arXiv - CS - Cryptography and Security最新文献_第8页

SoK: Security and Privacy Risks of Medical AI SOK：医疗人工智能的安全与隐私风险

arXiv - CS - Cryptography and Security Pub Date : 2024-09-11 DOI: arxiv-2409.07415

Yuanhaur Chang, Han Liu, Evin Jaff, Chenyang Lu, Ning Zhang

{"title":"SoK: Security and Privacy Risks of Medical AI","authors":"Yuanhaur Chang, Han Liu, Evin Jaff, Chenyang Lu, Ning Zhang","doi":"arxiv-2409.07415","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/arxiv-2409.07415","url":null,"abstract":"The integration of technology and healthcare has ushered in a new era where\u0000software systems, powered by artificial intelligence and machine learning, have\u0000become essential components of medical products and services. While these\u0000advancements hold great promise for enhancing patient care and healthcare\u0000delivery efficiency, they also expose sensitive medical data and system\u0000integrity to potential cyberattacks. This paper explores the security and\u0000privacy threats posed by AI/ML applications in healthcare. Through a thorough\u0000examination of existing research across a range of medical domains, we have\u0000identified significant gaps in understanding the adversarial attacks targeting\u0000medical AI systems. By outlining specific adversarial threat models for medical\u0000settings and identifying vulnerable application domains, we lay the groundwork\u0000for future research that investigates the security and resilience of AI-driven\u0000medical systems. Through our analysis of different threat models and\u0000feasibility studies on adversarial attacks in different medical domains, we\u0000provide compelling insights into the pressing need for cybersecurity research\u0000in the rapidly evolving field of AI healthcare technology.","PeriodicalId":501332,"journal":{"name":"arXiv - CS - Cryptography and Security","volume":"34 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-09-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142201642","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Advancing Malicious Website Identification: A Machine Learning Approach Using Granular Feature Analysis 推进恶意网站识别：使用粒度特征分析的机器学习方法

arXiv - CS - Cryptography and Security Pub Date : 2024-09-11 DOI: arxiv-2409.07608

Kinh Tran, Dusan Sovilj

{"title":"Advancing Malicious Website Identification: A Machine Learning Approach Using Granular Feature Analysis","authors":"Kinh Tran, Dusan Sovilj","doi":"arxiv-2409.07608","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/arxiv-2409.07608","url":null,"abstract":"Malicious website detection is an increasingly relevant yet intricate task\u0000that requires the consideration of a vast amount of fine details. Our objective\u0000is to create a machine learning model that is trained on as many of these finer\u0000details as time will allow us to classify a website as benign or malicious. If\u0000malicious, the model will classify the role it plays (phishing, spam, malware\u0000hosting, etc.). We proposed 77 features and created a dataset of 441,701\u0000samples spanning 9 website classifications to train our model. We grouped the\u0000proposed features into feature subsets based on the time and resources required\u0000to compute these features and the performance changes with the inclusion of\u0000each subset to the model. We found that the performance of the best performing\u0000model increased as more feature subsets were introduced. In the end, our best\u0000performing model was able to classify websites into 1 of 9 classifications with\u0000a 95.89% accuracy score. We then investigated how well the features we\u0000proposed ranked in importance and detail the top 10 most relevant features\u0000according to our models. 2 of our URL embedding features were found to be the\u0000most relevant by our best performing model, with content-based features\u0000representing half of the top 10 spots. The rest of the list was populated with\u0000singular features from different feature categories including: a host feature,\u0000a robots.txt feature, a lexical feature, and a passive domain name system\u0000feature.","PeriodicalId":501332,"journal":{"name":"arXiv - CS - Cryptography and Security","volume":"40 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-09-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142201625","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Improving Encrypted Transport Protocol Designs: Deep Dive on the QUIC Case 改进加密传输协议设计：深入研究 QUIC 案例

arXiv - CS - Cryptography and Security Pub Date : 2024-09-11 DOI: arxiv-2409.07138

