Economic Theory最新文献_第5页

Momentum in contests and its underlying behavioral mechanisms 竞赛中的动量及其潜在的行为机制

IF 1.3 3区经济学

Economic Theory Pub Date : 2024-03-17 DOI: 10.1007/s00199-024-01557-w

Greg Kubitz, Lionel Page, Hao Wan

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引用次数: 0

R &d and market sharing agreements 研发和市场共享协议

IF 1.3 3区经济学

Economic Theory Pub Date : 2024-03-06 DOI: 10.1007/s00199-024-01554-z

Jérôme Dollinger, Ana Mauleon, Vincent Vannetelbosch

引用次数: 0

Expectations, beliefs and the business cycle: tracing back to the deep economic drivers 预期、信念和商业周期：追溯经济的深层驱动力

IF 1.3 3区经济学

Economic Theory Pub Date : 2024-03-06 DOI: 10.1007/s00199-024-01555-y

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引用次数: 0

Level-k thinking in the extensive form 广泛形式的水平-k 思维

IF 1.3 3区经济学

Economic Theory Pub Date : 2024-03-06 DOI: 10.1007/s00199-024-01556-x

Burkhard C. Schipper, Hang Zhou

引用次数: 0

Existence of Walrasian equilibria with discontinuous, non-ordered, interdependent preferences, without free disposal, and with an infinite-dimensional commodity space 具有不连续、无序、相互依存偏好、无自由处置、无限维商品空间的瓦尔拉斯均衡的存在性

IF 1.3 3区经济学

Economic Theory Pub Date : 2024-02-28 DOI: 10.1007/s00199-024-01553-0

引用次数: 0

Aggregation of misspecified experts 聚合误报专家

IF 1.3 3区经济学

Economic Theory Pub Date : 2024-02-16 DOI: 10.1007/s00199-024-01552-1

Bach Dong-Xuan

引用次数: 0

Plea bargaining when juror effort is costly 在陪审员付出高昂代价的情况下进行辩诉交易

IF 1.3 3区经济学

Economic Theory Pub Date : 2024-02-14 DOI: 10.1007/s00199-024-01551-2

Brishti Guha

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引用次数: 0

Evolution of cooperation in the indefinitely repeated collective action with a contest for power 无限重复集体行动中的合作演变与权力争夺

IF 1.3 3区经济学

Economic Theory Pub Date : 2024-01-27 DOI: 10.1007/s00199-023-01549-2

Yaroslav Rosokha, Xinxin Lyu, Denis Tverskoi, Sergey Gavrilets

引用次数: 0

Perfect robust implementation by private information design 通过私人信息设计实现完美的稳健执行

IF 1.3 3区经济学

Economic Theory Pub Date : 2024-01-25 DOI: 10.1007/s00199-023-01548-3

Maxim Ivanov

引用次数: 0

Mechanisms and axiomatics for division problems with single-dipped preferences 具有单一偏好的除法问题的机制和公理