Journal of Retailing最新文献

FM ii: Copyright/ ID Statement

IF 8 1区管理学

Journal of Retailing Pub Date : 2025-03-18 DOI: 10.1016/S0022-4359(25)00018-1

引用次数: 0

Paving the way for responsible retailing

IF 8 1区管理学

Journal of Retailing Pub Date : 2025-03-05 DOI: 10.1016/j.jretai.2025.02.006

Niels Holtrop, Lara Lobschat, Anne ter Braak

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Lessons learned from the Kroger-Albertsons merger case

IF 8 1区管理学

Journal of Retailing Pub Date : 2025-02-27 DOI: 10.1016/j.jretai.2025.02.005

Edward J. Fox , Joe Bourdage , Justin LaTorraca , Laura O'Laughlin , Marcello Santana

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Optimal exclusivity strategy for digital service on competing platforms with different installed bases

IF 8 1区管理学

Journal of Retailing Pub Date : 2025-02-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.jretai.2025.01.004

Zheng Chai , Nan Feng , Harry Jiannan Wang , Haiyang Feng

{"title":"Optimal exclusivity strategy for digital service on competing platforms with different installed bases","authors":"Zheng Chai , Nan Feng , Harry Jiannan Wang , Haiyang Feng","doi":"10.1016/j.jretai.2025.01.004","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jretai.2025.01.004","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Exclusive digital services are increasingly prevalent on growing digital service platforms. This study explores the optimal exclusivity strategy for digital service developers and examines the negotiation of licensing fees in exclusive agreements between developers and platforms. We develop a game-theoretic model in which a developer offers a digital service to consumers through competing platforms, one of which is superior in terms of installed base and bargaining power in negotiations with the developer. One interesting finding is that the inferior platform may pay a lower licensing fee to the developer than the superior platform when the difference in their installed bases is small. As the superior platform's installed base grows, its equilibrium licensing fee increases if its bargaining power is low but decreases if it is high. Furthermore, our analysis reveals that exclusivity on the superior platform is more profitable for the developer when the inferior platform's installed base is sufficiently small. Conversely, when the inferior platform's installed base is large, the developer prefers exclusivity on the inferior platform if the number of new consumers is sufficiently large, and non-exclusivity otherwise. Finally, we find that consumer surplus is always highest under the non-exclusivity strategy, while social welfare reaches its maximum under the non-exclusivity strategy only when the platform with lower intrinsic value has a sufficiently large installed base.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48402,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Retailing","volume":"101 1","pages":"Pages 120-137"},"PeriodicalIF":8.0,"publicationDate":"2025-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143644974","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

The influence of the buy-now-pay-later payment mode on consumer spending decisions

IF 8 1区管理学

Journal of Retailing Pub Date : 2025-01-31 DOI: 10.1016/j.jretai.2025.01.003

Rhys Ashby , Shahin Sharifi , Jun Yao , Lawrence Ang

{"title":"The influence of the buy-now-pay-later payment mode on consumer spending decisions","authors":"Rhys Ashby , Shahin Sharifi , Jun Yao , Lawrence Ang","doi":"10.1016/j.jretai.2025.01.003","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jretai.2025.01.003","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Buy-now-pay-later, a rapidly growing payment mode, facilitates short-term deferral of payment by several installments without interest or fees. Although consumers and payment providers claim that buy-now-pay-later influences spending, existing research does not fully explain how or why. Purchase transaction data and a series of experiments demonstrate greater consumer spending with buy-now-pay-later compared to other payment modes. This research contributes an underlying process that explains how and why buy-now-pay-later increases consumer spending. The presentation of installment prices (i.e., the amount paid per installment) with buy-now-pay-later lowers consumers’ perception of purchase expensiveness, which increases spending. However, presenting installment prices does not affect spending with other payment modes. Furthermore, the number of installments, the magnitude of the first installment, and the presence of the installment price moderate the effect of buy-now-pay-later, demonstrating how installment prices affect consumer spending. Taken together, the findings provide opportunities for retailers to increase consumers’ spending and actionable insights for policymakers to protect consumers.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48402,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Retailing","volume":"101 1","pages":"Pages 103-119"},"PeriodicalIF":8.0,"publicationDate":"2025-01-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143644810","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Friends or Enemies? The impact of partial competitor referral on consumer purchase