Florentin Rochet

{"title":"Improving Encrypted Transport Protocol Designs: Deep Dive on the QUIC Case","authors":"Florentin Rochet","doi":"arxiv-2409.07138","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/arxiv-2409.07138","url":null,"abstract":"We propose in this paper to revisit the design of existing encrypted\u0000transport protocols to improve their efficiency. We call the methodology\u0000\"Reverso\" from reversing the order of field elements within a protocol\u0000specification. We detail how such a benign-looking change within the\u0000specifications may unlock implementation optimizations for encrypted protocols.\u0000To demonstrate our findings, we release quiceh, a QUIC implementation of QUIC\u0000VReverso, an extension of the QUIC V1 standard (RFC9000). Our methodology\u0000applied to the QUIC protocol reports ~30% of CPU efficiency improvement for\u0000processing packets at no added cost on the sender side and without relaxing any\u0000security guarantee from QUIC V1. We also implement a fork of Cloudflare's\u0000HTTP/3 module and client/server demonstrator using quiceh and show our\u0000optimizations to directly transfer to HTTP/3 as well, resulting in our new\u0000HTTP/3 to be ~ 38% more efficient than the baseline implementation using QUIC\u0000V1. We argue that Reverso applies to any modern encrypted protocol and its\u0000implementations and that similar efficiency improvement can also be unlocked\u0000for them, independently of the layer in which they operate.","PeriodicalId":501332,"journal":{"name":"arXiv - CS - Cryptography and Security","volume":"41 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-09-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142201650","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Exploring LLMs for Malware Detection: Review, Framework Design, and Countermeasure Approaches 探索用于恶意软件检测的 LLM：回顾、框架设计和对策方法

arXiv - CS - Cryptography and Security Pub Date : 2024-09-11 DOI: arxiv-2409.07587

Jamal Al-Karaki, Muhammad Al-Zafar Khan, Marwan Omar

{"title":"Exploring LLMs for Malware Detection: Review, Framework Design, and Countermeasure Approaches","authors":"Jamal Al-Karaki, Muhammad Al-Zafar Khan, Marwan Omar","doi":"arxiv-2409.07587","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/arxiv-2409.07587","url":null,"abstract":"The rising use of Large Language Models (LLMs) to create and disseminate\u0000malware poses a significant cybersecurity challenge due to their ability to\u0000generate and distribute attacks with ease. A single prompt can initiate a wide\u0000array of malicious activities. This paper addresses this critical issue through\u0000a multifaceted approach. First, we provide a comprehensive overview of LLMs and\u0000their role in malware detection from diverse sources. We examine five specific\u0000applications of LLMs: Malware honeypots, identification of text-based threats,\u0000code analysis for detecting malicious intent, trend analysis of malware, and\u0000detection of non-standard disguised malware. Our review includes a detailed\u0000analysis of the existing literature and establishes guiding principles for the\u0000secure use of LLMs. We also introduce a classification scheme to categorize the\u0000relevant literature. Second, we propose performance metrics to assess the\u0000effectiveness of LLMs in these contexts. Third, we present a risk mitigation\u0000framework designed to prevent malware by leveraging LLMs. Finally, we evaluate\u0000the performance of our proposed risk mitigation strategies against various\u0000factors and demonstrate their effectiveness in countering LLM-enabled malware.\u0000The paper concludes by suggesting future advancements and areas requiring\u0000deeper exploration in this fascinating field of artificial intelligence.","PeriodicalId":501332,"journal":{"name":"arXiv - CS - Cryptography and Security","volume":"5 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-09-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142201620","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Ciphertext Policy Attribute Based Encryption with Intel SGX 利用英特尔 SGX 进行基于密文策略属性的加密

arXiv - CS - Cryptography and Security Pub Date : 2024-09-11 DOI: arxiv-2409.07149

