IET Information Security最新文献_第8页

Differential, Linear, and Meet-in-the-Middle Attacks on the Lightweight Block Cipher RBFK 对轻量级区块密码 RBFK 的差分、线性和中间人攻击

IF 1.3 4区计算机科学

IET Information Security Pub Date : 2023-11-23 DOI: 10.1049/2023/6691726

Sugio Nobuyuki

{"title":"Differential, Linear, and Meet-in-the-Middle Attacks on the Lightweight Block Cipher RBFK","authors":"Sugio Nobuyuki","doi":"10.1049/2023/6691726","DOIUrl":"10.1049/2023/6691726","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 <p>Randomized butterfly architecture of fast Fourier transform for key cipher (RBFK) is the lightweight block cipher for Internet of things devices in an edge computing environment. Although the authors claimed that RBFK is secure against differential cryptanalysis, linear cryptanalysis, impossible differential attack, and zero correlation linear cryptanalysis, the details were not explained in the literature. Therefore, we have evaluated the security of RBFK by application of differential cryptanalysis, linear cryptanalysis, and meet-in-the-middle (MITM) attack and have found that RBFK is not secure against these attacks. This paper introduces not only a distinguish attack but also key recovery attacks on full-round RBFK. In the distinguish attack scenario, data for differential cryptanalysis are two, and the time complexity is one for an exclusive-OR operation. In the key recovery attack scenario, the data for linear cryptanalysis are one pair of known plaintext–ciphertext. The time complexity is one operation for a linear sum. Data for an MITM attack are two. The time complexity is 2<sup>48</sup> encryptions; the memory complexity is 2<sup>45</sup> bytes. Because the vulnerabilities are identified in the round function and the key scheduling part, we propose some improvements for RBFK against these attacks.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":50380,"journal":{"name":"IET Information Security","volume":"2023 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2023-11-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1049/2023/6691726","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139244466","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"计算机科学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Generic Construction of Fully Anonymous Broadcast Authenticated Encryption with Keyword Search with Adaptive Corruptions 具有自适应损坏的关键字搜索的完全匿名广播认证加密的一般构造

IF 1.3 4区计算机科学

IET Information Security Pub Date : 2023-11-07 DOI: 10.1049/2023/9922828

Keita Emura

{"title":"Generic Construction of Fully Anonymous Broadcast Authenticated Encryption with Keyword Search with Adaptive Corruptions","authors":"Keita Emura","doi":"10.1049/2023/9922828","DOIUrl":"10.1049/2023/9922828","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 <p>As a multireceiver variant of public key authenticated encryption with keyword search (PAEKS), broadcast authenticated encryption with keyword search (BAEKS) was proposed by Liu et al. (ACISP 2021). BAEKS focuses on receiver anonymity, where no information about the receiver is leaked from ciphertexts, which is reminiscent of the anonymous broadcast encryption. Here, there are rooms for improving their security definitions, e.g., two challenge sets of receivers are selected before the setup phase, and an adversary is not allowed to corrupt any receiver. In this paper, we propose a generic construction of BAEKS derived from PAEKS that provides ciphertext anonymity and consistency in a multireceiver setting. The proposed construction is an extension of the generic construction proposed by Libert et al. (PKC 2012) for the fully anonymous broadcast encryption and provides adaptive corruptions. We also demonstrate that the Qin et al. PAEKS scheme (ProvSec 2021) provides ciphertext anonymity and consistency in a multireceiver setting and can be employed as a building block of the proposed generic construction.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":50380,"journal":{"name":"IET Information Security","volume":"2023 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2023-11-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1049/2023/9922828","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135432911","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"计算机科学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Inner-Product Matchmaking Encryption: Bilateral Access Control and Beyond Equality 产品内部匹配加密：双边访问控制和超越平等

IF 1.3 4区计算机科学

IET Information Security Pub Date : 2023-11-02 DOI: 10.1049/2023/8829580

Qiaohan Chu, Anmin Fu, Haifeng Qian, Jie Chen

引用次数: 0

A Publicly Verifiable Leveled Fully Homomorphic Signcryption Scheme 一个可公开验证的水平全同态签名加密方案

IF 1.3 4区计算机科学

IET Information Security Pub Date : 2023-10-31 DOI: 10.1049/2023/1377042

Zhaoxuan Bian, Fuqun Wang, Renjun Zhang, Bin Lian, Lidong Han, Kefei Chen

引用次数: 0

Kyber, Saber, and SK-MLWR Lattice-Based Key Encapsulation Mechanisms Model Checking with Maude Kyber， Saber和SK-MLWR基于格子的密钥封装机制模型检查与Maude

