Education","volume":"192 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-02-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139793541","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Norm Critique and the Dialectics of Hegelian Recognition","authors":"Simon Nørgaard Iversen","doi":"10.1093/jopedu/qhae014","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/jopedu/qhae014","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 This article examines the relevance of Hegel’s theory of recognition within educational theory and practice in relation to the development of a non-affirmative theory of education. The article argues that Hegel’s theory of recognition can serve as a fruitful starting point for articulating an educational theory that can contribute to the subject’s open-ended formation in modern society. To start with, the article surveys the connection between Hegel’s educational thought and his concept of recognition. Against this backdrop, the article singles out how Hegel’s theory of recognition provides a compelling theory of intersubjectivity that calls attention to the role of norms in personal development and the construction of the social world. In continuation of a non-affirmative principle, it is argued that Hegelian recognition underlines, first, that the subject’s formation can fruitfully be an open-ended and dynamic process and, second, that in order to underpin this process it is necessary to critically assess norms and norm-generating practices within an educational context.","PeriodicalId":506406,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Philosophy of Education","volume":"59 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139827110","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Norm Critique and the Dialectics of Hegelian Recognition","authors":"Simon Nørgaard Iversen","doi":"10.1093/jopedu/qhae014","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/jopedu/qhae014","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 This article examines the relevance of Hegel’s theory of recognition within educational theory and practice in relation to the development of a non-affirmative theory of education. The article argues that Hegel’s theory of recognition can serve as a fruitful starting point for articulating an educational theory that can contribute to the subject’s open-ended formation in modern society. To start with, the article surveys the connection between Hegel’s educational thought and his concept of recognition. Against this backdrop, the article singles out how Hegel’s theory of recognition provides a compelling theory of intersubjectivity that calls attention to the role of norms in personal development and the construction of the social world. In continuation of a non-affirmative principle, it is argued that Hegelian recognition underlines, first, that the subject’s formation can fruitfully be an open-ended and dynamic process and, second, that in order to underpin this process it is necessary to critically assess norms and norm-generating practices within an educational context.","PeriodicalId":506406,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Philosophy of Education","volume":"21 3","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139887111","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Towards an Educational Case for Social and Political Issues in the Geography Curriculum","authors":"Alexander Standish","doi":"10.1093/jopedu/qhae013","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/jopedu/qhae013","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 While social and political issues have an important role in the geography curriculum, the long-term erosion of the value and insularity of disciplinary knowledge in society and the curriculum has blurred the distinction between educational aims and political advocacy in classrooms. Increasingly, teachers, policy makers, and NGOs instrumentalize the curriculum with respect to their political objectives, including climate change and social injustice. In taking an advocacy approach to pedagogy, they potentially undermine liberal educational objectives, including the development of autonomy and subjectification. Drawing on recent work in philosophy of education (e.g. Biesta; Van Poeck and Östman) as well as Social Realist approaches to knowledge, I make a case for teaching about social and political issues on liberal educational grounds. Geography plays a key role in the school curriculum by providing a space for exploring the human condition through the study of people in contrasting environments and cultural systems. Here, we examine how geography teachers can handle issues in a morally careful way and navigate a line between advocacy and educational aims. One key difference examined is the need to treat students as subjects in their own right and to help develop skills of moral enquiry. In practice this means encouraging an open-ended approach, exploring topics (and the values underpinning them) from a range of perspectives, developing sensitivity to difference, and showing tolerance for ideas of which one disapproves. For students to develop agency and moral independence, they must learn how to think about social and political issues rather than being told what to think.","PeriodicalId":506406,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Philosophy of Education","volume":"98 ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-01-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140481332","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}