{"title":"Paying by Donating: Corporate Donations Affiliated with Independent Directors","authors":"Ye Cai, Jin Xu, Jun Yang","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2801817","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2801817","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Corporate donations to charities affiliated with the board’s independent directors (affiliated donations) are large and mostly undetected due to lack of formal disclosure. Affiliated donations may impair independent directors’ monitoring incentives. CEO compensation is on average 9.4% higher at firms making affiliated donations than at other firms, and it is much higher when the compensation committee chair or a large fraction of compensation committee members are involved. We find suggestive evidence that CEOs are unlikely to be replaced for poor performance when firms donate to charities affiliated with a large fraction of the board or when they donate large amounts.","PeriodicalId":48446,"journal":{"name":"Accounting Review","volume":"396 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":4.1,"publicationDate":"2020-05-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"78086643","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Trading and Shareholder Democracy","authors":"D. Levit, Nadya Malenko, Ernst Maug","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3463129","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3463129","url":null,"abstract":"We study shareholder voting in a model in which trading affects the composition of the shareholder base. In this model, trading and voting are complementary, which gives rise to self-fulfilling expectations about proposal acceptance. We show three main results. First, increasing liquidity and trading opportunities may reduce prices and welfare, because it allows shareholders with more extreme preferences to accumulate large positions and impose their views on more moderate shareholders through voting. Second, prices and welfare can move in opposite directions, which suggests that the former is an invalid proxy for the latter. Third, delegation of the decision to a board of directors may strictly improve shareholder value. However, the optimal board is generally biased, should not be representative of current shareholders, and may not always garner voting support from the majority of shareholders.","PeriodicalId":48446,"journal":{"name":"Accounting Review","volume":"26 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":4.1,"publicationDate":"2019-09-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"79510005","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Do Director Networks Help Managers Forecast Better?","authors":"M. Schabus","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2824070","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2824070","url":null,"abstract":"I examine whether directors' superior access to information through their board network improves the accuracy of firms' forecasting. Managers may benefit from well-connected directors (i.e., board centrality) as they may have limited insight into market developments or decision-making processes of other firms beyond knowledge specific to their firm. Employing a sample of U.S.-listed companies, I separately examine the effect of within-firm variation in direct and indirect board connections on management earnings forecast accuracy. The study contributes by showing that higher-degree connections can have an economically significant effect on the accuracy of management forecasts, regardless of firms' board interlocks. Further analyses point toward well-connected directors' ability to provide managers with valuable advice in a forecasting context, which complements directors' more extensively studied role in preventing managerial expropriation.","PeriodicalId":48446,"journal":{"name":"Accounting Review","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":4.1,"publicationDate":"2019-03-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.2139/ssrn.2824070","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48072385","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Review of Corporate Governance Bundle","authors":"Dr. Ahmed Al-Baidhani د. احمد البيضاني","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2462863","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2462863","url":null,"abstract":"Due to the importance of corporate governance in our business world today, especially after the frequent non-stop financial crises, and since one corporate governance mechanism may not fulfill the purpose, researchers recently came up with a bundle of corporate governance mechanisms which may complement each other or substitute one another. This paper reviews the literature as regards the evolution, development, current application, and potential future use of this bundle, together with relevant critiques.","PeriodicalId":48446,"journal":{"name":"Accounting Review","volume":"23 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":4.1,"publicationDate":"2014-07-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"81328617","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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