发布求助
文献互助 智能选刊 最新文献

Journal of Law Economics & Organization最新文献

筛选
英文 中文
Investor Protection and the Value of Shares: Evidence from Statutory Rules Governing Variations of Shareholders' Class Rights in an Emerging Market 投资者保护与股票价值:来自新兴市场股东阶级权利变动的法定规则的证据
IF 1.1 3区 社会学
Journal of Law Economics & Organization Pub Date : 2013-12-01 DOI: 10.1093/JLEO/EWS001
A. Muravyev
{"title":"Investor Protection and the Value of Shares: Evidence from Statutory Rules Governing Variations of Shareholders' Class Rights in an Emerging Market","authors":"A. Muravyev","doi":"10.1093/JLEO/EWS001","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/JLEO/EWS001","url":null,"abstract":"This article uses a quasi-experimental framework provided by recent changes in Russian corporate law to study the effect of investor protection on the value of shares. The legal change analyzed involves the empowerment of nonvoting shareholders to veto unfavorable changes to their class rights. We take advantage of the presence of well-defined treatment and control groups and use the voting premium, a traditional measure of private benefits of control and shareholder expropriation, as the outcome variable. Based on a novel hand-collected dataset of dual-class stock companies in Russia and using a difference-in-difference regression analysis as well as an event study, we find a statistically and economically significant effect of improved protection of preferred shareholders on the value of their shares. The result is robust to several changes in the empirical specification. (JEL G30, G38, K22) The Author 2012. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of Yale University. All rights reserved. For Permissions, please email: journals.permissions@oup.com, Oxford University Press.","PeriodicalId":47987,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Law Economics & Organization","volume":"9 1","pages":"1344-1383"},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2013-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"78879695","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 12
How Tort Reform Affects Insurance Markets 侵权改革如何影响保险市场
IF 1.1 3区 社会学
Journal of Law Economics & Organization Pub Date : 2013-12-01 DOI: 10.1093/JLEO/EWS026
Martin Grace, J. T. Leverty
{"title":"How Tort Reform Affects Insurance Markets","authors":"Martin Grace, J. T. Leverty","doi":"10.1093/JLEO/EWS026","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/JLEO/EWS026","url":null,"abstract":"The impact of a statute that is currently in effect depends on expectations about its future constitutionality. We investigate the effect of tort reform by segmenting reforms into those that are eventually declared unconstitutional (temporary) and those that are unchallenged or upheld (permanent). We find permanent tort reforms lower medical malpractice insurance losses and premiums and increase insurer profitability. In contrast, the effects of temporary reforms are never statistically significant. Measures that combine temporary and permanent reforms, the norm in the literature, significantly misestimate the impact of tort reform. Our results suggest that examining the effect of a current law without accounting for its future treatment produces misleading results. (JEL K13, K4, H7, G22) The Author 2012. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of Yale University. All rights reserved. For Permissions, please email: journals.permissions@oup.com, Oxford University Press.","PeriodicalId":47987,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Law Economics & Organization","volume":"75 1","pages":"1253-1278"},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2013-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"78206795","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 39
Institutions and Organizational Structure: The Case of State-Owned Corporate Pyramids 制度与组织结构:以国有金字塔企业为例
IF 1.1 3区 社会学
Journal of Law Economics & Organization Pub Date : 2013-12-01 DOI: 10.1093/JLEO/EWS028
Joseph P. H. Fan, T. Wong, Tianyu Zhang
{"title":"Institutions and Organizational Structure: The Case of State-Owned Corporate Pyramids","authors":"Joseph P. H. Fan, T. Wong, Tianyu Zhang","doi":"10.1093/JLEO/EWS028","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/JLEO/EWS028","url":null,"abstract":"Pyramidal organizational structures are common throughout the world. This article considers an explanation for pyramids built by the state: separating firms from political interference. Although intermediate pyramidal layers insulate managers from a pyramid's top owners and hence induce agency costs, they also minimize political costs of state intervention. All else equal, the optimal division of power between the government and the managers should be the point at which the marginal agency costs are equal to the marginal political costs. Our empirical results, based on hand-collected data for 742 local government-owned Chinese business groups are generally in line with this hypothesis. (JEL: D21, D23, G32, L22, L32, P31). The Author 2012. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of Yale University. All rights reserved. For Permissions, please email: journals.permissions@oup.com, Oxford University Press.","PeriodicalId":47987,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Law Economics & Organization","volume":"6 1","pages":"1217-1252"},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2013-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"80687290","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 261
