Journal of Law Economics & Organization最新文献

{"title":"Organizational Capacity, Regulatory Review, and the Limits of Political Control","authors":"Alexander Bolton, R. Potter, Sharece Thrower","doi":"10.1093/JLEO/EWV025","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/JLEO/EWV025","url":null,"abstract":"Studies of administrative politics focus primarily on political control and ignore organizational capacity. We argue that political and organizational factors, as well as the interaction between the two, are necessary for explaining executive policymaking. To test this theory, we consider the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA), an agency often perceived to be the president’s political instrument. Using a new dataset of over 22,000 regulations reviewed by OIRA, we demonstrate that political factors influence review lengths, but organizational factors also exhibit a significant role. We find that reviews are longer when OIRA is understaffed and over-worked. Significantly, we demonstrate that low organizational capacity inhibits the president’s ability to expedite priority rules. Overall, this study highlights the organizational limits of political control. (JEL H11, H83, K23, L50, L51, M50)","PeriodicalId":47987,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Law Economics & Organization","volume":"144 1","pages":"242-271"},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2016-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"86894732","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"More than Politics: Ability and Ideology in the British Appellate Committee","authors":"Matias Iaryczower, Gabriel Katz","doi":"10.1093/JLEO/EWV009","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/JLEO/EWV009","url":null,"abstract":"We argue that a model of judicial behavior that accounts for differences in justices’ ability and ideology provides a fruitful alternative for the empirical analysis of judicial decision-making around the world, and illustrate this by focusing on the case of the United Kingdom. We show that the model explains the decisions of the Lords of Appeal remarkably well, and improves the fit of a purely ideological model. We use our estimates to tackle previously unaddressed questions about the relative role of justices’ preferences and ability in the Appellate Committee. (JEL C11, C13, D71, K40.)","PeriodicalId":47987,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Law Economics & Organization","volume":"5 1","pages":"61-93"},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2016-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"75529468","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Three-party settlement bargaining with an insurer duty to settle: Structural model and evidence from malpractice claims","authors":"Kowsar Yousefi, Bernard Black","doi":"10.1093/JLEO/EWV015","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/JLEO/EWV015","url":null,"abstract":"Prior efforts to specify and then empirically estimate structural models of the outcomes of tort lawsuits involve only two parties—plaintiff and defendant. We incorporate the defendant’s insurer and its \"duty to settle\" into a three-party settlement model. In medical malpractice cases, there is both anecdotal and quantitative evidence that policy limits and the insurer’s duty to settle are central parts of settlement bargaining. We estimate the model using a Texas database of closed, paid medical malpractice claims. Both the data and our model predict a mass of cases with a settlement offer by the plaintiff exactly at limits; a smaller but still sizeable mass of cases with payout exactly at limits (both in pre-trial settlements and after trial), and substantial haircuts (payout limits. In counterfactual analysis, we predict that, as duty-to-settle liability becomes stricter, there will be: more at-limits offers, fewer trials, fewer at-limits payments in tried cases, more insurer payments above limits, and smaller haircuts. (JEL K13, K41)","PeriodicalId":47987,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Law Economics & Organization","volume":"49 1","pages":"180-212"},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2016-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"83072604","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Trial and Error: Decision Reversal and Panel Size in State Courts","authors":"Yosh Halberstam","doi":"10.1093/JLEO/EWV007","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/JLEO/EWV007","url":null,"abstract":"Using cross-state and within-court variation, I show that lower court decisions are reversed more frequently by larger, rather than smaller, panels of high court judges. Overall, conditional on being reviewed, the probability that a case is reversed by a high court judicial panel is less than one half. To understand these findings, I develop a simple framework that connects reversals and panel size with the extent to which judicial decision-making is congruent with the law. Assuming the high court rules correctly more often than not, my empirical results suggest that increasing judicial panel size erodes the quality of decision-making in high courts. These results are consistent with a large literature investigating small group size effects on productivity and output. (JEL D02, D71, H41, K40)","PeriodicalId":47987,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Law Economics & Organization","volume":"28 1","pages":"94-118"},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2016-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"83498381","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Vetogates and American Public Law","authors":"William N. Eskridge","doi":"10.1093/JLEO/EWS009","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/JLEO/EWS009","url":null,"abstract":"In this article, I explore the ramifications of a vetogates model of the legislative process. The vetogates model focuses on the many points in the legislative process where proposed legislation can be stopped (vetoed). A political system where statutes must pass through a variety of filters, each motivated by somewhat different incentives and interests, is one where (1) statutes are hard to enact; (2) statutes that are enacted will tend to have compromises, logrolls, and delegations; and, (3) once enacted, statutes are hard to repeal. These consequences represent a significant cost of the vetogates model to our system of governance, but they also carry some potential benefits. I explore the ramifications of the vetogates model for legal doctrine. For example, the vetogates model supports judicial consultation of legislative history in statutory cases and suggests the virtue of deliberation-rewarding canons for judicial review of agency statutory interpretations.","PeriodicalId":47987,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Law Economics & Organization","volume":"38 1","pages":"756-781"},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2015-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"84801968","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Interpreting Circuit Court Voting Patterns: A Social Interactions Framework","authors":"J. Fischman","doi":"10.1093/JLEO/EWS042","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/JLEO/EWS042","url":null,"abstract":"Many empirical studies have found that circuit judges’ votes are significantly influenced by their panel colleagues. Although this influence is typically measured in terms of colleagues’ characteristics, this article argues that it is better understood as an effect of colleagues’ votes. Applying the latter interpretation, this article reanalyzes 11 prior