Philosophical presuppositions in “Computational thinking” – old wine in new bottles?

Abstract

‘Computational thinking’ is highlighted in research literature, societal debates and educational policies alike as of prime significance in the 21st century. It is currently being introduced into K–12 curricula around the world. However, there is no consensus on what exactly ‘computational thinking’ consists of, which skills it involves, and how it relates to programming. This article pinpoints four competing claims as to what constitutes the defining traits of computational thinking. For each of the four claims, inherent philosophical presuppositions are identified concerning the nature of thinking, problem-solving, and human-computer relationships. It is argued that most of these philosophical presuppositions are very similar to ones that Hubert Dreyfus and Donald Schön addressed 40–50 years ago. Therefore, claims about the power of computational thinking raise old discussions in a new disguise. Dreyfus and Schön argued that the presuppositions were wrong. Do their arguments hold and thus defeat contemporary claims about computational thinking? Alternatively, has the technological development since the time of their writings proven them wrong? The article argues that it is necessary to heed the arguments of Dreyfus, Schön and—later—Bent Flyvbjerg to ensure that computational thinking curricula are built in accord with the value-rational nature of human practice, rather than on misconceived rationalizations of problem-solving, computer use, and computational aspects in the world. However, the pervasive integration of information technology in today’s world raises new issues concerning human-machine collaborations that side-track the arguments of Dreyfus and Schön. A revised view of computational thinking is required which focusses on articulating how humans can design for, partake in, and critically appraise human-machine collaborations.