Do Freedom of Information Laws Decrease Corruption 信息自由法能减少腐败吗
IF 1.1 3区 社会学
Journal of Law Economics & Organization Pub Date : 2013-12-01 DOI: 10.1093/JLEO/EWS016
S. Costa
{"title":"Do Freedom of Information Laws Decrease Corruption","authors":"S. Costa","doi":"10.1093/JLEO/EWS016","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/JLEO/EWS016","url":null,"abstract":"International organizations have encouraged countries to adopt Freedom of Information (FOI) laws as a means to increase transparency and thus combat corruption. This article uses the recent introduction of FOI laws in several countries as a natural experiment to determine their effect on corruption perceptions and the quality of governance. Using different corruption perception indices, both at the macro- and micro-level, I find that countries that adopted FOI laws saw an increase in perceived corruption and a decrease in the quality of governance, rather than the expected improvement. This increase in corruption perception seems to take place in the initial years of the reform, with no significant decrease in the long term. Countries with a free press appear to be the ones experiencing the increase. Results are robust throughout different samples and specifications. (JEL D72, D73, H11, K39, K42). The Author 2012. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of Yale University. All rights reserved. For Permissions, please email: journals.permissions@oup.com, Oxford University Press.","PeriodicalId":47987,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Law Economics & Organization","volume":"13 1","pages":"1317-1343"},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2013-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"78900435","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 64
Time for Blood: The Effect of Paid Leave Legislation on Altruistic Behavior 鲜血时刻:带薪休假立法对利他行为的影响
IF 1.1 3区 社会学
Journal of Law Economics & Organization Pub Date : 2013-12-01 DOI: 10.1093/JLEO/EWS019
N. Lacetera, Mario Macis
{"title":"Time for Blood: The Effect of Paid Leave Legislation on Altruistic Behavior","authors":"N. Lacetera, Mario Macis","doi":"10.1093/JLEO/EWS019","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/JLEO/EWS019","url":null,"abstract":"Organizations and public agencies that promote pro-social activities constantly struggle to attract and encourage more contributions. In this article, we study the effects of an explicit reward in the context of blood donation. Specifically, we analyze the effects of a legislative provision that grants a one-day paid leave of absence to blood donors who are employees in Italy, using a unique data set with the complete donation histories of the blood donors in an Italian town. The across-donor variation in employment status, and within-donor changes over time are the sources of variation that we employ to study whether the paid-day-off incentive affects the frequency of their donations. Our analysis indicates that the day-off privilege leads donors who are employees to make, on average, one extra donation per year, which represents an increase of around 40%. We also find that the provision has persistent effects, with donors maintaining higher donation frequencies even when they cease to be eligible for the incentive. We discuss the implications of our findings for policies aimed at reducing the shortages in the supply of blood and, more generally, for organizations that try to motivate voluntary contributors. (JEL: D12, D64, I18) The Author 2012. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of Yale University. All rights reserved. For Permissions, please email: journals.permissions@oup.com, Oxford University Press.","PeriodicalId":47987,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Law Economics & Organization","volume":"89 1","pages":"1384-1420"},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2013-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"79392302","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 32
Hold Up Under Costly Litigation and Imperfect Courts of Law 在昂贵的诉讼和不完善的法院下停滞不前
IF 1.1 3区 社会学
Journal of Law Economics & Organization Pub Date : 2013-10-01 DOI: 10.1093/JLEO/EWS018
M. Willington
