银行不当行为:国家治理的威慑效应与客户反应

IF 3.8 2区 经济学 Q1 BUSINESS, FINANCE
Alessandro Carretta , Doriana Cucinelli , Lucrezia Fattobene , Paola Schwizer
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引用次数: 0

摘要

利用国家和国际当局对109家欧洲银行发布的251项制裁的专有手工收集数据库,我们研究了2009年至2019年国家层面治理有效性对发现的银行不当行为的威慑作用。我们还研究了被发现的银行不当行为对存款人行为的影响,以调查客户的反应如何受到媒体报道的影响。我们基于probit效应和面板固定效应的实证策略表明,国家治理有效性存在威慑效应。此外,工具回归表明,存款人对发现的银行不当行为的反应是提取他们的资金,当新闻报道高时,这种反应更强烈。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Bank misconduct: The deterrent effect of country governance and customer reaction
Using a proprietary, hand-collected database of 251 sanctions issued by national and international authorities on 109 European banks, we investigate the deterrent effect of governance effectiveness at the country level on detected bank misconduct from 2009 to 2019. We also examine the impact of detected bank misconduct on depositor behavior to investigate how customer reaction is shaped by media coverage. Our empirical strategy based on probit and panel fixed effects shows the existence of a deterrent effect exerted by country governance effectiveness. Moreover, the instrumental regressions show that depositors react to detected bank misconduct by withdrawing their funds and that this reaction is stronger when news coverage is high.
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来源期刊
CiteScore
6.40
自引率
5.40%
发文量
262
期刊介绍: The Journal of Banking and Finance (JBF) publishes theoretical and empirical research papers spanning all the major research fields in finance and banking. The aim of the Journal of Banking and Finance is to provide an outlet for the increasing flow of scholarly research concerning financial institutions and the money and capital markets within which they function. The Journal''s emphasis is on theoretical developments and their implementation, empirical, applied, and policy-oriented research in banking and other domestic and international financial institutions and markets. The Journal''s purpose is to improve communications between, and within, the academic and other research communities and policymakers and operational decision makers at financial institutions - private and public, national and international, and their regulators. The Journal is one of the largest Finance journals, with approximately 1500 new submissions per year, mainly in the following areas: Asset Management; Asset Pricing; Banking (Efficiency, Regulation, Risk Management, Solvency); Behavioural Finance; Capital Structure; Corporate Finance; Corporate Governance; Derivative Pricing and Hedging; Distribution Forecasting with Financial Applications; Entrepreneurial Finance; Empirical Finance; Financial Economics; Financial Markets (Alternative, Bonds, Currency, Commodity, Derivatives, Equity, Energy, Real Estate); FinTech; Fund Management; General Equilibrium Models; High-Frequency Trading; Intermediation; International Finance; Hedge Funds; Investments; Liquidity; Market Efficiency; Market Microstructure; Mergers and Acquisitions; Networks; Performance Analysis; Political Risk; Portfolio Optimization; Regulation of Financial Markets and Institutions; Risk Management and Analysis; Systemic Risk; Term Structure Models; Venture Capital.
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