The effect of random shocks on reciprocal behavior in dynamic principal-agent settings.

IF 1.7 3区经济学 Q2 ECONOMICS

Experimental Economics Pub Date : 2023-01-01 DOI:10.1007/s10683-022-09771-w

Rudolf Kerschbamer, Regine Oexl

引用次数: 1

Abstract

Previous work has shown that unobservable random shocks on output have a detrimental effect on efficiency in short-term ('static') employment relationships. Given the prevalence of long-term ('dynamic') relationships in firms, we investigate whether the impact of shocks is similarly pronounced in gift-exchange relationships where the same principal-agent pair interacts repeatedly. In dynamic relationships, shocks have a significantly less pronounced negative effect on efficiency than in static relationships. In an attempt to identify the drivers for our results we find that the combination of a repeated-game effect (current misbehavior can be punished in future periods) and a noise-canceling effect (part of the noise cancels out in the long run) is required to avoid the detrimental effects of unobservable random shocks on efficiency.

Supplementary information: The online version contains supplementary material available at 10.1007/s10683-022-09771-w.

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动态委托代理环境下随机冲击对相互行为的影响。

先前的研究表明，对产出的不可观察的随机冲击对短期(“静态”)雇佣关系的效率有不利影响。鉴于企业中长期(“动态”)关系的普遍存在，我们研究了在相同的委托代理对重复交互的礼物交换关系中，冲击的影响是否同样明显。在动态关系中，冲击对效率的负面影响明显小于静态关系。在试图确定我们的结果的驱动因素时，我们发现需要重复博弈效应(当前的不当行为可以在未来受到惩罚)和噪声消除效应(部分噪声在长期内被消除)的结合，以避免不可观察的随机冲击对效率的有害影响。补充信息:在线版本包含补充资料，提供地址:10.1007/s10683-022-09771-w。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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来源期刊

Experimental Economics ECONOMICS-

CiteScore

4.10

自引率

8.70%

发文量

期刊介绍： Experimental methods are uniquely suited to the study of many phenomena that have been difficult to observe directly in naturally occurring economic contexts. For example, the ability to induce preferences and control information structures makes it possible to isolate the effects of alternate economic structures, policies, and market institutions.Experimental Economics is an international journal that serves the growing group of economists around the world who use experimental methods. The journal invites high-quality papers in any area of experimental research in economics and related fields (i.e. accounting, finance, political science, and the psychology of decision making). State-of-the-art theoretical work and econometric work that is motivated by experimental data is also encouraged. The journal will also consider articles with a primary focus on methodology or replication of controversial findings. We welcome experiments conducted in either the laboratory or in the field. The relevant data can be decisions or non-choice data such as physiological measurements. However, we only consider studies that do not employ deception of participants and in which participants are incentivized. Experimental Economics is structured to promote experimental economics by bringing together innovative research that meets professional standards of experimental method, but without editorial bias towards specific orientations. All papers will be reviewed through the standard, anonymous-referee procedure and all accepted manuscripts will be subject to the approval of two editors. Authors must submit the instructions that participants in their study received at the time of submission of their manuscript. Authors are expected to submit separate data appendices which will be attached to the journal''s web page upon publication. Officially cited as: Exp Econ