诉讼和解

IF 1.3 3区 社会学 Q3 ECONOMICS
C. L. Boyd, David Hoffman
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引用次数: 46

摘要

民事诉讼通常在双方妥协时结束。虽然现有的和解理论主要侧重于信息交换,但我们研究了动议实践,特别是非发现动议,如何实质上塑造当事人对其案件的了解,从而影响和解的时间。使用案宗级联邦地区法院的数据,我们发现动议如何影响这一过程的一些强烈影响:包括动议的提交大大加快了案件的解决;被批准的动议比被拒绝的动议对和解时间更为直接关键;原告的胜利比被告的胜利有更大的影响。这些结果为通过信息交换和诉讼中的动议实践进行妥协的机制提供了独特的详细视角,同时也提供了证据,表明这种影响远远超出了传统研究的发现过程。(凝胶c00, k00, k10, k41)。作者2012。牛津大学出版社代表耶鲁大学出版。版权所有。有关许可,请发送电子邮件:journals.permissions@oup.com,牛津大学出版社。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Litigating Toward Settlement
Civil litigation typically ends when the parties compromise. While existing theories of settlement primarily focus on information exchange, we instead examine how motion practice, especially nondiscovery motions, can substantially shape parties' knowledge about their cases and thereby influence the timing of settlement. Using docket-level federal district court data, we find a number of strong effects regarding how motions can influence this process: including that the filing of a motion significantly speeds case settlement; that granted motions are more immediately critical to settlement timing than motions denied; and that plaintiff victories have a stronger effect than defendant victories. These results provide a uniquely detailed look at the mechanism of compromise via information exchange and motion practice in litigation while simultaneously yielding evidence that this effect goes well beyond the traditionally studied discovery process. (JEL C00, K00, K10, K41). The Author 2012. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of Yale University. All rights reserved. For Permissions, please email: journals.permissions@oup.com, Oxford University Press.
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来源期刊
CiteScore
2.20
自引率
0.00%
发文量
25
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