IF 8 1区管理学

Journal of Retailing Pub Date : 2025-01-30 DOI: 10.1016/j.jretai.2025.01.001

Haichuan Zhao , Mingyue Zhang , Haipeng (Allan) Chen

{"title":"Friends or Enemies? The impact of partial competitor referral on consumer purchase","authors":"Haichuan Zhao , Mingyue Zhang , Haipeng (Allan) Chen","doi":"10.1016/j.jretai.2025.01.001","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jretai.2025.01.001","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Partial competitor referral is a common sales influence tactic used to increase consumers’ likelihood of purchasing a focal product (e.g., a painting or table) by referring consumers to a competitor that offers a non-focal product (e.g., a frame or chairs). This study examines the impact of two types of partial competitor referrals, i.e., recommending a competitor with strategic vs. tactical advantages, and their impact on consumers’ purchase intention. Five studies showed that recommending a competitor with strategic (vs. tactical) advantages on a non-focal product increases consumers’ purchase intention of the focal product. Credibility of the referral signal and trust of the seller (e.g. goodwill, integrity, and competence trust) mediate the effects. Skepticism toward salespeople, the presence of monetary incentives for referrals, and seller-competitor product assortment overlap moderate the effects. Additionally, we found that recommending a competitor with strategic (vs. tactical) advantages on a non-focal product decreases consumers' future purchase intention for the non-focal product. Theoretical contributions and practical implications of our research are discussed.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48402,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Retailing","volume":"101 1","pages":"Pages 86-102"},"PeriodicalIF":8.0,"publicationDate":"2025-01-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143644809","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Lost in translation? How multilingual packaging influences product evaluations by impeding consumers’ processing fluency

IF 8 1区管理学

Journal of Retailing Pub Date : 2024-12-31 DOI: 10.1016/j.jretai.2024.12.004

Verena Hüttl-Maack, Rafael Munz

{"title":"Lost in translation? How multilingual packaging influences product evaluations by impeding consumers’ processing fluency","authors":"Verena Hüttl-Maack, Rafael Munz","doi":"10.1016/j.jretai.2024.12.004","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jretai.2024.12.004","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Owing to the global nature of today's marketplace, companies commonly use standardized packaging to distribute their products in multiple countries. Hence, consumers are regularly confronted with packaging that presents product information in their native language and in multiple foreign languages. However, how this impacts consumers has rarely been studied. In three experimental studies (<em>N</em> = 3,010), we identify processing fluency as an important driver of the consumer-sided consequences of multilingual packaging. Our research finds that the presence of foreign languages with which consumers are only weakly familiar impedes their mental processing of the product, resulting in less favorable product evaluations. Furthermore, a high number of translations printed on packaging also decreases processing fluency. Although multilingual packaging might be seen as a purely distributional cost-cutting method, the results of this research suggest that companies need to carefully consider how many and which languages are placed on packaging to realize their products’ full sales potential. Theoretical contributions, implications for packaging design, and directions for further research are discussed.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48402,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Retailing","volume":"101 1","pages":"Pages 68-85"},"PeriodicalIF":8.0,"publicationDate":"2024-12-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143644808","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Too assertive to recommend: The effect of assertive tone on referral behavior

IF 8 1区管理学

Journal of Retailing Pub Date : 2024-12-30 DOI: 10.1016/j.jretai.2024.12.001

Huixin Deng , Shaoguang Yang , Liyin Jin

{"title":"Too assertive to recommend: The effect of assertive tone on referral behavior","authors":"Huixin Deng , Shaoguang Yang , Liyin Jin","doi":"10.1016/j.jretai.2024.12.001","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jretai.2024.12.001","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Brands and retailers are increasingly adopting referral reward programs (RRPs) as a customer acquisition strategy. RRPs provide existing customers with referral messages and incentivize them to share those messages with other potential customers. Despite their growing popularity, there is a limited understanding of how to effectively promote RRPs, especially with regard to message tone assertiveness. In a large-scale field experiment (<em>N</em> = 61,401, Study 1), we discovered that consumers (i.e., senders) are less inclined to participate in referral programs when they are provided with a pregenerated referral message with a more assertive tone than when they are provided with less assertive alternatives. We found that an assertive message leads senders to anticipate greater psychological reactance from their recipients, a metaperception that diminishes their willingness to engage in RRPs (Studies 2A and 2B). Additionally, we identified two significant moderators: the detrimental effect of an assertive tone is mitigated when the product offers important benefits to recipients (Study 3) or when the referral promotion is time limited (Study 4).</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48402,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Retailing","volume":"101 1","pages":"Pages 40-54"},"PeriodicalIF":8.0,"publicationDate":"2024-12-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143644806","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Pricing cues and retail competition

