交易与股东民主

IF 4.4 3区 管理学 Q1 BUSINESS, FINANCE
D. Levit, Nadya Malenko, Ernst Maug
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引用次数: 0

摘要

我们在交易影响股东基础构成的模型中研究股东投票。在该模型中,交易和投票是互补的,这就产生了对提案接受的自我实现期望。我们展示了三个主要结果。首先,流动性和交易机会的增加可能会降低价格和福利,因为它允许偏好更极端的股东积累大量头寸,并通过投票将自己的观点强加给更温和的股东。其次,价格和福利可以朝相反的方向运动,这表明前者是后者的无效代表。第三,将决策权委托给董事会可能会严格提高股东价值。然而,最理想的董事会通常是有偏见的,不应该代表现有股东,也可能并不总是能获得大多数股东的投票支持。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Trading and Shareholder Democracy
We study shareholder voting in a model in which trading affects the composition of the shareholder base. In this model, trading and voting are complementary, which gives rise to self-fulfilling expectations about proposal acceptance. We show three main results. First, increasing liquidity and trading opportunities may reduce prices and welfare, because it allows shareholders with more extreme preferences to accumulate large positions and impose their views on more moderate shareholders through voting. Second, prices and welfare can move in opposite directions, which suggests that the former is an invalid proxy for the latter. Third, delegation of the decision to a board of directors may strictly improve shareholder value. However, the optimal board is generally biased, should not be representative of current shareholders, and may not always garner voting support from the majority of shareholders.
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来源期刊
Accounting Review
Accounting Review BUSINESS, FINANCE-
CiteScore
5.80
自引率
2.40%
发文量
110
期刊介绍: The Accounting Review ‘‘should be viewed as the premier journal for publishing articles reporting the results of accounting research and explaining and illustrating related research methodology. The scope of acceptable articles should embrace any research methodology and any accounting-related subject, as long as the articles meet the standards established for publication in the journal
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