Vivek SuryawanshiIndian Institute of Technology Kharagpur, Shamik SuralIndian Institute of Technology Kharagpur

引用次数: 0

XDC Staking and Tokenomics -- Improvement Proposal: Enhancing Sustainability and Decentralization on the Eve of XDC 2.0 XDC 赌注和代币经济学 -- 改进建议：在 XDC 2.0 发布前夕增强可持续性和去中心化

arXiv - CS - Cryptography and Security Pub Date : 2024-09-11 DOI: arxiv-2409.07420

Van Khanh Nguyen

引用次数: 0

ZKFault: Fault attack analysis on zero-knowledge based post-quantum digital signature schemes ZKFault：基于零知识的后量子数字签名方案的故障攻击分析

arXiv - CS - Cryptography and Security Pub Date : 2024-09-11 DOI: arxiv-2409.07150

Puja Mondal, Supriya Adhikary, Suparna Kundu, Angshuman Karmakar

{"title":"ZKFault: Fault attack analysis on zero-knowledge based post-quantum digital signature schemes","authors":"Puja Mondal, Supriya Adhikary, Suparna Kundu, Angshuman Karmakar","doi":"arxiv-2409.07150","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/arxiv-2409.07150","url":null,"abstract":"Computationally hard problems based on coding theory, such as the syndrome\u0000decoding problem, have been used for constructing secure cryptographic schemes\u0000for a long time. Schemes based on these problems are also assumed to be secure\u0000against quantum computers. However, these schemes are often considered\u0000impractical for real-world deployment due to large key sizes and inefficient\u0000computation time. In the recent call for standardization of additional\u0000post-quantum digital signatures by the National Institute of Standards and\u0000Technology, several code-based candidates have been proposed, including LESS,\u0000CROSS, and MEDS. These schemes are designed on the relatively new\u0000zero-knowledge framework. Although several works analyze the hardness of these\u0000schemes, there is hardly any work that examines the security of these schemes\u0000in the presence of physical attacks. In this work, we analyze these signature schemes from the perspective of\u0000fault attacks. All these schemes use a similar tree-based construction to\u0000compress the signature size. We attack this component of these schemes.\u0000Therefore, our attack is applicable to all of these schemes. In this work, we\u0000first analyze the LESS signature scheme and devise our attack. Furthermore, we\u0000showed how this attack can be extended to the CROSS signature scheme. Our\u0000attacks are built on very simple fault assumptions. Our results show that we\u0000can recover the entire secret key of LESS and CROSS using as little as a single\u0000fault. Finally, we propose various countermeasures to prevent these kinds of\u0000attacks and discuss their efficiency and shortcomings.","PeriodicalId":501332,"journal":{"name":"arXiv - CS - Cryptography and Security","volume":"15 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-09-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142201649","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

AdaPPA: Adaptive Position Pre-Fill Jailbreak Attack Approach Targeting LLMs AdaPPA：针对 LLM 的自适应位置预填充越狱攻击方法

arXiv - CS - Cryptography and Security Pub Date : 2024-09-11 DOI: arxiv-2409.07503

Lijia Lv, Weigang Zhang, Xuehai Tang, Jie Wen, Feng Liu, Jizhong Han, Songlin Hu

引用次数: 0

Differential Degradation Vulnerabilities in Censorship Circumvention Systems 审查规避系统中的差异退化漏洞

arXiv - CS - Cryptography and Security Pub Date : 2024-09-10 DOI: arxiv-2409.06247

