British Accounting Review最新文献_第4页

Epidemic experience, analyst sentiment, and earnings forecasts: Evidence from SARS exposure 疫情经历、分析师情绪和盈利预测：非典疫情证据

IF 5.5 3区管理学

British Accounting Review Pub Date : 2024-11-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.bar.2024.101452

Lihua Liu , Dongmin Kong

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Capitalism and the return on capital employed. Some further evidence 资本主义与资本回报率。一些进一步的证据

IF 5.5 3区管理学

British Accounting Review Pub Date : 2024-11-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.bar.2024.101320

John Richard Edwards

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Audit committee member busyness and risk factor disclosure 审计委员会成员的工作繁忙程度和风险因素披露

IF 5.5 3区管理学

British Accounting Review Pub Date : 2024-11-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.bar.2024.101442

Cristina Bailey , Joshua J. Filzen

{"title":"Audit committee member busyness and risk factor disclosure","authors":"Cristina Bailey , Joshua J. Filzen","doi":"10.1016/j.bar.2024.101442","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.bar.2024.101442","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Audit committees in the U.S. oversee risk management within organizations, including oversight of the disclosure of risk factors in periodic filings. Because audit committees have become increasingly over-burdened, we examine the impact of the busyness of audit committee members, measured via members’ service on other boards, on risk factor disclosures. We find firms with busy members issue disclosures that are of lower quality (i.e., less readable and less focused on firm fundamentals). Further, we find that firms with busy members are more likely to issue timely updates to disclosures. However, these updates are more likely to be vague—implying they are inconsequential to the market. We find these results are primarily driven by service in other non-audit committee roles. In additional cross-sectional tests, we find that our results are strongest when there is more uncertainty or complexity in the business environment. Finally, additional specifications and tests show that our results are robust to concerns related to endogeneity. Overall, we find that the busyness of audit committee members has important implications for risk factor disclosures.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":47996,"journal":{"name":"British Accounting Review","volume":"56 6","pages":"Article 101442"},"PeriodicalIF":5.5,"publicationDate":"2024-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141697343","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Product market shock, stakeholder relationships, and trade credit 产品市场冲击、利益相关者关系和贸易信贷

IF 5.5 3区管理学

British Accounting Review Pub Date : 2024-11-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.bar.2024.101458

Jagriti Srivastava , Balagopal Gopalakrishnan , Rajesh Tharyan

{"title":"Product market shock, stakeholder relationships, and trade credit","authors":"Jagriti Srivastava , Balagopal Gopalakrishnan , Rajesh Tharyan","doi":"10.1016/j.bar.2024.101458","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.bar.2024.101458","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>The COVID-19 pandemic resulted in an extremely rare instance of a shock to global product markets. Using quarterly data for a sample of 7397 firms from 54 countries over the period 2017–2020, we study the causal impact of this shock on trade credit. Employing a difference-in-difference analysis, we find that, in contrast to findings in the literature on financial market shocks, low-credit quality firms are credit-rationed by their suppliers during a shock to product markets and that for low-credit quality firms, there is no substitution of trade credit with financial credit. Importantly, however, our analysis shows that low-credit quality firms with better stakeholder relations are able to obtain more trade credit than those with weaker stakeholder relations. Our results are robust to alternative definitions of key variables, alternative methodologies that address endogeneity concerns, a placebo test, stage of market development, and various levels of controls for unobserved heterogeneity. We show that trade credit is conditional on product market conditions and is not always a generous substitute for financial credit. However, maintaining good relations with stakeholders serves as an antidote to the adverse effect of product market shocks on trade credit.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":47996,"journal":{"name":"British Accounting Review","volume":"56 6","pages":"Article 101458"},"PeriodicalIF":5.5,"publicationDate":"2024-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0890838924002221/pdfft?md5=17f806cbc0dff2f3ef0c625b8a7b510c&pid=1-s2.0-S0890838924002221-main.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142045849","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Withdrawal notice to: “Key audit matters disclosures and informed Traders” [YBARE 56 (6) (2024) 101386]

IF 5.5 3区管理学

British Accounting Review Pub Date : 2024-11-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.bar.2024.101532

Zabihollah Rezaee , Saeid Homayoun

引用次数: 0

The bright side of common ownership: Evidence from bank transparency 共同所有权的光明面：银行透明度的证据