{"title":"Hold Up Under Costly Litigation and Imperfect Courts of Law","authors":"M. Willington","doi":"10.1093/JLEO/EWS018","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/JLEO/EWS018","url":null,"abstract":"Most of the incomplete contracting literature assumes courts of law perfectly distinguish verifiable from nonverifiable variables and that only claims related to the former can be brought to courts. We consider a more realistic enforcement technology: Parties are able to sign \"vague contracts\" and, by spending resources on litigation, get the court to hear and rule on cases even if they have bogus grounds and-or the claim is related to nonverifiable variables. We reexamine the results obtained in the literature on contractual solutions to the hold-up problem. In contrast to Che and Hausch (1999 \"Cooperative Investment and the Value of Contracting,\" 89 American Economic Review 125--47.) , we find that a simple contract can be valuable and even the first-best might be achievable in the cooperative investment case. For the case of selfish investment, the efficient result of Edlin and Reichelstein (1996 \"Holdups, Standard Breach Remedies, and Optimal Investment,\" 86 American Economic Review, 478--501.) does not hold in general if attention is restricted to simple contracts. Our model predicts that, if allowed to do so, the parties will--by choosing the appropriate contract--manipulate the litigation costs and court rulings in opposite directions, depending on the nature of investment. (JEL: D20, D78, K10, K40, L22) The Author 2012. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of Yale University. All rights reserved. For Permissions, please email: journals.permissions@oup.com, Oxford University Press.","PeriodicalId":47987,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Law Economics & Organization","volume":"21 4 1","pages":"1023-1055"},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2013-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"78006575","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 5
Judicial Institutions and Firms' External Finance: Evidence from Russia 司法机构与企业外部融资:来自俄罗斯的证据
IF 1.1 3区 社会学
Journal of Law Economics & Organization Pub Date : 2013-08-01 DOI: 10.1093/JLEO/EWS006
J. Shvets
{"title":"Judicial Institutions and Firms' External Finance: Evidence from Russia","authors":"J. Shvets","doi":"10.1093/JLEO/EWS006","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/JLEO/EWS006","url":null,"abstract":"This study presents microeconomic evidence on the relationship between the quality of judiciary and lending. We analyze loans to 11,000 Russian firms between 1996 and 2002 and ask whether the creditor's willingness to lend to a firm is affected by the quality of courts that protect the creditor's rights. We match each firm to the regional commercial court where the creditor would have to sue the firm if it defaulted. We use the share of the court's decisions that get appealed as an (inverse) proxy for court quality. First, we find that creditors make fewer loans when their rights are protected by courts with higher appeal rates. Second, banks respond more to court quality than other creditors (such as suppliers). Furthermore, firms that are younger and not owned by their creditors suffer more from poor courts. These latter findings suggest that creditors use reputation concerns and ownership as substitutes for courts in contract enforcement. The Author 2012. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of Yale University. All rights reserved. For Permissions, please email: journals.permissions@oup.com, Oxford University Press.","PeriodicalId":47987,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Law Economics & Organization","volume":"15 1","pages":"735-764"},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2013-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"75297097","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 30
Litigating Toward Settlement 诉讼和解
IF 1.1 3区 社会学
Journal of Law Economics & Organization Pub Date : 2013-08-01 DOI: 10.2139/SSRN.1649643
C. L. Boyd, David Hoffman
{"title":"Litigating Toward Settlement","authors":"C. L. Boyd, David Hoffman","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.1649643","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.1649643","url":null,"abstract":"Civil litigation typically ends when the parties compromise. While existing theories of settlement primarily focus on information exchange, we instead examine how motion practice, especially nondiscovery motions, can substantially shape parties' knowledge about their cases and thereby influence the timing of settlement. Using docket-level federal district court data, we find a number of strong effects regarding how motions can influence this process: including that the filing of a motion significantly speeds case settlement; that granted motions are more immediately critical to settlement timing than motions denied; and that plaintiff victories have a stronger effect than defendant victories. These results provide a uniquely detailed look at the mechanism of compromise via information exchange and motion practice in litigation while simultaneously yielding evidence that this effect goes well beyond the traditionally studied discovery process. (JEL C00, K00, K10, K41). The Author 2012. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of Yale University. All rights reserved. For Permissions, please email: journals.permissions@oup.com, Oxford University Press.","PeriodicalId":47987,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Law Economics & Organization","volume":"54 1","pages":"898-929"},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2013-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"82266877","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 46
