通过捐赠支付:与独立董事相关的企业捐赠

IF 4.4 3区 管理学 Q1 BUSINESS, FINANCE
Ye Cai, Jin Xu, Jun Yang
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引用次数: 17

摘要

公司对与董事会独立董事有关联的慈善机构的捐款(关联捐款)数额巨大,由于缺乏正式披露,这些捐款大多未被发现。关联捐赠可能损害独立董事的监督激励。接受关联捐赠的公司CEO的薪酬平均比其他公司高9.4%,当薪酬委员会主席或很大一部分薪酬委员会成员参与其中时,CEO的薪酬要高得多。我们发现有启发性的证据表明,当公司向与董事会有很大一部分关联的慈善机构捐款时,或者当ceo捐款数额很大时,他们不太可能因业绩不佳而被替换。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Paying by Donating: Corporate Donations Affiliated with Independent Directors
Corporate donations to charities affiliated with the board’s independent directors (affiliated donations) are large and mostly undetected due to lack of formal disclosure. Affiliated donations may impair independent directors’ monitoring incentives. CEO compensation is on average 9.4% higher at firms making affiliated donations than at other firms, and it is much higher when the compensation committee chair or a large fraction of compensation committee members are involved. We find suggestive evidence that CEOs are unlikely to be replaced for poor performance when firms donate to charities affiliated with a large fraction of the board or when they donate large amounts.
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来源期刊
Accounting Review
Accounting Review BUSINESS, FINANCE-
CiteScore
5.80
自引率
2.40%
发文量
110
期刊介绍: The Accounting Review ‘‘should be viewed as the premier journal for publishing articles reporting the results of accounting research and explaining and illustrating related research methodology. The scope of acceptable articles should embrace any research methodology and any accounting-related subject, as long as the articles meet the standards established for publication in the journal
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