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Endogenous reference price auctions for a diverse set of commodities: an experimental analysis. 多种商品的内生参考价格拍卖：实验分析。
IF 2.3 3区 经济学
Experimental Economics Pub Date : 2023-03-30 DOI: 10.1007/s10683-022-09783-6
Olivier Armantier, Charles A Holt
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引用次数: 0
When, and why, do teams benefit from self-selection? 什么时候，为什么团队会从自我选择中受益?
IF 2.3 3区 经济学
Experimental Economics Pub Date : 2023-03-28 DOI: 10.1007/s10683-023-09800-2
Mira Fischer, Rainer Michael Rilke, B. Yurtoglu
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引用次数: 0
The distributional preferences of Americans, 2013–2016 美国人的分配偏好，2013-2016
IF 2.3 3区 经济学
Experimental Economics Pub Date : 2023-03-07 DOI: 10.1007/s10683-023-09792-z
Raymond J. Fisman, Pamela Jakiela, Shachar Kariv, Silvia Vannutelli
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引用次数: 6
Cross-game learning and cognitive ability in auctions 拍卖中的跨博弈学习与认知能力
3区 经济学
Experimental Economics Pub Date : 2023-03-07 DOI: 10.1007/s10683-023-09789-8
Thomas Giebe, Radosveta Ivanova-Stenzel, Martin G. Kocher, Simeon Schudy
{"title":"Cross-game learning and cognitive ability in auctions","authors":"Thomas Giebe, Radosveta Ivanova-Stenzel, Martin G. Kocher, Simeon Schudy","doi":"10.1007/s10683-023-09789-8","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10683-023-09789-8","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Overbidding in sealed-bid second-price auctions (SPAs) has been shown to be persistent and associated with cognitive ability. We study experimentally to what extent cross-game learning can reduce overbidding in SPAs, taking into account cognitive skills. Employing an order-balanced design, we use first-price auctions (FPAs) to expose participants to an auction format in which losses from high bids are more salient than in SPAs. Experience in FPAs causes substantial cross-game learning for cognitively less able participants but does not affect overbidding for the cognitively more able. Vice versa, experiencing SPAs before bidding in an FPA does not substantially affect bidding behavior by the cognitively less able but, somewhat surprisingly, reduces bid shading by cognitively more able participants, resulting in lower profits in FPAs. Thus, ‘cross-game learning’ may rather be understood as ‘cross-game transfer’, as it has the potential to benefit bidders with lower cognitive ability whereas it has little or even adverse effects for higher-ability bidders.","PeriodicalId":47992,"journal":{"name":"Experimental Economics","volume":"24 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-03-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136340770","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Editorial: Symposium "Pre-results review". 社论：专题讨论会“成果前审查”。
IF 1.7 3区 经济学
Experimental Economics Pub Date : 2023-02-27 DOI: 10.1007/s10683-023-09793-y
Urs Fischbacher, Irenaeus Wolff
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引用次数: 0
Call for papers – Special issue in memory of Amnon Rapoport: Experimental Economics 论文征集-纪念阿姆农·拉波波特特刊:实验经济学
IF 2.3 3区 经济学
Experimental Economics Pub Date : 2023-02-20 DOI: 10.1007/s10683-023-09794-x
D. Budescu, Ido Erev, Tamar Kugler, R. Zwick
{"title":"Call for papers – Special issue in memory of Amnon Rapoport: Experimental Economics","authors":"D. Budescu, Ido Erev, Tamar Kugler, R. Zwick","doi":"10.1007/s10683-023-09794-x","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10683-023-09794-x","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":47992,"journal":{"name":"Experimental Economics","volume":"26 1","pages":"251 - 252"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2023-02-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43173614","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Morally monotonic choice in public good games 公共利益博弈中的道德单调选择
IF 2.3 3区 经济学
Experimental Economics Pub Date : 2023-02-15 DOI: 10.1007/s10683-022-09787-2
James C. Cox, V. Sadiraj, Susan Xu Tang
{"title":"Morally monotonic choice in public good games","authors":"James C. Cox, V. Sadiraj, Susan Xu Tang","doi":"10.1007/s10683-022-09787-2","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10683-022-09787-2","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":47992,"journal":{"name":"Experimental Economics","volume":"26 1","pages":"697 - 725"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2023-02-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46853601","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Principal’s distributive preferences and the incentivization of agents 委托人的分配偏好与代理人的激励