studies of panel voting, as well as three novel data sets, and reveals the impact of colleagues’ votes to be strikingly uniform. In almost every type of case, each colleague’s vote increases the likelihood that a judge will vote in the same direction by roughly 40 percentage points. This result is consistent with a strong norm of consensus and can account for nearly all of the perceived impact of colleagues’ party, gender, and race. This finding raises questions about strategic and deliberative models of panel voting and helps clarify measurement issues regarding the relationship between judicial characteristics and voting behavior (JEL C31, K40).","PeriodicalId":47987,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Law Economics & Organization","volume":"116 1","pages":"808-842"},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2015-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"74684168","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Becker Meets Ricardo: Multisector Matching with Communication and Cognitive Skills","authors":"R. McCann, Xianwen Shi, A. Siow, R. Wolthoff","doi":"10.1093/JLEO/EWV002","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/JLEO/EWV002","url":null,"abstract":"This article presents a tractable framework for studying frictionless matching in education and labor markets when individuals have heterogeneous communication and cognitive skills. In the model, there are gains to specialization and team production, but specialization requires communication and coordination between team members. Individuals accumulate cognitive skills in schools when young. As adults, they decide whether to work as a manager or a worker in a firm or become a teacher in a school. Individuals with more communication skills will become either managers or teachers and earn higher wages. Each manager manages several workers and each teacher teaches several students, with their span of control being determined by their communication skill. These individuals also invest discretely more in education than marginally different individuals who become workers. Equilibrium is equivalent to the solution of an utilitarian social planner solving a linear programming problem.","PeriodicalId":47987,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Law Economics & Organization","volume":"105 1","pages":"690-720"},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2015-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"76307197","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Auditor Conservatism, Incentive Compensation, and the Quality of Financial Reporting","authors":"Ravi Singh, Ian Larkin","doi":"10.1093/JLEO/EWV012","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/JLEO/EWV012","url":null,"abstract":"This paper examines how performance-based compensation for managers influences their reporting behavior and the resulting stance auditors take when deciding whether to certify a manager’s report. The paper makes endogenous the stance auditors take: with a more conservative stance, auditors are less likely to certify an inflated report, but are more likely to refuse to certify an accurate one. The auditor’s tradeoff between these two error types, and the resulting interplay with the level of performance-based pay for managers, play a critical role in determining the level of managerial misreporting, investor welfare, and a number of other key variables. The paper finds that (1) strengthening the link between pay and reported performance can result in a weaker link between pay and actual performance and, consequently, lower managerial effort; (2) conservatism among auditors improves performance measurement; and (3) raising penalties on managers for overstating earnings can reduce audit quality and harm investors, while raising penalties on auditors for certifying overstated results does not harm investors. (JEL D82, G30, G34, G38, K22, M40, M52)","PeriodicalId":47987,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Law Economics & Organization","volume":"37 1","pages":"721-751"},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2015-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"82472955","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Introduction to “25 Years of Law and Positive Political Theory: Past, Present and the Future”","authors":"Daniel B. Rodriguez, Emerson H. Tiller","doi":"10.1093/JLEO/EWV024","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/JLEO/EWV024","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":47987,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Law Economics & Organization","volume":"14 1","pages":"752-755"},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2015-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"79798899","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"A Model of Judicial Influence on Congressional Policy Making: Grove City College v. Bell","authors":"Brian A. Marks","doi":"10.1093/JLEO/EWS010","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/JLEO/EWS010","url":null,"abstract":"Traditional law and economic analysis has focused on legal rules directly related to the allocation of resources. Today, economic analysis is being used to examine more traditional legal issues. This article explores one such traditional legal issue by applying economic methodology to the legislative-judicial interaction or \"bargaining game.\" The purpose of this article is to determine the impact of judicial interpretation on regulatory legislation. Most studies of the political economy of regulation have focused on elected politicians (e.g., Congressmen), ignoring the role of the courts. Yet, judges interpret the law and may, in the extreme, reverse legislative decisions. Studying the influence of the judiciary on the legislature’s regulatory decisions remains an unexplored but important issue. The model allows us to address a variety of issues central to national policy making, for example, how the court influences legislative choices. We focus on an issue raised in the legal literature and in judicial opinions. Suppose a regulatory statute has been altered or reinterpreted by the courts, and we then observe that Congress does not act to change the court ruling. What can we infer from this lack of action? Many prominent political and legal scholars conclude that this inaction indicates acceptability by a majority of legislators. Because there exists no analytical foundation for assessing how judicial decisions affect legislative decision making over regulatory issues, however, such conclusions rest on questionable assumptions. The purpose of this article is to develop a formal economic model of legislative-judicial interaction. The model allows us to predict the circumstances in which Congress will and will not change judicial decisions. The model shows that congressional inaction is not a sign of acceptability by a majority of legislators. Instead, congressional inaction is a consequence of congressional structure and procedures: committees play an important role here, as does bicameralism. This model will be used to explore and explain the legislative events surrounding the Supreme Court decision Grove City College v. Bell (1984), a case involving statutory interpretation and the Department of Education’s regulatory provisions prohibiting sex discrimination. (JEL D72, D78, K00, K40, Z18)","PeriodicalId":47987,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Law Economics & Organization","volume":"16 1","pages":"843-875"},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2015-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"89148264","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}