Contract Enforcement: A Political Economy Model of Legal Development 契约执行:法律发展的政治经济学模型
IF 1.1 3区 社会学
Journal of Law Economics & Organization Pub Date : 2013-08-01 DOI: 10.1093/JLEO/EWS004
Fali Huang
{"title":"Contract Enforcement: A Political Economy Model of Legal Development","authors":"Fali Huang","doi":"10.1093/JLEO/EWS004","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/JLEO/EWS004","url":null,"abstract":"In an effort to understand why the relative usage of relational and legal contracts differs across societies, this article builds a political economy model of legal development where legal quality of contract enforcement is a costly public good. It finds that legal investment tends to be too small under elite rule but too large under majority rule in comparison with the socially optimal level. Furthermore, elite rule, low legal quality, and high-income inequality may form a self-perpetuating circle that hinders economic development. In contrast to the conventional view, this article suggests that the often-observed association between heavy reliance on relational contracts and under development is most likely caused by the presence of elite rule rather than by a more collective-oriented culture per se because it is optimal for societies better at using relational contracts to start legal investment relatively late and to have lower quality of legal enforcement. The Author 2012. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of Yale University. All rights reserved. For Permissions, please email: journals.permissions@oup.com, Oxford University Press.","PeriodicalId":47987,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Law Economics & Organization","volume":"2012 1","pages":"835-870"},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2013-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"88163638","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 4
The Effect of Regulatory Uncertainty on Investment: Evidence from Renewable Energy Generation 监管不确定性对投资的影响:来自可再生能源发电的证据
IF 1.1 3区 社会学
Journal of Law Economics & Organization Pub Date : 2013-08-01 DOI: 10.1093/JLEO/EWS007
Kira Fabrizio
{"title":"The Effect of Regulatory Uncertainty on Investment: Evidence from Renewable Energy Generation","authors":"Kira Fabrizio","doi":"10.1093/JLEO/EWS007","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/JLEO/EWS007","url":null,"abstract":"How are firms' investment decisions influenced by potential instability in the regulatory environment? Firms that anticipate regulatory change may alter their responses to current policies, potentially rendering those policies less effective. This article explores the pattern of investments in renewable generation assets in the US electricity industry following the implementation of Renewable Portfolio Standard (RPS) policies. Viewing these investments through the lens of transaction cost economics, the article investigates whether the likelihood of future regulatory change in a state dampened (or spurred) firm responses to RPS policies in that state. I find that firms invested less in new assets in states that had previously passed and repealed legislation to restructure the electricity industry, indicating that perceived regulatory instability reduces new investment and undermines policy goals. (JEL D02, D81, D23, D21, K2) The Author 2012. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of Yale University. All rights reserved. For Permissions, please email: journals.permissions@oup.com, Oxford University Press.","PeriodicalId":47987,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Law Economics & Organization","volume":"30 1","pages":"765-798"},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2013-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"81897815","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 104
首页 上一页 下一页 尾页
0
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
提示
您的信息不完整，为了账户安全，请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
现在去查看 取消
×
提示
确定
请完成安全验证×
相关产品
×
本文献相关产品
联系我们：info@booksci.cn Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务，方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。 Copyright © 2023 布克学术 All rights reserved.
京ICP备2023020795号-1
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号：481959085
Book学术官方微信