Public ChoicePub Date : 2023-09-29DOI: 10.1007/s11127-023-01116-2
Nicholas R. Miller
{"title":"Ranked-choice voting and the spoiler effect: a supplementary note","authors":"Nicholas R. Miller","doi":"10.1007/s11127-023-01116-2","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-023-01116-2","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":48322,"journal":{"name":"Public Choice","volume":"79 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135246790","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Public ChoicePub Date : 2023-09-29DOI: 10.1007/s11127-023-01076-7
Clara E. Piano, Rachael Behr, Kacey Reeves West
{"title":"The supply and demand of marital contracts: the case of same-sex marriage","authors":"Clara E. Piano, Rachael Behr, Kacey Reeves West","doi":"10.1007/s11127-023-01076-7","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-023-01076-7","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":48322,"journal":{"name":"Public Choice","volume":"56 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135243875","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Public ChoicePub Date : 2023-09-28DOI: 10.1007/s11127-023-01107-3
Sezer Yasar, Ceyhun Elgin
{"title":"Democracy and fiscal-policy response to COVID-19","authors":"Sezer Yasar, Ceyhun Elgin","doi":"10.1007/s11127-023-01107-3","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-023-01107-3","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract In this paper, we investigate the relationship between the level of democracy and fiscal-policy response to the economic crisis induced by the COVID-19 pandemic. We use a novel cross-country panel dataset of fiscal-policy responses with time variation. Our results suggest that more democratic countries adopted substantially larger fiscal-policy packages (in % GDP), and the gap regarding the size of packages between more democratic and less democratic countries widened over time. Our analysis of the components of fiscal policy shows that democracies, in particular, provide larger packages that benefit the broad public. Furthermore, our system-equations estimations suggest that the relation of democracy level with the fiscal-policy response is established through democracy’s relation with inclusive institutions, represented by the parliamentary system, and corruption.","PeriodicalId":48322,"journal":{"name":"Public Choice","volume":"70 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135385826","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Public ChoicePub Date : 2023-09-28DOI: 10.1007/s11127-023-01106-4
Ramon P. DeGennaro, Daniel J. Smith
{"title":"Harold A. Black academic conference: an introduction to the special issue","authors":"Ramon P. DeGennaro, Daniel J. Smith","doi":"10.1007/s11127-023-01106-4","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-023-01106-4","url":null,"abstract":"This special issue brings together the papers presented and discussed at the Harold A. Black Academic Conference hosted by the Probasco Distinguished Chair of Free Enterprise at the University of Tennessee, Chattanooga, the Haslam College of Business at the University of Tennessee, Knoxville, and the Political Economy Research Institute at Middle Tennessee State University. Dr. Black is an emeritus professor of finance at the Haslam College of Business at the University of Tennessee, Knoxville, and has had a distinguished career advancing our understanding of race and discrimination in banking and finance. More specifically, throughout his career, Dr. Black undertook in-depth empirical studies that examined the institutional details of statistically observed disparate outcomes in banking and finance to determine whether these outcomes were attributable to discrimination or could be explained by non-discriminatory factors. In some instances, Dr. Black found that addressing disparate outcomes with inappropriate policies could result in perverse consequences that harmed the intended beneficiaries. This introduction explores the relationship between Harold Black’s work, the papers in this special issue examining, building on, and extending Harold Black’s work, and public choice economics.","PeriodicalId":48322,"journal":{"name":"Public Choice","volume":"41 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135385557","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Public ChoicePub Date : 2023-09-22DOI: 10.1007/s11127-023-01099-0
Erwin Dekker, Pavel V. Vasiliev
{"title":"Markets and knowledge commons: Is there a difference between private and community governance of markets?","authors":"Erwin Dekker, Pavel V. Vasiliev","doi":"10.1007/s11127-023-01099-0","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-023-01099-0","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract It is well-established that market governance can be provided by both public (state) and private organizations. However, the concept of private governance has been used, this article contends, to refer to two distinct forms of non-state governance: private governance and community governance. We distinguish between these two forms, arguing that private governance should be understood as the provision of market governance by (external) private parties, while community governance refers to a process where a group, a community, or society has the autonomy to govern its own affairs without interference from external authorities. The former internalizes the externalities associated with governance, while the latter comes about mainly as an unintended externality of social interaction in markets. To further illuminate the differences, and the relative strengths of these types of non-state governance, we distinguish among three elements of market governance: (1) the formation and interpretation of rules, (2) the administration of rules of ownership and exchange, and (3) the enforcement of rules. We argue that community governance is of great relevance for the formation and interpretation of the rules of ownership and exchange, which is consequently very hard to outsource to external parties, private or public. Community governance also plays a frequently overlooked role in administration and enforcement through the process of co-production. Rule formation and interpretation are theorized as the epistemic components of market governance, which can be analyzed within the Governing Knowledge Commons framework.","PeriodicalId":48322,"journal":{"name":"Public Choice","volume":"27 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136060836","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Public ChoicePub Date : 2023-09-13DOI: 10.1007/s11127-023-01110-8
Nathan Goodman, Otto Lehto
{"title":"Intellectual property, complex externalities, and the knowledge commons","authors":"Nathan Goodman, Otto Lehto","doi":"10.1007/s11127-023-01110-8","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-023-01110-8","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":48322,"journal":{"name":"Public Choice","volume":"51 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135742090","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Public ChoicePub Date : 2023-09-11DOI: 10.1007/s11127-023-01109-1
Rafael Hortala-Vallve, Jaakko Meriläinen, Janne Tukiainen
{"title":"Pre-electoral coalitions and the distribution of political power","authors":"Rafael Hortala-Vallve, Jaakko Meriläinen, Janne Tukiainen","doi":"10.1007/s11127-023-01109-1","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-023-01109-1","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Pre-electoral coalitions (PECs) may increase parties’ chances of winning an election, but they may also distort electoral results and policies away from citizens’ preferences. To shed light on how PECs shape post-electoral power distribution, we study the causes and consequences of PECs in Finland where elections use an open-list proportional representation system, and parties may form joint lists. We present descriptive evidence showing that PECs are more common between parties of equal size and similar ideology, and when elections are more disproportional or involve more parties. Using difference-in-differences and density discontinuity designs, we illustrate that voters punish coalescing parties and target personal votes strategically within the coalitions, and that PECs are formed with the particular purpose of influencing the distribution of power. PECs increase small parties’ chances of acquiring leadership positions, lead to more dispersed seat distributions, and sometimes prevent absolute majorities. They can thus enable a broader representation of citizens’ policy preferences.","PeriodicalId":48322,"journal":{"name":"Public Choice","volume":"24 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135939038","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Public ChoicePub Date : 2023-09-05DOI: 10.1007/s11127-023-01105-5
Benjamin Monnery, François-Charles Wolff
{"title":"Is participatory democracy in line with social protest? Evidence from the French Yellow Vests movement","authors":"Benjamin Monnery, François-Charles Wolff","doi":"10.1007/s11127-023-01105-5","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-023-01105-5","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":48322,"journal":{"name":"Public Choice","volume":"197 1","pages":"283 - 309"},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2023-09-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42056932","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}