{"title":"解读巡回法院投票模式:一个社会互动框架","authors":"J. Fischman","doi":"10.1093/JLEO/EWS042","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Many empirical studies have found that circuit judges’ votes are significantly influenced by their panel colleagues. Although this influence is typically measured in terms of colleagues’ characteristics, this article argues that it is better understood as an effect of colleagues’ votes. Applying the latter interpretation, this article reanalyzes 11 prior studies of panel voting, as well as three novel data sets, and reveals the impact of colleagues’ votes to be strikingly uniform. In almost every type of case, each colleague’s vote increases the likelihood that a judge will vote in the same direction by roughly 40 percentage points. This result is consistent with a strong norm of consensus and can account for nearly all of the perceived impact of colleagues’ party, gender, and race. This finding raises questions about strategic and deliberative models of panel voting and helps clarify measurement issues regarding the relationship between judicial characteristics and voting behavior (JEL C31, K40).","PeriodicalId":47987,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Law Economics & Organization","volume":"116 1","pages":"808-842"},"PeriodicalIF":1.3000,"publicationDate":"2015-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"59","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Interpreting Circuit Court Voting Patterns: A Social Interactions Framework\",\"authors\":\"J. Fischman\",\"doi\":\"10.1093/JLEO/EWS042\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"Many empirical studies have found that circuit judges’ votes are significantly influenced by their panel colleagues. Although this influence is typically measured in terms of colleagues’ characteristics, this article argues that it is better understood as an effect of colleagues’ votes. Applying the latter interpretation, this article reanalyzes 11 prior studies of panel voting, as well as three novel data sets, and reveals the impact of colleagues’ votes to be strikingly uniform. In almost every type of case, each colleague’s vote increases the likelihood that a judge will vote in the same direction by roughly 40 percentage points. This result is consistent with a strong norm of consensus and can account for nearly all of the perceived impact of colleagues’ party, gender, and race. This finding raises questions about strategic and deliberative models of panel voting and helps clarify measurement issues regarding the relationship between judicial characteristics and voting behavior (JEL C31, K40).\",\"PeriodicalId\":47987,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Journal of Law Economics & Organization\",\"volume\":\"116 1\",\"pages\":\"808-842\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":1.3000,\"publicationDate\":\"2015-11-01\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"59\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Journal of Law Economics & Organization\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"96\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1093/JLEO/EWS042\",\"RegionNum\":3,\"RegionCategory\":\"社会学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q3\",\"JCRName\":\"ECONOMICS\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Journal of Law Economics & Organization","FirstCategoryId":"96","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1093/JLEO/EWS042","RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q3","JCRName":"ECONOMICS","Score":null,"Total":0}
Interpreting Circuit Court Voting Patterns: A Social Interactions Framework
Many empirical studies have found that circuit judges’ votes are significantly influenced by their panel colleagues. Although this influence is typically measured in terms of colleagues’ characteristics, this article argues that it is better understood as an effect of colleagues’ votes. Applying the latter interpretation, this article reanalyzes 11 prior studies of panel voting, as well as three novel data sets, and reveals the impact of colleagues’ votes to be strikingly uniform. In almost every type of case, each colleague’s vote increases the likelihood that a judge will vote in the same direction by roughly 40 percentage points. This result is consistent with a strong norm of consensus and can account for nearly all of the perceived impact of colleagues’ party, gender, and race. This finding raises questions about strategic and deliberative models of panel voting and helps clarify measurement issues regarding the relationship between judicial characteristics and voting behavior (JEL C31, K40).