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De-SPAC performance under better aligned sponsor contracts 在更一致的赞助商合同下的De-SPAC表现
IF 3.6 2区 经济学
Journal of Banking & Finance Pub Date : 2025-03-27 DOI: 10.1016/j.jbankfin.2025.107440
Yao-Min Chiang , Woojin Kim , Bokyung Park , Tae Jun Yoon
{"title":"De-SPAC performance under better aligned sponsor contracts","authors":"Yao-Min Chiang ,&nbsp;Woojin Kim ,&nbsp;Bokyung Park ,&nbsp;Tae Jun Yoon","doi":"10.1016/j.jbankfin.2025.107440","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jbankfin.2025.107440","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We examine the implications of special purpose acquisition companies (SPACs) in South Korea, where sponsor contracts are better aligned than in the U.S. Unlike in U.S. where SPAC targets (de-SPACs)' post-merger prices generally fall below the SPAC IPO offer price due to distorted incentives of the SPAC sponsors, Korean de-SPACs' prices tend to remain above the initial SPAC price. The better alignment of incentives results in positive or at least non-negative average buy-and-hold returns and excess portfolio returns in Korean de-SPACs, which contrast with the negative long-run performance observed in the U.S. Korean de-SPACs also increase investment more than matched private firms following the listing. Overall, our results suggest that better aligned sponsor contracts may incentivize sponsors to target high-quality firms, enhancing post-merger performance.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48460,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Banking & Finance","volume":"176 ","pages":"Article 107440"},"PeriodicalIF":3.6,"publicationDate":"2025-03-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143817288","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Renegotiation of international loans, capital regulation, and monetary policy 重新谈判国际贷款、资本监管和货币政策
IF 3.6 2区 经济学
Journal of Banking & Finance Pub Date : 2025-03-27 DOI: 10.1016/j.jbankfin.2025.107443
Kerron Joseph , Ca Nguyen , John K. Wald
{"title":"Renegotiation of international loans, capital regulation, and monetary policy","authors":"Kerron Joseph ,&nbsp;Ca Nguyen ,&nbsp;John K. Wald","doi":"10.1016/j.jbankfin.2025.107443","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jbankfin.2025.107443","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We analyze how changes in capital requirements and policy rate shocks affect international lenders’ decisions to drop out of syndicated loans. Increases in capital requirements in the lender country and decreases in borrower country policy rates imply a greater likelihood that foreign lenders stop supplying capital in international syndicated loans. These results are robust to the inclusion of borrower country, lender country, and loan-round fixed effects. Using lender country capital regulations as instruments, we find evidence of significant economic spillover effects as international lender exits imply smaller loan amounts and shorter maturities. Economic Policy Uncertainty (EPU) and culture variables also help explain lenders’ decisions to exit a syndicate.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48460,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Banking & Finance","volume":"176 ","pages":"Article 107443"},"PeriodicalIF":3.6,"publicationDate":"2025-03-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143817173","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Connections with investment banks and their value: Evidence from seasoned equity offerings 与投资银行的关系及其价值：来自经验丰富的股票发行的证据
IF 3.6 2区 经济学
Journal of Banking & Finance Pub Date : 2025-03-27 DOI: 10.1016/j.jbankfin.2025.107441
Ying Dou , Yulia Merkoulova , Betty Wu
{"title":"Connections with investment banks and their value: Evidence from seasoned equity offerings","authors":"Ying Dou ,&nbsp;Yulia Merkoulova ,&nbsp;Betty Wu","doi":"10.1016/j.jbankfin.2025.107441","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jbankfin.2025.107441","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>External networks are usually believed to add value, but what happens when the connected parties have conflicting interests in a transaction? We study the impact of social connections between seasoned equity offering (SEO) issuers and their lead underwriters on SEO outcomes. We find that, during accelerated offerings, connected issuers profit substantially from their links to investment banks through both lower direct issuance costs and smaller SEO discounts. Results of an event study based on the sudden collapse of Lehman Brothers show that the effect of connections is causal. We present evidence supporting an information flow hypothesis that connections improve deal outcomes by facilitating more efficient information exchange.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48460,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Banking & Finance","volume":"175 ","pages":"Article 107441"},"PeriodicalIF":3.6,"publicationDate":"2025-03-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143761212","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Are enhanced creditor rights in bankruptcy desirable to shareholders? Evidence from the cost of equity capital 破产案中债权人权利的增强是否对股东有利？证据来自权益资本成本
IF 3.6 2区 经济学
Journal of Banking & Finance Pub Date : 2025-03-27 DOI: 10.1016/j.jbankfin.2025.107442
Xiaoran Ni , Jin Xu , David Yin