Zhen Sun, Vitaly Shmatikov

{"title":"Differential Degradation Vulnerabilities in Censorship Circumvention Systems","authors":"Zhen Sun, Vitaly Shmatikov","doi":"arxiv-2409.06247","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/arxiv-2409.06247","url":null,"abstract":"Several recently proposed censorship circumvention systems use encrypted\u0000network channels of popular applications to hide their communications. For\u0000example, a Tor pluggable transport called Snowflake uses the WebRTC data\u0000channel, while a system called Protozoa substitutes content in a WebRTC\u0000video-call application. By using the same channel as the cover application and\u0000(in the case of Protozoa) matching its observable traffic characteristics,\u0000these systems aim to resist powerful network-based censors capable of\u0000large-scale traffic analysis. Protozoa, in particular, achieves a strong\u0000indistinguishability property known as behavioral independence. We demonstrate that this class of systems is generically vulnerable to a new\u0000type of active attacks we call \"differential degradation.\" These attacks do not\u0000require multi-flow measurements or traffic classification and are thus\u0000available to all real-world censors. They exploit the discrepancies between the\u0000respective network requirements of the circumvention system and its cover\u0000application. We show how a censor can use the minimal application-level\u0000information exposed by WebRTC to create network conditions that cause the\u0000circumvention system to suffer a much bigger degradation in performance than\u0000the cover application. Even when the attack causes no observable differences in\u0000network traffic and behavioral independence still holds, the censor can block\u0000circumvention at a low cost, without resorting to traffic analysis, and with\u0000minimal collateral damage to non-circumvention users. We present effective differential degradation attacks against Snowflake and\u0000Protozoa. We explain the root cause of these vulnerabilities, analyze the\u0000tradeoffs faced by the designers of circumvention systems, and propose a\u0000modified version of Protozoa that resists differential degradation attacks.","PeriodicalId":501332,"journal":{"name":"arXiv - CS - Cryptography and Security","volume":"32 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-09-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142201338","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

A Pervasive, Efficient and Private Future: Realizing Privacy-Preserving Machine Learning Through Hybrid Homomorphic Encryption 无处不在、高效和私密的未来：通过混合同态加密实现保护隐私的机器学习

arXiv - CS - Cryptography and Security Pub Date : 2024-09-10 DOI: arxiv-2409.06422

Khoa Nguyen, Mindaugas Budzys, Eugene Frimpong, Tanveer Khan, Antonis Michalas

{"title":"A Pervasive, Efficient and Private Future: Realizing Privacy-Preserving Machine Learning Through Hybrid Homomorphic Encryption","authors":"Khoa Nguyen, Mindaugas Budzys, Eugene Frimpong, Tanveer Khan, Antonis Michalas","doi":"arxiv-2409.06422","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/arxiv-2409.06422","url":null,"abstract":"Machine Learning (ML) has become one of the most impactful fields of data\u0000science in recent years. However, a significant concern with ML is its privacy\u0000risks due to rising attacks against ML models. Privacy-Preserving Machine\u0000Learning (PPML) methods have been proposed to mitigate the privacy and security\u0000risks of ML models. A popular approach to achieving PPML uses Homomorphic\u0000Encryption (HE). However, the highly publicized inefficiencies of HE make it\u0000unsuitable for highly scalable scenarios with resource-constrained devices.\u0000Hence, Hybrid Homomorphic Encryption (HHE) -- a modern encryption scheme that\u0000combines symmetric cryptography with HE -- has recently been introduced to\u0000overcome these challenges. HHE potentially provides a foundation to build new\u0000efficient and privacy-preserving services that transfer expensive HE operations\u0000to the cloud. This work introduces HHE to the ML field by proposing\u0000resource-friendly PPML protocols for edge devices. More precisely, we utilize\u0000HHE as the primary building block of our PPML protocols. We assess the\u0000performance of our protocols by first extensively evaluating each party's\u0000communication and computational cost on a dummy dataset and show the efficiency\u0000of our protocols by comparing them with similar protocols implemented using\u0000plain BFV. Subsequently, we demonstrate the real-world applicability of our\u0000construction by building an actual PPML application that uses HHE as its\u0000foundation to classify heart disease based on sensitive ECG data.","PeriodicalId":501332,"journal":{"name":"arXiv - CS - Cryptography and Security","volume":"130 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-09-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142201334","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0