SynthesePub Date : 2023-10-24DOI: 10.1007/s11229-023-04368-z
Kevin C. Elliott
{"title":"Navigating dissent by managing value judgments: the case of Lyme disease","authors":"Kevin C. Elliott","doi":"10.1007/s11229-023-04368-z","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-023-04368-z","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":49452,"journal":{"name":"Synthese","volume":"38 4","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135273288","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
SynthesePub Date : 2023-10-24DOI: 10.1007/s11229-023-04366-1
Michael H. Herzog, Adrien Doerig, Christian Sachse
{"title":"Why computational complexity may set impenetrable barriers for epistemic reductionism","authors":"Michael H. Herzog, Adrien Doerig, Christian Sachse","doi":"10.1007/s11229-023-04366-1","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-023-04366-1","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract According to physicalism, everything is physical or metaphysically connected to the physical. If physicalism were true, it seems that we should – in principle – be able to reduce the descriptions and explanations of special sciences to physical ones, for example, explaining biological regularities, via chemistry, by the laws of particle physics. The multiple realization of the property types of the special sciences is often seen to be an obstacle to such epistemic reductions. Here, we introduce another, new argument against epistemic reduction. Based on mathematical complexity, we show that, under certain conditions, there can be “complexity barriers” that make epistemic reduction – in principle – unachievable even if physicalism were true.","PeriodicalId":49452,"journal":{"name":"Synthese","volume":"9 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135316155","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
SynthesePub Date : 2023-10-24DOI: 10.1007/s11229-023-04370-5
Hannah Hilligardt
{"title":"Partisan science and the democratic legitimacy ideal","authors":"Hannah Hilligardt","doi":"10.1007/s11229-023-04370-5","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-023-04370-5","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract The democratic legitimacy ideal requires value judgments in science to be legitimised by democratic procedures in order for them to reflect the public interest or democratic aims. Such a view has been explicitly defended by Intemann (2015) and Schroeder (2021), amongst others, and reflects a more widely shared commitment to a democratisation of science and integration of public participation procedures. This paper suggests that the democratic legitimacy ideal in its current form does not leave space for partisan science – science that is politically or societally engaged. This is problematic because partisan research can contribute substantially to science and society, a point that I will illustrate with a recent case study from the Netherlands. To resolve this problem, I scrutinise the notion of democratic legitimacy and consider its use in the values in science discourse. Current discussions focus on democratic decision-making procedures to legitimise specific value judgements. I show that this focus does not adequately represent sound procedures of legitimisation at the hand of political theories of representation. Consequently, I develop a different approach: I propose to consider scientists as a special case of representatives who are authorised to make independent value judgements while nevertheless being constrained by the demands of their constituencies. Based on this approach, I argue that values in science do not need to be based on democratically agreed upon aims or the public interest in every instance. Instead, I advocate for a pluralist system of scientific mandates, which differs from both value pluralism and the democratic legitimacy ideal.","PeriodicalId":49452,"journal":{"name":"Synthese","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135316033","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
SynthesePub Date : 2023-10-21DOI: 10.1007/s11229-023-04377-y
Jacopo Ambrosj, Hugh Desmond, Kris Dierickx
{"title":"The value-free ideal in codes of conduct for research integrity","authors":"Jacopo Ambrosj, Hugh Desmond, Kris Dierickx","doi":"10.1007/s11229-023-04377-y","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-023-04377-y","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":49452,"journal":{"name":"Synthese","volume":"58 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135512463","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
SynthesePub Date : 2023-10-19DOI: 10.1007/s11229-023-04363-4
Oliver Laas
{"title":"Deepfakes and trust in technology","authors":"Oliver Laas","doi":"10.1007/s11229-023-04363-4","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-023-04363-4","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":49452,"journal":{"name":"Synthese","volume":"30 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135730148","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
SynthesePub Date : 2023-10-17DOI: 10.1007/s11229-023-04362-5
Tom Kaspers
