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Dynamic Amnesty Programs 动态大赦计划
IF 10.7 1区 经济学
American Economic Review Pub Date : 2022-12-01 DOI: 10.1257/aer.20211428
Samuel Kapon
{"title":"Dynamic Amnesty Programs","authors":"Samuel Kapon","doi":"10.1257/aer.20211428","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20211428","url":null,"abstract":"A regulator faces a stream of agents engaged in crimes with stochastic returns. The regulator designs an amnesty program, committing to a time path of punishments for criminals who report their crimes. In an optimal program, time variation in the returns from crime can generate time variation in the generosity of amnesty. I construct an optimal time path and show that it exhibits amnesty cycles. Amnesty becomes increasingly generous over time until it hits a bound, after which the cycle resets. Agents engaged in high return crime report at the end of each cycle, while agents engaged in low return crime report always. (JEL D82, D86, K42)","PeriodicalId":48472,"journal":{"name":"American Economic Review","volume":"47 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":10.7,"publicationDate":"2022-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"82591797","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 5
Job Search and Hiring with Limited Information about Workseekers’ Skills 关于求职者技能信息有限的求职和招聘
IF 10.7 1区 经济学
American Economic Review Pub Date : 2022-11-01 DOI: 10.1257/aer.20200961
Eliana Carranza, R. Garlick, K. Orkin, Neil A. Rankin
{"title":"Job Search and Hiring with Limited Information about Workseekers’ Skills","authors":"Eliana Carranza, R. Garlick, K. Orkin, Neil A. Rankin","doi":"10.1257/aer.20200961","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20200961","url":null,"abstract":"We assess South African workseekers’ skills and disseminate the assessment results to explore how limited information affects firm and workseeker behavior. Giving workseekers assessment results that they can credibly share with firms increases workseekers’ employment and earnings and better aligns their skills, beliefs and search strategies. Giving workseekers assessment results that they cannot easily share with firms has similar effects on beliefs and search, but smaller effects on employment and earnings. Giving assessment results only to firms shifts interview decisions. These findings show that getting credible skill information to the right agents can improve outcomes in the labor market. (JEL J22, J23, J24, J31, J41, J64, O15)","PeriodicalId":48472,"journal":{"name":"American Economic Review","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":10.7,"publicationDate":"2022-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"89511695","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 13
Human Capital Depreciation and Returns to Experience 人力资本折旧与经验回报
IF 10.7 1区 经济学
American Economic Review Pub Date : 2022-11-01 DOI: 10.1257/aer.20201571
Michael Dinerstein, Rigissa Megalokonomou, Constantine Yannelis
{"title":"Human Capital Depreciation and Returns to Experience","authors":"Michael Dinerstein, Rigissa Megalokonomou, Constantine Yannelis","doi":"10.1257/aer.20201571","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20201571","url":null,"abstract":"Human capital can depreciate if skills are unused. But estimating human capital depreciation is challenging, as worker skills are difficult to measure and less productive workers are more likely to spend time in nonemployment. We overcome these challenges with new administrative data on teachers’ assignments and their students’ outcomes, and quasi-random variation from the teacher assignment process in Greece. We find significant losses to output, as a one-year increase in time without formal employment lowers students’ test scores by 0.05 standard deviations. Using a simple production model, we estimate a skill depreciation rate of 4.3 percent and experience returns of 6.8 percent. (JEL I21, J24, J45, J64, J65)","PeriodicalId":48472,"journal":{"name":"American Economic Review","volume":"22 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":10.7,"publicationDate":"2022-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"85460066","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 5
Persistent Polarizing Effects of Persuasion: Experimental Evidence from Turkey 说服的持续极化效应:来自土耳其的实验证据
IF 10.7 1区 经济学
American Economic Review Pub Date : 2022-11-01 DOI: 10.1257/aer.20201892
C. Baysan