IF 8 1区管理学

Journal of Retailing Pub Date : 2024-12-23 DOI: 10.1016/j.jretai.2024.12.002

Anand Krishnamoorthy , Preethika Sainam

{"title":"Pricing cues and retail competition","authors":"Anand Krishnamoorthy , Preethika Sainam","doi":"10.1016/j.jretai.2024.12.002","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jretai.2024.12.002","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Retailers that do not consistently display pricing cues (e.g., “Save $200″) may face lower demand from consumers who do not benefit from the additional transaction utility, a fact that is well-documented in the extant literature. This study investigates why some retailers choose not to display pricing cues despite these documented benefits, how optimal prices are affected by the display of pricing cues, and which type of retailer – service-focused or price-focused – is more likely to display pricing cues.</div><div>Analysis of our analytical model of competing retailers with asymmetric sales support reveals two effects of pricing-cue display: a “direct-demand effect” and a “competitive effect.” We find that when both retailers display a pricing cue, they can charge a higher price due to the increased transaction utility provided to customers (“direct-demand effect”). However, in the asymmetric scenario, when only one retailer displays a pricing cue, it has the additional effect of lowering the price of the non-displaying retailer (“competitive effect”). Further, we find that the price dispersion is higher when a service-focused retailer displays a pricing cue and the competing price-focused retailer does not, leading that case to be the more likely asymmetric equilibrium.</div><div>Empirical analysis of price and pricing-cue data for consumer-electronics products across several online retailers validates our analytical findings. Our analytical and empirical assessments underscore the significance of retailers’ pricing-cue display strategies and their impact on consumers, offering both academic and managerial implications.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48402,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Retailing","volume":"101 1","pages":"Pages 55-67"},"PeriodicalIF":8.0,"publicationDate":"2024-12-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143644807","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

A potential win-win-win strategy when pruning the direct channel: Motivating retailers to migrate to a designated intermediary

IF 8 1区管理学

Journal of Retailing Pub Date : 2024-12-14 DOI: 10.1016/j.jretai.2024.11.002

Divya Anand , Andrew T. Crecelius , Justin M. Lawrence , Lisa K. Scheer

{"title":"A potential win-win-win strategy when pruning the direct channel: Motivating retailers to migrate to a designated intermediary","authors":"Divya Anand , Andrew T. Crecelius , Justin M. Lawrence , Lisa K. Scheer","doi":"10.1016/j.jretai.2024.11.002","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jretai.2024.11.002","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Many retailers prefer to directly purchase from manufacturers, yet cost concerns motivate manufacturers to periodically prune their channels by cutting off direct customers or nudging them towards intermediaries. One frequent divestment strategy is involuntary intermediation wherein the manufacturer eliminates a retailer's option to purchase directly, while steering it toward a designated intermediary. Using enactment theory from supply chain disruption literature, this research examines this strategy and customers’ subsequent decisions when facing involuntary intermediation, specifically: (1) whether or not to migrate as suggested by the manufacturer and (2) for customers that choose to migrate, how much to purchase subsequently from the intermediary, including both the manufacturer's products and other brands. Analyzing unique data provided by both a manufacturer and its designated intermediary, the authors find that although only 80 % of the customers migrated, usually all parties—the migrating customers, the manufacturer, and the intermediary—benefitted from the changes. Interestingly, purchasing increased most among the types of customers least likely to migrate, indicating that resources devoted to persuading such customers are worthwhile and can pay high dividends for both manufacturer and intermediary.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48402,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Retailing","volume":"101 1","pages":"Pages 25-39"},"PeriodicalIF":8.0,"publicationDate":"2024-12-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143644805","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0