Achyuta Adhvaryu, Prashant Bharadwaj, James Fenske, Anant Nyshadham, Richard Stanley
{"title":"Dust and Death: Evidence from the West African Harmattan","authors":"Achyuta Adhvaryu, Prashant Bharadwaj, James Fenske, Anant Nyshadham, Richard Stanley","doi":"10.1093/ej/uead088","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/ej/uead088","url":null,"abstract":"Using two decades of data from twelve low-income countries in West Africa, we show that dust carried by harmattan trade winds increases infant and child mortality. Health investments respond to dust exposure, consistent with compensating behaviors. Despite these efforts, surviving children still exhibit negative health impacts. Our data allow us to investigate differential impacts over time and across countries. We find declining impacts over time, suggesting adaptation. Using national-level measures of macroeconomic conditions and health resources, we find suggestive evidence that both economic development and public health improvements have contributed to this adaptation, with health improvements playing a larger role.","PeriodicalId":501319,"journal":{"name":"The Economic Journal","volume":"256 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-01-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139516722","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Estimating the Cost of Capital and the Profit Share","authors":"Has van Vlokhoven","doi":"10.1093/ej/ueae001","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/ej/ueae001","url":null,"abstract":"Capital costs are not directly observed since firms own part of their capital stock. I show under which assumptions variation in firms’ input choices reveals the user cost of capital. Using Compustat data for the United States, I find that the costs of tangible capital as a share of output have not been increasing while economic profits have been increasing over the past 50 years from around 4% to around 9% of sales. About three-quarters of the fall in the labour share is associated with a rise in profits and the remainder is associated with a rise in intangible intensity.","PeriodicalId":501319,"journal":{"name":"The Economic Journal","volume":"56 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-01-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139483528","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"On the Importance of Social Status for Occupational Sorting","authors":"Paweł Gola","doi":"10.1093/ej/uead119","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/ej/uead119","url":null,"abstract":"Models of self-selection predict that occupations with flat wage schedules attract workers of lower average ability. However, in certain prominent occupations such as academia and the civil service, wages are flat yet the average skill level is high. In this paper, I examine whether social status concerns can explain this puzzle. I find that within-occupation status allows flat-wage occupations to attract predominantly high-skilled workers, but only at the cost of attracting few workers overall. If, however, workers care both about within- and between-occupation status, then occupations paying flat wages can be arbitrarily large and attract workers of high average skill. I conclude that within- and between-occupation status concerns act as complements.","PeriodicalId":501319,"journal":{"name":"The Economic Journal","volume":"56 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-01-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139414151","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"P-Hacking, Data Type and Data-Sharing Policy","authors":"Abel Brodeur, Nikolai Cook, Carina Neisser","doi":"10.1093/ej/uead104","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/ej/uead104","url":null,"abstract":"This paper examines the relationship between p-hacking, publication bias, and data-sharing policies. We collect 38,876 test statistics from 1,106 articles published in leading economic journals between 2002–2020. We find that while data-sharing policies increase the provision of data, they do not decrease the extent of p-hacking and publication bias. Similarly, articles that use hard-to-access administrative data or third-party surveys, as compared to those that use easier-to-access (e.g., author-collected) data are not different in their p-hacking and publication extent. Voluntary provision of data by authors on their homepages offers no evidence of reduced p-hacking.","PeriodicalId":501319,"journal":{"name":"The Economic Journal","volume":"30 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-01-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139397164","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"School Choice with Consent: An Experiment","authors":"Claudia Cerrone, Yoan Hermstrüwer, Onur Kesten","doi":"10.1093/ej/uead120","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/ej/uead120","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Public school choice often yields student assignments that are neither fair nor efficient. The efficiency-adjusted deferred acceptance mechanism (EADAM) allows students to consent to waive priorities that have no effect on their assignments. A burgeoning recent literature places EADAM at the centre of the trade-off between efficiency and fairness in school choice. Meanwhile, the Flemish Ministry of Education has taken the first steps to implement this algorithm in Belgium. We provide the first experimental evidence on the performance of EADAM against the celebrated deferred acceptance mechanism (DA). We find that both efficiency and truth-telling rates are higher under EADAM than under DA, even though EADAM is not strategy-proof. When the priority waiver is enforced, efficiency further increases, while truth-telling rates decrease relative to the EADAM variants where students can dodge the waiver. Our results challenge the importance of strategy-proofness as a prerequisite for truth-telling and portend a new trade-off between efficiency and vulnerability to preference manipulation.","PeriodicalId":501319,"journal":{"name":"The Economic Journal","volume":"49 14","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-01-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139382085","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Solar Eclipses and the Origins of Critical Thinking and Complexity","authors":"Anastasia Litina, Èric Roca Fernández","doi":"10.1093/ej/uead117","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/ej/uead117","url":null,"abstract":"This