{"title":"Persistent Polarizing Effects of Persuasion: Experimental Evidence from Turkey","authors":"C. Baysan","doi":"10.1257/aer.20201892","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20201892","url":null,"abstract":"I evaluate randomly varied neighborhood exposure to information campaigns regarding either executive performance, or increases in executive power, prior to a Turkish referendum on weakening checks and balances on the executive. The campaigns increased voter polarization over the referendum, and subsequently changed party affiliation in national and local elections over the next two years, leading to partisan polarization. My results suggest that, when voters disagree on whether increasing executive power is a good policy, more information can increase voter polarization. Finally, I conclude that because potential polarization is often ignored, the impact of information campaigns on civil society is underestimated. (JEL D72, D83, O17)","PeriodicalId":48472,"journal":{"name":"American Economic Review","volume":"91 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":10.7,"publicationDate":"2022-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"80351611","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 3
Posterior Separable Cost of Information 后验可分离信息代价
IF 10.7 1区 经济学
American Economic Review Pub Date : 2022-10-01 DOI: 10.1257/aer.20211252
Tommaso Denti
{"title":"Posterior Separable Cost of Information","authors":"Tommaso Denti","doi":"10.1257/aer.20211252","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20211252","url":null,"abstract":"We provide testable conditions under which the cost of acquiring information is given by the expected reduction of a measure of uncertainty (e.g., entropy). The assumption, under the name of posterior separability, is nearly universal in the literature of rational inattention; yet, a testable characterization has been lacking. In applications to experimental data, we indicate situations in which posterior separability is—and is not—a compelling assumption for the cost of information; we propose a generalization to address some of its shortcomings. We also show how to identify and estimate nonparametrically the cost of information from observable choice behavior. (JEL C91, D11, D12, D81, D91)","PeriodicalId":48472,"journal":{"name":"American Economic Review","volume":"91 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":10.7,"publicationDate":"2022-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"83913447","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 34
Persistent Overconfidence and Biased Memory: Evidence from Managers 持续过度自信和偏见记忆:来自管理者的证据
IF 10.7 1区 经济学
American Economic Review Pub Date : 2022-10-01 DOI: 10.1257/aer.20190668
David Huffman, Collin Raymond, J. Shvets
{"title":"Persistent Overconfidence and Biased Memory: Evidence from Managers","authors":"David Huffman, Collin Raymond, J. Shvets","doi":"10.1257/aer.20190668","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20190668","url":null,"abstract":"A long-standing puzzle is how overconfidence can persist in settings characterized by repeated feedback. This paper studies managers who participate repeatedly in a high-powered tournament incentive system, learning relative performance each time. Using reduced form and structural methods we find that (i) managers make over-confident predictions about future performance; (ii) managers have overly positive memories of past performance; (iii) the two phenomena are linked at an individual level. Our results are consistent with models of motivated beliefs in which individuals are motivated to distort memories of feedback and preserve unrealistic expectations. (JEL D82, D83, J33, L25, L81, M52, M54)","PeriodicalId":48472,"journal":{"name":"American Economic Review","volume":"35 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":10.7,"publicationDate":"2022-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"81460967","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 43
Credit, Attention, and Externalities in the Adoption of Energy Efficient Technologies by Low-Income Households 低收入家庭采用节能技术的信贷、关注和外部性
IF 10.7 1区 经济学
American Economic Review Pub Date : 2022-10-01 DOI: 10.1257/aer.20210766
Susanna Berkouwer, Joshua T. Dean
{"title":"Credit, Attention, and Externalities in the Adoption of Energy Efficient Technologies by Low-Income Households","authors":"Susanna Berkouwer, Joshua T. Dean","doi":"10.1257/aer.20210766","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20210766","url":null,"abstract":"We study an energy efficient charcoal cookstove in an experiment with 1,000 households in Nairobi. We estimate a 39 percent reduction in charcoal spending, which matches engineering estimates, generating a 295 percent annual return. Despite fuel savings of $237 over the stove’s two-year lifespan—and $295 in emissions reductions—households are only willing to pay $12. Drawing attention to energy savings does not increase demand. However, a loan more than doubles willingness to pay: credit constraints prevent adoption of privately optimal technologies. Energy efficient technologies could drive sustainable development by slowing greenhouse emissions while saving households money. (JEL D12, D91, G51, O12, O13, O32, Q54)","PeriodicalId":48472,"journal":{"name":"American Economic Review","volume":"26 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":10.7,"publicationDate":"2022-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"84471137","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 28