{"title":"Are enhanced creditor rights in bankruptcy desirable to shareholders? Evidence from the cost of equity capital","authors":"Xiaoran Ni ,&nbsp;Jin Xu ,&nbsp;David Yin","doi":"10.1016/j.jbankfin.2025.107442","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jbankfin.2025.107442","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Stronger creditor rights in bankruptcy are often viewed as adding deadweight costs and leading to inefficient liquidation. However, ex ante, they also increase firms' borrowing capacity and reduce financial constraints. This study investigates shareholders' overall attitudes toward enhanced creditor rights in bankruptcy by examining the impact of the staggered adoption of anti-recharacterization laws across U.S. states on the cost of equity capital. We find that the strengthening of creditor rights leads to a significant reduction in the cost of equity capital, with the effect being more pronounced among financially constrained firms and firms with more growth opportunities and volatile cash flows. The reduction is stronger among firms that are more likely to utilize securitized debt. Overall, our results suggest that enhanced creditor rights in bankruptcy improve shareholder value through increased borrowing capacity.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48460,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Banking & Finance","volume":"175 ","pages":"Article 107442"},"PeriodicalIF":3.6,"publicationDate":"2025-03-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143769327","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Measuring the impact of changing deposit insurance coverage levels: Findings from Colombia 衡量存款保险覆盖水平变化的影响：来自哥伦比亚的调查结果
IF 3.6 2区 经济学
Journal of Banking & Finance Pub Date : 2025-03-25 DOI: 10.1016/j.jbankfin.2025.107435
Juan C. Quintero-V
{"title":"Measuring the impact of changing deposit insurance coverage levels: Findings from Colombia","authors":"Juan C. Quintero-V","doi":"10.1016/j.jbankfin.2025.107435","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jbankfin.2025.107435","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This paper examines the effects on social welfare of changes in coverage levels within deposit insurance schemes. It utilizes a solid theoretical framework and takes advantage of a quasi-natural experiment and bank-level data to measure the impact of an increase in Colombia’s deposit insurance coverage level. For the case studied, the benefits outweigh the costs, resulting in a positive net impact on welfare. However, some banks concentrate most of the gains. The size of a bank, its probability of default, and the change in the percentage of insured deposits that occurred due to the increase in the coverage level are critical. Two extensions of the main model are also analyzed. The first allows banks to be bailed out because of “too-big-to-fail” considerations, and the second incorporates banks’ reaction to the increase in the coverage level. The benefits of increasing the coverage level remain positive in both cases but are lower than using the main model.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48460,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Banking & Finance","volume":"175 ","pages":"Article 107435"},"PeriodicalIF":3.6,"publicationDate":"2025-03-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143746749","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Inequality and capital structure 不平等与资本结构
IF 3.6 2区 经济学
Journal of Banking & Finance Pub Date : 2025-03-22 DOI: 10.1016/j.jbankfin.2025.107432
Stefano Lugo
{"title":"Inequality and capital structure","authors":"Stefano Lugo","doi":"10.1016/j.jbankfin.2025.107432","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jbankfin.2025.107432","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>High-income individuals direct a higher share of their savings toward the stock market and a lower share toward credit markets and bank deposits. An increase in income inequality thus translates into an expected decrease in the relative supply of debt capital. Nonfinancial corporations are predicted to cater to these shifts by adjusting their capital structure. Results from instrumental variable models estimated on a panel sample of either US or non-US corporations and several robustness checks empirically support this prediction. Consistent with the theorized household portfolio channel, the negative relation between leverage and local income inequality is driven by corporations less likely to have access to non-local capital markets. This result is confirmed when exploiting the introduction of the euro as an exogenous shock to European firms’ relative exposure to non-domestic investors.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48460,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Banking & Finance","volume":"174 ","pages":"Article 107432"},"PeriodicalIF":3.6,"publicationDate":"2025-03-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143695918","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Financial misconduct and bank risk-taking: Evidence from US banks 金融不端行为与银行冒险：来自美国银行的证据
IF 3.6 2区 经济学
Journal of Banking & Finance Pub Date : 2025-03-21 DOI: 10.1016/j.jbankfin.2025.107433
John Thornton , Yener Altunbaş , Yurtsev Uymaz
