Journal of Cryptographic Engineering最新文献_第7页

A critical view on the real-world security of logic locking. 逻辑锁在现实世界中的安全性。

IF 1.9 4区计算机科学

Journal of Cryptographic Engineering Pub Date : 2022-01-01 Epub Date: 2022-08-20 DOI: 10.1007/s13389-022-00294-x

Susanne Engels, Max Hoffmann, Christof Paar

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引用次数: 1

Improving recent side-channel attacks against the DES key schedule 改进了最近针对DES密钥调度的侧信道攻击

IF 1.9 4区计算机科学

Journal of Cryptographic Engineering Pub Date : 2021-12-04 DOI: 10.1007/s13389-021-00279-2

A. Wiemers, Johannes Mittmann

引用次数: 2

Optimized threshold implementations: securing cryptographic accelerators for low-energy and low-latency applications 优化的阈值实现：为低能耗和低延迟应用程序保护加密加速器

IF 1.9 4区计算机科学

Journal of Cryptographic Engineering Pub Date : 2021-11-25 DOI: 10.1007/s13389-021-00276-5

Dušan Božilov, Miroslav Knezevic, V. Nikov

引用次数: 12

In-depth energy analysis of security algorithms and protocols for the Internet of Things 物联网安全算法和协议的深度能量分析

IF 1.9 4区计算机科学

Journal of Cryptographic Engineering Pub Date : 2021-11-24 DOI: 10.1007/s13389-021-00274-7

J. Winderickx, An Braeken, Dave Singelée, N. Mentens

引用次数: 4

Spatial dependency analysis to extract information from side-channel mixtures: extended version 从侧通道混合物中提取信息的空间相关性分析：扩展版本

IF 1.9 4区计算机科学

Journal of Cryptographic Engineering Pub Date : 2021-11-15 DOI: 10.1145/3474376.3487280

Aurélien Vasselle, Hugues Thiebeauld, P. Maurine

{"title":"Spatial dependency analysis to extract information from side-channel mixtures: extended version","authors":"Aurélien Vasselle, Hugues Thiebeauld, P. Maurine","doi":"10.1145/3474376.3487280","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3474376.3487280","url":null,"abstract":"Practical side-channel attacks on recent devices may be challenging due to the poor quality of acquired signals. It can originate from different factors, such as the growing architecture complexity, especially in System-on-Chips, creating unpredictable and concurrent operation of multiple signal sources in the device. This work makes use of mixture distributions to formalize this complexity, allowing us to explain the benefit of using a technique like Scatter, where different samples of the traces are aggregated into the same distribution. Some observations of the conditional mixture distributions are made in order to model the leakage in such context. From this, we infer local coherency of information held in the distribution as a general expression of the leakage in mixture distributions. This leads us to introduce how spatial analysis tools, such as Moran’s Index, can be used to significantly improve non-profiled attacks compared to other techniques from the state-of-the-art. Exploitation of this technique is experimentally shown very promising, as demonstrated by its application on two AES implementations including masking and shuffling countermeasures.","PeriodicalId":48508,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Cryptographic Engineering","volume":"1 1","pages":"1-17"},"PeriodicalIF":1.9,"publicationDate":"2021-11-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48475659","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"计算机科学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 3

Sycon: a new milestone in designing ASCON-like permutations Sycon:设计ascon类排列的新里程碑

IF 1.9 4区计算机科学

Journal of Cryptographic Engineering Pub Date : 2021-10-08 DOI: 10.1007/s13389-021-00272-9

K. Mandal, Dhiman Saha, Sumanta Sarkar, Yosuke Todo

引用次数: 4

Breaking TrustZone memory isolation and secure boot through malicious hardware on a modern FPGA-SoC 通过现代FPGA-SoC上的恶意硬件打破TrustZone内存隔离和安全启动

IF 1.9 4区计算机科学

Journal of Cryptographic Engineering Pub Date : 2021-09-15 DOI: 10.1007/s13389-021-00273-8

Mathieu Gross, Nisha Jacob, A. Zankl, G. Sigl

引用次数: 4

The SQALE of CSIDH: sublinear Vélu quantum-resistant isogeny action with low exponents CSIDH的SQALE:低指数的亚线性vsamulu抗量子等构作用

IF 1.9 4区计算机科学

Journal of Cryptographic Engineering Pub Date : 2021-08-31 DOI: 10.1007/s13389-021-00271-w

J. Chávez-Saab, Jesús-Javier Chi-Domínguez, Samuel Jaques, F. Rodríguez-Henríquez

引用次数: 29

The ASHES 2019 special issue at JCEN ASHES2019 JCEN特刊

IF 1.9 4区计算机科学

Journal of Cryptographic Engineering Pub Date : 2021-08-22 DOI: 10.1007/s13389-021-00270-x

Chip-Hong Chang, Daniel E. Holcomb, U. Rührmair, P. Schaumont

引用次数: 0

Rank estimation with bounded error via exponential sampling 基于指数抽样的有界误差秩估计

IF 1.9 4区计算机科学

Journal of Cryptographic Engineering Pub Date : 2021-08-04 DOI: 10.1007/s13389-021-00269-4

Liron David, A. Wool

引用次数: 3