IF 2.3 3区 经济学
Experimental Economics Pub Date : 2023-02-03 DOI: 10.1007/s10683-023-09791-0
Sophie Cêtre, Max Lobeck
{"title":"Principal’s distributive preferences and the incentivization of agents","authors":"Sophie Cêtre, Max Lobeck","doi":"10.1007/s10683-023-09791-0","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10683-023-09791-0","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":47992,"journal":{"name":"Experimental Economics","volume":"26 1","pages":"646 - 672"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2023-02-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45764790","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
The effect of random shocks on reciprocal behavior in dynamic principal-agent settings. 动态委托代理环境下随机冲击对相互行为的影响。
IF 2.3 3区 经济学
Experimental Economics Pub Date : 2023-01-01 DOI: 10.1007/s10683-022-09771-w
Rudolf Kerschbamer, Regine Oexl
{"title":"The effect of random shocks on reciprocal behavior in dynamic principal-agent settings.","authors":"Rudolf Kerschbamer,&nbsp;Regine Oexl","doi":"10.1007/s10683-022-09771-w","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10683-022-09771-w","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>Previous work has shown that unobservable random shocks on output have a detrimental effect on efficiency in short-term ('static') employment relationships. Given the prevalence of long-term ('dynamic') relationships in firms, we investigate whether the impact of shocks is similarly pronounced in gift-exchange relationships where the same principal-agent pair interacts repeatedly. In dynamic relationships, shocks have a significantly less pronounced negative effect on efficiency than in static relationships. In an attempt to identify the drivers for our results we find that the combination of a repeated-game effect (current misbehavior can be punished in future periods) and a noise-canceling effect (part of the noise cancels out in the long run) is required to avoid the detrimental effects of unobservable random shocks on efficiency.</p><p><strong>Supplementary information: </strong>The online version contains supplementary material available at 10.1007/s10683-022-09771-w.</p>","PeriodicalId":47992,"journal":{"name":"Experimental Economics","volume":"26 2","pages":"468-488"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC10129933/pdf/","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"9746646","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Ingroup bias in a social learning experiment. 社会学习实验中的内群体偏见。
IF 2.3 3区 经济学
Experimental Economics Pub Date : 2023-01-01 DOI: 10.1007/s10683-022-09788-1
Wenbo Zou, Xue Xu
{"title":"Ingroup bias in a social learning experiment.","authors":"Wenbo Zou,&nbsp;Xue Xu","doi":"10.1007/s10683-022-09788-1","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10683-022-09788-1","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>Does social learning and subsequent private information processing differ depending on whether the observer shares the same group identity as the predecessor whose action is observed? In this paper, we conduct a lab experiment to answer this question, in which subjects first observe a social signal and then receive a private signal. We find that subjects put greater weights on the social signal if they share with the predecessor the same group identity that is induced in the experimental environment. We also provide suggestive evidence that such an ingroup-outgroup difference cannot be explained by individuals' beliefs of the predecessor's rationality. Moreover, heterogeneous effects of group identity exist in weights given to the subsequent private signal: Compared to when the predecessor is an outgroup, those who have learned from an ingroup predecessor put a greater (smaller) weight on the private signal if it contradicts (confirms) the social signal. We conjecture that such group effects are consistent with the perspective that group identity works as a framing device and brings about certain decision heuristics in the social signal phase, which no longer exist in the private signal phase.</p><p><strong>Supplementary information: </strong>The online version contains supplementary material available at 10.1007/s10683-022-09788-1.</p>","PeriodicalId":47992,"journal":{"name":"Experimental Economics","volume":"26 1","pages":"27-54"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC9795456/pdf/","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"10688562","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
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