IF 1.3 4区计算机科学

IET Information Security Pub Date : 2023-10-30 DOI: 10.1049/2023/9399887

Duong Dinh Tran, Kazuhiro Ogata, Santiago Escobar, Sedat Akleylek, Ayoub Otmani

{"title":"Kyber, Saber, and SK-MLWR Lattice-Based Key Encapsulation Mechanisms Model Checking with Maude","authors":"Duong Dinh Tran, Kazuhiro Ogata, Santiago Escobar, Sedat Akleylek, Ayoub Otmani","doi":"10.1049/2023/9399887","DOIUrl":"10.1049/2023/9399887","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 <p>Facing the potential threat raised by quantum computing, a great deal of research from many groups and industrial giants has gone into building public-key post-quantum cryptographic primitives that are resistant to the quantum attackers. Among them, there is a large number of post-quantum key encapsulation mechanisms (KEMs), whose purpose is to provide a secure key exchange, which is a very crucial component in public-key cryptography. This paper presents a formal security analysis of three lattice-based KEMs including Kyber, Saber, and SK-MLWR. We use Maude, a specification language supporting equational and rewriting logic and a high-performance tool equipped with many advanced features, such as a reachability analyzer that can be used as a model checker for invariant properties, to model the three KEMs as state machines. Because they all belong to the class of lattice-based KEMs, they share many common parts in their designs, such as polynomials, vectors, and message exchange patterns. We first model these common parts and combine them into a specification, called base specification. After that, for each of the three KEMs, by extending the base specification, we just need to model some additional parts and the mechanism execution. Once completing the three specifications, we conduct invariant model checkings with the Maude search command, pointing out a similar man-in-the-middle attack. The occurrence of this attack is due to the fact that authentication is not part of the KEMs, and therefore an active attacker can modify all communication between two honest parties.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":50380,"journal":{"name":"IET Information Security","volume":"2023 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2023-10-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1049/2023/9399887","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136019437","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"计算机科学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Bit-Sliced Implementation of SM4 and New Performance Records SM4的位切片实现和新的性能记录

IF 1.3 4区计算机科学

IET Information Security Pub Date : 2023-10-27 DOI: 10.1049/2023/1821499

Xin Miao, Lu Li, Chun Guo, Meiqin Wang, Weijia Wang

引用次数: 0

A Survey of Secure Communications for Satellite Internet Based on Cryptography and Physical Layer Security 基于密码学和物理层安全的卫星互联网安全通信研究

IF 1.3 4区计算机科学

IET Information Security Pub Date : 2023-10-26 DOI: 10.1049/2023/5604802

Yu Zhang, Shuangrui Zhao, Ji He, Yuanyu Zhang, Yulong Shen, Xiaohong Jiang

{"title":"A Survey of Secure Communications for Satellite Internet Based on Cryptography and Physical Layer Security","authors":"Yu Zhang, Shuangrui Zhao, Ji He, Yuanyu Zhang, Yulong Shen, Xiaohong Jiang","doi":"10.1049/2023/5604802","DOIUrl":"10.1049/2023/5604802","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 <p>Satellite internet serves as an indispensable component of the upcoming sixth-generation networks for providing global broadband internet access service. Due to the open nature of satellite-ground communication, security issue in satellite internet has always been an important concern for both industry and academia. Although many researchers focus on secure communications in satellite internet, the literature is surprisingly sparse, with no comprehensive overview of the state-of-the-art security techniques. This paper provides an in-depth survey of secure communications for various satellite internet scenarios. Based on different security mechanisms, we first categorize the existing works of secure communications in satellite internet into two categories: cryptography-based and physical layer security-based. The former includes classical encryption-based and quantum encryption-based secure communication, and the latter is further divided into precoding-based, cooperative jamming-based, relay selection-based, and physical-layer authentication-based secure communication depending on the applied techniques. Finally, we provide some future research directions.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":50380,"journal":{"name":"IET Information Security","volume":"2023 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2023-10-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1049/2023/5604802","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134907874","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"计算机科学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Cross-Space Conduction Assessment Method of Network Attack Risk under the Strong Coupling Characteristics of Electric Power Cyber Physics 电力网络物理强耦合特性下网络攻击风险跨空间传导评估方法