paper relates curiosity to economic development through its impact on human capital formation and technological advancement in pre-modern times. More specifically, we propose that exposure to inexplicable phenomena prompts curiosity and thinking in an attempt to comprehend these mysteries, thus raising human capital and technology, and ultimately, fostering growth. We focus on solar eclipses as one particular trigger of curiosity and empirically establish a robust relationship between their number and several proxies of economic prosperity. We also offer evidence compatible with the human capital and technological increases we postulate, finding a more intricate thinking process and more developed technology among societies more exposed to solar eclipses. Among other factors, we study the development of written language, the playing of strategy games and the accuracy of folkloric explanations for eclipses, as well as the number of tasks undertaken in a society, their relative complexity, and broad technological indicators. Lastly, we document rising curiosity both at the social and individual level: societies incorporate more terms related to curiosity and eclipses in their folklore, and people who observed a total solar eclipse during their childhood were more likely to have entered a scientific occupation.","PeriodicalId":501319,"journal":{"name":"The Economic Journal","volume":"12 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-12-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139057505","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Partisan Effects of Information Campaigns in Competitive Authoritarian Elections: Evidence from Bangladesh","authors":"Firoz Ahmed, Roland Hodler, Asad Islam","doi":"10.1093/ej/uead115","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/ej/uead115","url":null,"abstract":"To study the effects of non-partisan information and get-out-the-vote (GOTV) campaigns on the partisan composition of the voting population in competitive authoritarian elections, we conducted a large-scale field experiment prior to the 2018 Bangladeshi general election. Our two treatments highlight that high turnout increases the winning party’s legitimacy and that election outcomes matter for policy outcomes. Both treatments increase turnout (measured by ink marks) in government strongholds but decrease turnout in opposition strongholds. We explain the withdrawal of treated opposition supporters and conclude that non-partisan information and GOTV campaigns can further tilt the uneven playing field in competitive authoritarian elections.","PeriodicalId":501319,"journal":{"name":"The Economic Journal","volume":"74 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-12-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139057461","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Taking Back Control? Quasi-Experimental Evidence on the Impact of Retirement on Locus of Control","authors":"Andrew E Clark, Rong Zhu","doi":"10.1093/ej/uead118","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/ej/uead118","url":null,"abstract":"We use Australian panel data to examine the impact of retirement on individual locus of control, a socio-emotional skill with substantial explanatory power for a broad range of life outcomes. Exploiting the eligibility age for the Australian Age Pension, we find that retirement leads to increased internal locus of control. This greater internal control explains around one-third and one-fifth of the positive effects of retirement on health and subjective well-being, respectively. We also show that locus of control is much more malleable at retirement than the other socio-emotional skills of the Big-Five personality traits, risk and time preferences, and trust.","PeriodicalId":501319,"journal":{"name":"The Economic Journal","volume":"114 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-12-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139057357","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Social Value of Public Information in Bargaining","authors":"Deepal Basak","doi":"10.1093/ej/uead114","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/ej/uead114","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 We consider a bargaining game in which both sides are uncertain about their opponent’s commitment, which leads to delay and welfare loss in equilibrium. We address the following question: does ex ante better public information about a player improve expected social welfare? We show that if the information cannot turn the bargaining table (turns the weak bargainer into a strong one and vice versa), more information does not help. More information about a weak bargainer has zero impact, whereas that about the strong bargainer is strictly detrimental. Moreover, by specializing in a binary signal structure, we show that if the information is more accurate in every state, it improves social welfare when it can turn the table.","PeriodicalId":501319,"journal":{"name":"The Economic Journal","volume":"47 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-12-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138951821","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Deborah A Cobb-Clark, Sarah C Dahmann, Daniel A Kamhöfer, Hannah Schildberg-Hörisch
{"title":"Surveillance and Self-Control","authors":"Deborah A Cobb-Clark, Sarah C Dahmann, Daniel A Kamhöfer, Hannah Schildberg-Hörisch","doi":"10.1093/ej/uead111","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/ej/uead111","url":null,"abstract":"This paper studies important determinants of adult self-control using population-representative data and exploiting Germany’s division as quasi-experimental variation. We find that former East Germans have substantially more self-control than West Germans and provide evidence for government surveillance as a possible underlying mechanism. We thereby demonstrate that institutional factors can shape people’s self-control. Moreover, we find that self-control increases linearly with age. In contrast to previous findings for children, there is no gender gap in adult self-control and family background does not predict self-control.","PeriodicalId":501319,"journal":{"name":"The Economic Journal","volume":"36 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-12-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138820401","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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