Demagogues and the Economic Fragility of Democracies 煽动者和民主国家的经济脆弱性
IF 10.7 1区 经济学
American Economic Review Pub Date : 2022-10-01 DOI: 10.1257/aer.20211125
D. Bernhardt, Stefan Krasa, Mehdi Shadmehr
{"title":"Demagogues and the Economic Fragility of Democracies","authors":"D. Bernhardt, Stefan Krasa, Mehdi Shadmehr","doi":"10.1257/aer.20211125","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20211125","url":null,"abstract":"We investigate the susceptibility of democracies to demagogues, studying tensions between representatives who guard voters’ long-run interests and demagogues who cater to voters’ short-run desires. Parties propose consumption and investment. Voters base choices on current-period consumption and valence shocks. Younger/poorer economies and economically disadvantaged voters are attracted to the demagogue’s disinvestment policies, forcing farsighted representatives to mimic them. This electoral competition can destroy democracy: if capital falls below a critical level, a death spiral ensues with capital stocks falling thereafter. We identify when economic development mitigates this risk and characterize how the death-spiral risk declines as capital grows large. (JEL D72, E21, E22, E32)","PeriodicalId":48472,"journal":{"name":"American Economic Review","volume":"130 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":10.7,"publicationDate":"2022-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"83990111","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 4
Methods Matter: p-Hacking and Publication Bias in Causal Analysis in Economics: Reply 方法:经济学因果分析中的p-Hacking和发表偏倚
IF 10.7 1区 经济学
American Economic Review Pub Date : 2022-09-01 DOI: 10.1257/aer.20220277
A. Brodeur, Nikolai Cook, A. Heyes
{"title":"Methods Matter: p-Hacking and Publication Bias in Causal Analysis in Economics: Reply","authors":"A. Brodeur, Nikolai Cook, A. Heyes","doi":"10.1257/aer.20220277","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20220277","url":null,"abstract":"In Brodeur, Cook, and Heyes (2020) we present evidence that instrumental variable (and to a lesser extent difference-in-difference) articles are more p-hacked than randomized controlled trial and regression discontinuity design articles. We also find no evidence that (i) articles published in the top five journals are different; (ii) the “revise and resubmit” process mitigates the problem; (iii) things are improving through time. Kranz and Pütz (2022) apply a novel adjustment to address rounding errors. They successfully replicate our results with the exception of our shakiest finding: after adjusting for rounding errors, bunching of test statistics for difference-in-difference articles is now smaller around the 5 percent level (and coincidentally larger at the 10 percent level). (JEL A14, C12, C52)","PeriodicalId":48472,"journal":{"name":"American Economic Review","volume":"44 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":10.7,"publicationDate":"2022-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"82620533","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
The Rise and Fall of Local Elections in China 中国地方选举的兴衰
IF 10.7 1区 经济学
American Economic Review Pub Date : 2022-09-01 DOI: 10.1257/aer.20181249
Monica Martinez-Bravo, Gerard Padró i Miquel, Nancy Qian, Yang Yao
{"title":"The Rise and Fall of Local Elections in China","authors":"Monica Martinez-Bravo, Gerard Padró i Miquel, Nancy Qian, Yang Yao","doi":"10.1257/aer.20181249","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20181249","url":null,"abstract":"We posit that autocrats introduce local elections when their bureaucratic capacity is low. Local elections exploit citizens’ informational advantage in keeping local officials accountable, but they also weaken vertical control. As bureaucratic capacity increases, the autocrat limits the role of elected bodies to regain vertical control. We argue that these insights can explain the introduction of village elections in rural China and the subsequent erosion of village autonomy years later. We construct a novel dataset to document political reforms, policy outcomes, and de facto power for almost four decades. We find that the introduction of elections improves popular policies and weakens unpopular ones. Increases in regional government resources lead to loss of village autonomy, but less so in remote villages. These patterns are consistent with an organizational view of local elections within autocracies. (JEL D72, D73, D83, O17, O18, P25, P26)","PeriodicalId":48472,"journal":{"name":"American Economic Review","volume":"57 61 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":10.7,"publicationDate":"2022-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"77793918","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 18
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