IF 1.3 4区计算机科学

IET Information Security Pub Date : 2023-10-25 DOI: 10.1049/2023/9006166

Shenjian Qiu, Jiaxuan Fei, Jian Wang

{"title":"Cross-Space Conduction Assessment Method of Network Attack Risk under the Strong Coupling Characteristics of Electric Power Cyber Physics","authors":"Shenjian Qiu, Jiaxuan Fei, Jian Wang","doi":"10.1049/2023/9006166","DOIUrl":"10.1049/2023/9006166","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 <p>With the deep integration and wide application of advanced digital sensing, Internet of Things technology, and energy technology in power systems. Power information systems and physical systems are gradually being coupled and developed into power cyber–physical systems (CPS). A number of blackouts in recent years have shown that cyberspace cyber attacks on CPS can lead to the intensification and rapid spread of faults in the physical space of the power grid, and even system collapse. Aiming at the difficulty of analyzing the evolution of cyber–physical cross-space impacts of cyber-attacks, this paper proposes a cross-domain propagation impact assessment method that considers cyber–physical coupling risks caused by attacks. First, according to the multiple coupling relationship between the power system information space and physical space, the monitoring function model and the control function model are established. Second, under the effect of high-concealment attack, analyze the impact of the risk caused by its failure after it is transmitted to the physical space with different propagation probabilities. Finally, the experimental verification was carried out using the IEEE RTS79 standard test system. The simulation results show that the proposed method can comprehensively consider the cyber–physical energy supply coupling relationship, the risk propagation probability, and the operating characteristics of the information system, and effectively quantify and evaluate the impact of information space network attacks on the physical space entity power grid. It further reveals the objective law that information space risks can evolve and spread across domains under the condition of strong coupling of information physics.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":50380,"journal":{"name":"IET Information Security","volume":"2023 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2023-10-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1049/2023/9006166","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135112439","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"计算机科学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Hardness of Module-LWE with Semiuniform Seeds from Module-NTRU 模组- ntru半均匀种子模组- lwe硬度

IF 1.3 4区计算机科学

IET Information Security Pub Date : 2023-10-23 DOI: 10.1049/2023/2969432

Wenjuan Jia, Jiang Zhang, Baocang Wang

{"title":"Hardness of Module-LWE with Semiuniform Seeds from Module-NTRU","authors":"Wenjuan Jia, Jiang Zhang, Baocang Wang","doi":"10.1049/2023/2969432","DOIUrl":"10.1049/2023/2969432","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 <p>The module learning with errors (MLWE) problem has attracted significant attention and has been widely used in building a multitude of lattice-based cryptographic primitives. The hardness of the MLWE problem has been established for several variants, but most of the known results require the seed distribution (i.e., the distribution of matrix <b>A</b>) to be the uniform distribution. In this paper, we show that under the Module-N-th degree Truncated polynomial Ring Units (NTRU) (MNTRU) assumption, the search MLWE problem can still be hard for some distributions that are not (even computationally indistinguishable from) the uniform distribution. Specifically, we show that if the seed distribution is a semiuniform distribution (namely, the seed distribution can be publicly derived from and has a “small difference” to the uniform distribution), then for appropriate settings of parameters, the search MLWE problem is hard under the MNTRU assumption. Moreover, we also show that under the appropriate settings of parameters, the search learning with errors over rings problem with semiuniform seeds can still be hard under the NTRU assumption due to our results for the search MLWE problem with semiuniform seeds being rank-preserving.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":50380,"journal":{"name":"IET Information Security","volume":"2023 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2023-10-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1049/2023/2969432","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135412746","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"计算机科学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Hardness of (Semiuniform) MLWE with Short Distributions Using the Rényi Divergence 用rsamnyi散度分析短分布（半均匀）MLWE的硬度

IF 1.3 4区计算机科学

IET Information Security Pub Date : 2023-10-23 DOI: 10.1049/2023/2104380

Wenjuan Jia, Baocang Wang

{"title":"Hardness of (Semiuniform) MLWE with Short Distributions Using the Rényi Divergence","authors":"Wenjuan Jia, Baocang Wang","doi":"10.1049/2023/2104380","DOIUrl":"10.1049/2023/2104380","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 <p>The module learning with errors (MLWE) problem has attracted considerable attention for its tradeoff between security and efficiency. The quantum/classical worst-case to average-case hardness for the MLWE problem (or more exactly, a family of problems) has been established, but most of the known results require the seed distribution to be the uniform distribution. In the present paper, we show that, using the noise flooding technique based on the Rényi divergence, the search MLWE problem with uniform <i>B</i>-bounded secret distribution for 1 ≤ <i>B</i> ≪ <i>q</i> can still be hard for some seed distributions that are not (even computationally indistinguishable from) the uniform distribution under the standard MLWE assumption. Specifically, we show that if the seed distribution is a semiuniform distribution (namely, the seed distribution can be publicly derived from and has a “small difference” to the uniform distribution), then for suitable parameter choices, the search MLWE problem with uniform bounded secret distribution is hard under the standard MLWE assumption. Moreover, we also show that under the appropriate setting of parameters, the search MLWE problem with uniform bounded noise distribution is at least as hard as the standard MLWE assumption using a different approach than the one used by Boudgoust et al. in [JoC 2023].</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":50380,"journal":{"name":"IET Information Security","volume":"2023 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2023-10-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1049/2023/2104380","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135412888","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"计算机科学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0