{"title":"Permutation tests for experimental data.","authors":"Charles A Holt, Sean P Sullivan","doi":"10.1007/s10683-023-09799-6","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s10683-023-09799-6","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>This article surveys the use of nonparametric permutation tests for analyzing experimental data. The permutation approach, which involves randomizing or permuting features of the observed data, is a flexible way to draw statistical inferences in common experimental settings. It is particularly valuable when few independent observations are available, a frequent occurrence in controlled experiments in economics and other social sciences. The permutation method constitutes a comprehensive approach to statistical inference. In two-treatment testing, permutation concepts underlie popular rank-based tests, like the Wilcoxon and Mann-Whitney tests. But permutation reasoning is not limited to ordinal contexts. Analogous tests can be constructed from the permutation of measured observations-as opposed to rank-transformed observations-and we argue that these tests should often be preferred. Permutation tests can also be used with multiple treatments, with ordered hypothesized effects, and with complex data-structures, such as hypothesis testing in the presence of nuisance variables. Drawing examples from the experimental economics literature, we illustrate how permutation testing solves common challenges. Our aim is to help experimenters move beyond the handful of overused tests in play today and to instead see permutation testing as a flexible framework for statistical inference.</p><p><strong>Supplementary information: </strong>The online version contains supplementary material available at 10.1007/s10683-023-09799-6.</p>","PeriodicalId":47992,"journal":{"name":"Experimental Economics","volume":" ","pages":"1-38"},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2023-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC10066020/pdf/","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"9716978","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Endogenous reference price auctions for a diverse set of commodities: an experimental analysis.","authors":"Olivier Armantier, Charles A Holt","doi":"10.1007/s10683-022-09783-6","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s10683-022-09783-6","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>This paper is concerned with multi-object, multi-unit auctions with a budget constrained auctioneer who has noisy value estimates for each object. We propose a new allocation mechanism, the <i>endogenous reference price auction</i>, with two key features. First, bids are normalized across objects using \"reference prices.\" Second, reference prices are set endogenously using information extracted from the bids submitted. We report on an experiment showing that a simple endogenous process mitigates value inaccuracies and improves three performance measures: the seller's profit, allocative efficiency and total surplus. These results have important implications for large auctions used in practice.</p><p><strong>Supplementary information: </strong>The online version contains supplementary material available at 10.1007/s10683-022-09783-6.</p>","PeriodicalId":47992,"journal":{"name":"Experimental Economics","volume":" ","pages":"1-27"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2023-03-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC10061412/pdf/","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"9742589","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"When, and why, do teams benefit from self-selection?","authors":"Mira Fischer, Rainer Michael Rilke, B. Yurtoglu","doi":"10.1007/s10683-023-09800-2","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10683-023-09800-2","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":47992,"journal":{"name":"Experimental Economics","volume":"26 1","pages":"749 - 774"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2023-03-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44189958","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Thomas Giebe, Radosveta Ivanova-Stenzel, Martin G. Kocher, Simeon Schudy
{"title":"Cross-game learning and cognitive ability in auctions","authors":"Thomas Giebe, Radosveta Ivanova-Stenzel, Martin G. Kocher, Simeon Schudy","doi":"10.1007/s10683-023-09789-8","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10683-023-09789-8","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Overbidding in sealed-bid second-price auctions (SPAs) has been shown to be persistent and associated with cognitive ability. We study experimentally to what extent cross-game learning can reduce overbidding in SPAs, taking into account cognitive skills. Employing an order-balanced design, we use first-price auctions (FPAs) to expose participants to an auction format in which losses from high bids are more salient than in SPAs. Experience in FPAs causes substantial cross-game learning for cognitively less able participants but does not affect overbidding for the cognitively more able. Vice versa, experiencing SPAs before bidding in an FPA does not substantially affect bidding behavior by the cognitively less able but, somewhat surprisingly, reduces bid shading by cognitively more able participants, resulting in lower profits in FPAs. Thus, ‘cross-game learning’ may rather be understood as ‘cross-game transfer’, as it has the potential to benefit bidders with lower cognitive ability whereas it has little or even adverse effects for higher-ability bidders.","PeriodicalId":47992,"journal":{"name":"Experimental Economics","volume":"24 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-03-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136340770","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Call for papers – Special issue in memory of Amnon Rapoport: Experimental Economics","authors":"D. Budescu, Ido Erev, Tamar Kugler, R. Zwick","doi":"10.1007/s10683-023-09794-x","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10683-023-09794-x","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":47992,"journal":{"name":"Experimental Economics","volume":"26 1","pages":"251 - 252"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2023-02-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43173614","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Morally monotonic choice in public good games","authors":"James C. Cox, V. Sadiraj, Susan Xu Tang","doi":"10.1007/s10683-022-09787-2","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10683-022-09787-2","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":47992,"journal":{"name":"Experimental Economics","volume":"26 1","pages":"697 - 725"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2023-02-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46853601","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Principal’s distributive preferences and the incentivization of agents","authors":"Sophie Cêtre, Max Lobeck","doi":"10.1007/s10683-023-09791-0","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10683-023-09791-0","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":47992,"journal":{"name":"Experimental Economics","volume":"26 1","pages":"646 - 672"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2023-02-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45764790","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The effect of random shocks on reciprocal behavior in dynamic principal-agent settings.","authors":"Rudolf Kerschbamer, Regine Oexl","doi":"10.1007/s10683-022-09771-w","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10683-022-09771-w","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>Previous work has shown that unobservable random shocks on output have a detrimental effect on efficiency in short-term ('static') employment relationships. Given the prevalence of long-term ('dynamic') relationships in firms, we investigate whether the impact of shocks is similarly pronounced in gift-exchange relationships where the same principal-agent pair interacts repeatedly. In dynamic relationships, shocks have a significantly less pronounced negative effect on efficiency than in static relationships. In an attempt to identify the drivers for our results we find that the combination of a repeated-game effect (current misbehavior can be punished in future periods) and a noise-canceling effect (part of the noise cancels out in the long run) is required to avoid the detrimental effects of unobservable random shocks on efficiency.</p><p><strong>Supplementary information: </strong>The online version contains supplementary material available at 10.1007/s10683-022-09771-w.</p>","PeriodicalId":47992,"journal":{"name":"Experimental Economics","volume":"26 2","pages":"468-488"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC10129933/pdf/","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"9746646","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}