{"title":"Financial misconduct and bank risk-taking: Evidence from US banks","authors":"John Thornton ,&nbsp;Yener Altunbaş ,&nbsp;Yurtsev Uymaz","doi":"10.1016/j.jbankfin.2025.107433","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jbankfin.2025.107433","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We test for a link between bank risk-taking and regulatory enforcements against US banks for financial misconduct. Misconduct-related enforcements are associated with increased bank risk-taking on several measures of risk, and there is some evidence that the impact of enforcements on risk-taking is accentuated in the presence of powerful CEOs and a higher proportion of institutional investor ownership and mitigated when executive boards are larger, older, more independent, more gender diverse, busier, and where independent directors are relatively inexperienced. The results are robust to alternative measures of bank risk-taking, and alternative estimation techniques, including controlling for endogeneity bias.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48460,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Banking & Finance","volume":"177 ","pages":"Article 107433"},"PeriodicalIF":3.6,"publicationDate":"2025-03-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144221210","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Stock market experience and investor overconfidence: Do investors learn to be overconfident? 股市经验与投资者过度自信：投资者是否学会过度自信？
IF 3.6 2区 经济学
Journal of Banking & Finance Pub Date : 2025-03-17 DOI: 10.1016/j.jbankfin.2025.107431
Gennaro Bernile , Yosef Bonaparte , Stefanos Delikouras
{"title":"Stock market experience and investor overconfidence: Do investors learn to be overconfident?","authors":"Gennaro Bernile ,&nbsp;Yosef Bonaparte ,&nbsp;Stefanos Delikouras","doi":"10.1016/j.jbankfin.2025.107431","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jbankfin.2025.107431","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Investor overconfidence, characterized by an excessive belief in the ability to generate superior portfolio returns, is a widely studied behavioral bias. This paper investigates the mechanisms underlying overconfidence using a Bayesian model that incorporates two features: biased prior beliefs, which imply overconfidence even before investors engage in the stock market, and biased learning, where investors overemphasize instances of outperforming the market. Empirical analysis supports the hypothesis that biased learning contributes to overconfidence, but only in the early years of investor tenure. Although overconfidence decreases with investment experience, we find that it is a widespread and persistent behavioral trait.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48460,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Banking & Finance","volume":"174 ","pages":"Article 107431"},"PeriodicalIF":3.6,"publicationDate":"2025-03-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143704113","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Bank misconduct: The deterrent effect of country governance and customer reaction 银行不当行为：国家治理的威慑效应与客户反应
IF 3.6 2区 经济学
Journal of Banking & Finance Pub Date : 2025-03-15 DOI: 10.1016/j.jbankfin.2025.107434
Alessandro Carretta , Doriana Cucinelli , Lucrezia Fattobene , Paola Schwizer
{"title":"Bank misconduct: The deterrent effect of country governance and customer reaction","authors":"Alessandro Carretta ,&nbsp;Doriana Cucinelli ,&nbsp;Lucrezia Fattobene ,&nbsp;Paola Schwizer","doi":"10.1016/j.jbankfin.2025.107434","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jbankfin.2025.107434","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Using a proprietary, hand-collected database of 251 sanctions issued by national and international authorities on 109 European banks, we investigate the deterrent effect of governance effectiveness at the country level on detected bank misconduct from 2009 to 2019. We also examine the impact of detected bank misconduct on depositor behavior to investigate how customer reaction is shaped by media coverage. Our empirical strategy based on probit and panel fixed effects shows the existence of a deterrent effect exerted by country governance effectiveness. Moreover, the instrumental regressions show that depositors react to detected bank misconduct by withdrawing their funds and that this reaction is stronger when news coverage is high.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48460,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Banking & Finance","volume":"174 ","pages":"Article 107434"},"PeriodicalIF":3.6,"publicationDate":"2025-03-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143687448","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Regulating bank risk in a mobile labour market 管理流动劳动力市场中的银行风险
IF 3.6 2区 经济学
Journal of Banking & Finance Pub Date : 2025-03-11 DOI: 10.1016/j.jbankfin.2025.107421
Anton van Boxtel
{"title":"Regulating bank risk in a mobile labour market","authors":"Anton van Boxtel","doi":"10.1016/j.jbankfin.2025.107421","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jbankfin.2025.107421","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This paper argues that bonus caps can be welfare improving in banking labour markets with high mobility. On the labour market, the largest banks hire the most talented traders, but they need to do so with contracts with high bonuses in order to both screen talent and to prevent poaching by smaller banks. This can lead to excessive risk taking. In some cases, it is socially optimal to prevent screening, leading to a less efficient matching of talent to banks, but also to less risk taking. Bonus caps can achieve this in a way that is both more effective and less costly than setting tighter capital constraints.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48460,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Banking & Finance","volume":"175 ","pages":"Article 107421"},"PeriodicalIF":3.6,"publicationDate":"2025-03-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143761213","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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