{"title":"Truth and its uses: deflationism and alethic pluralism","authors":"Tom Kaspers","doi":"10.1007/s11229-023-04362-5","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-023-04362-5","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Deflationists believe that the question “What is truth?” should be answered not by means of a metaphysical inquiry into the nature of truth, but by figuring out what use we make of the concept of truth, and the word ‘true’, in practice. This article accepts this methodology, and it thereby rejects pluralism about truth that is driven by ontological considerations. However, it shows that there are practical considerations for a pluralism about truth, formulated at the level of use . The theory expounded by this article states that truth is a dual-purpose tool; it can be used as a device for transferring justificatory burdens and, for select areas of discourse, it can also be used as a standard, a norm. This contrast in how truth is used introduces a bifurcation in our discourse that is reminiscent of metaphysical divides traced by more traditional versions of alethic pluralism. However, my pluralism “at the level of use” states that truth is plural solely at the level of use. It is unified at both the conceptual as well as the metaphysical level. At those levels, the theory takes its cue from deflationism. As such, this theory is offered as a midway point and as a potential way forward in the debate between deflationism and pluralism.","PeriodicalId":49452,"journal":{"name":"Synthese","volume":"183 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135994571","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
SynthesePub Date : 2023-10-17DOI: 10.1007/s11229-023-04335-8
Bahadir Eker
{"title":"Realism about tense and atemporality","authors":"Bahadir Eker","doi":"10.1007/s11229-023-04335-8","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-023-04335-8","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Realists about tense, or A-theorists of time, believe that some of the facts that fundamentally constitute reality are tensed, and most of them seem to think that those tensed facts are to be understood as fixing the way things are, absolutely speaking , or simpliciter . But there is a simple yet powerful argument, the argument from atemporality , to the effect that realists should reject the absolutist conception of reality’s constitution by facts because, despite appearances to the contrary, that conception is in fact inconsistent with realism about tense. After presenting the argument, I investigate why the relevant inconsistency has not been recognised so far and point to one possible explanation.","PeriodicalId":49452,"journal":{"name":"Synthese","volume":"19 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136033138","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
SynthesePub Date : 2023-10-17DOI: 10.1007/s11229-023-04364-3
Lieke Joske Franci Asma
{"title":"Implicit bias as unintentional discrimination","authors":"Lieke Joske Franci Asma","doi":"10.1007/s11229-023-04364-3","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-023-04364-3","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract In this paper, I argue that instead of primarily paying attention to the nature of implicit attitudes that are taken to cause implicit discrimination, we should investigate how discrimination can be implicit in itself. I propose to characterize implicit discrimination as unintentional discrimination: the person responds to facts unintentionally and often unconsciously which are, given their end, irrelevant and imply unfair treatment. The result is a unified account of implicit bias that allows for the different ways in which it can display itself and can be explained. Furthermore, the view can account for the central characteristics of implicit bias: (1) that it is, for a variety of reasons, difficult to control, (2) that we are not necessarily unconscious of implicit bias but not properly conscious either, and (3) that we can unintentionally discriminate regardless of whether we claim to care about fairness.","PeriodicalId":49452,"journal":{"name":"Synthese","volume":"56 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135993658","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
SynthesePub Date : 2023-10-17DOI: 10.1007/s11229-023-04347-4
Clint Hurshman
{"title":"Artifacts and intervention: a persistence theory of artifact functions","authors":"Clint Hurshman","doi":"10.1007/s11229-023-04347-4","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-023-04347-4","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":49452,"journal":{"name":"Synthese","volume":"76 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135995742","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
SynthesePub Date : 2023-10-17DOI: 10.1007/s11229-023-04360-7
Laura Caponetto, Luca San Mauro, Giorgio Venturi
{"title":"How to make (mathematical) assertions with directives","authors":"Laura Caponetto, Luca San Mauro, Giorgio Venturi","doi":"10.1007/s11229-023-04360-7","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-023-04360-7","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract It is prima facie uncontroversial that the justification of an assertion amounts to a collection of other (inferentially related) assertions. In this paper, we point at a class of assertions, i.e. mathematical assertions, that appear to systematically flout this principle. To justify a mathematical assertion (e.g. a theorem) is to provide a proof—and proofs are sequences of directives. The claim is backed up by linguistic data on the use of imperatives in proofs, and by a pragmatic analysis of theorems and their proofs. Proofs, we argue, are sequences of instructions whose performance inevitably gets one to truth. It follows that a felicitous theorem, i.e. a theorem that has been correctly proven, is a persuasive theorem. When it comes to mathematical assertions, there is no sharp distinction between illocutionary and perlocutionary success.","PeriodicalId":49452,"journal":{"name":"Synthese","volume":"18 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135993363","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}