IF 5.5 3区管理学

British Accounting Review Pub Date : 2024-11-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.bar.2024.101445

Haerang Park , Shams Pathan , Konstantinos Stathopoulos , Alex Marwick

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From apathy to activism: Shareholder dissent on director's pay proposals and board effectiveness 从冷漠到激进：股东对董事薪酬提案和董事会有效性的异议

IF 5.5 3区管理学

British Accounting Review Pub Date : 2024-11-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.bar.2024.101360

Chan Ke , Xuezhi Zhang , Zixun Zhou

{"title":"From apathy to activism: Shareholder dissent on director's pay proposals and board effectiveness","authors":"Chan Ke , Xuezhi Zhang , Zixun Zhou","doi":"10.1016/j.bar.2024.101360","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.bar.2024.101360","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Using a hand-collected dataset of shareholder voting on 10,805 director compensation proposals at general shareholder meetings<span><span> of Chinese listed firms from 2010 to 2019, we provide novel empirical evidence on board reactions to shareholder dissent. We find that boards of directors facing shareholder dissent significantly improve their monitoring and advising effectiveness. Specifically, they reduce the likelihood of financial restatements, improve CEO performance-turnover sensitivity, and improve corporate investment efficiency. Our findings are robust to propensity score matching, </span>instrumental variable estimation and the exogenous shock of mandatory online voting. Moreover, independent directors facing dissent are more likely to vote against board proposals and to reduce their absences from board meetings. The mechanism analysis shows that shareholder dissent operates through the reputation concern and market signal channels. The effect of dissent is more prominent for non-SOEs, for firms with more high-profile directors, and for firms with less powerful CEOs. Besides, the improved board effectiveness induced by shareholder dissent leads to better firm performance. Overall, our findings highlight the role of shareholder voting in emerging markets with concentrated ownership and weak investor protection.</span></div></div>","PeriodicalId":47996,"journal":{"name":"British Accounting Review","volume":"56 6","pages":"Article 101360"},"PeriodicalIF":5.5,"publicationDate":"2024-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140087843","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Information leakage prior to market switches and the importance of Nominated Advisers 市场转换前的信息泄露和指定顾问的重要性

IF 5.5 3区管理学

British Accounting Review Pub Date : 2024-11-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.bar.2024.101461

Antonios Siganos , Angelos Synapis , Ioannis Tsalavoutas

引用次数: 0

Withdrawal notice to‟Nineteenth century audit reports: Evolution from free-form to standardised wording” [YBARE(56/6) (2024) / 101428]

IF 5.5 3区管理学

British Accounting Review Pub Date : 2024-11-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.bar.2024.101536

Niamh M. Brennan , Sean Bradley Power

引用次数: 0

Director networks, accounting conservatism and director reputation: Evidence after financial reporting failure 董事网络、会计保守主义和董事声誉：财务报告失败后的证据

IF 5.5 3区管理学

British Accounting Review Pub Date : 2024-11-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.bar.2024.101421

Chih-Liang Liu , Shu-Miao Lai , In-Mu Haw

{"title":"Director networks, accounting conservatism and director reputation: Evidence after financial reporting failure","authors":"Chih-Liang Liu , Shu-Miao Lai , In-Mu Haw","doi":"10.1016/j.bar.2024.101421","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.bar.2024.101421","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This study examines whether connected boards of directors restore their reputation via conservative accounting after financial misstatements. Using a sample of restating firms from 2004 to 2020, we find central boards of directors are positively related to accounting conservatism in the post-restatement period. More importantly, we find accounting conservatism has positive effects on the reputation restoration of directors in central boards, leading to more prestigious board seats, additional outside directorships, and higher compensation following restatements. The reputation recovery of directors in central boards is more prominent among restating firms that seek external financing where potential benefits of director reputation are greater. The findings suggest that directors in central boards successfully recover their damaged reputation via conservative accounting after restatements and minimize adverse consequences in the director market. Our robustness tests support the causal interpretation of our evidence. Collectively, our study offers novel insights into the monitoring incentives resulted from the reputation restoration of directors in central boards via conservative accounting after financial reporting failures.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":47996,"journal":{"name":"British Accounting Review","volume":"56 6","pages":"Article 101421"},"PeriodicalIF":5.5,"publicationDate":"2024-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141329475","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0