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On the limit points of an infinitely repeated rational expectations equilibrium 论无限重复理性预期均衡的极限点
IF 1.3 3区 经济学
Economic Theory Pub Date : 2024-06-04 DOI: 10.1007/s00199-024-01576-7
Marialaura Pesce, Niccolò Urbinati, Nicholas C. Yannelis
{"title":"On the limit points of an infinitely repeated rational expectations equilibrium","authors":"Marialaura Pesce, Niccolò Urbinati, Nicholas C. Yannelis","doi":"10.1007/s00199-024-01576-7","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-024-01576-7","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We study the rational expectations equilibrium (REE) in the framework of a repeated economy. In each repetition agents observe the sequence of asymmetric REE’s occurred in the past to update their private information. We show that, in the limit, agents reach a symmetric information REE which exists universally (and not generically) and it is Pareto efficient and obviously incentive compatible. We also prove the converse result, i.e., given a symmetric information REE, we can construct a sequence of approximate asymmetric REE allocations that converges to the symmetric information REE. In view of the above results, the symmetric information REE provides a rationalization for the asymmetric one.</p>","PeriodicalId":47982,"journal":{"name":"Economic Theory","volume":"3 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2024-06-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141254154","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Reputation, learning and project choice in frictional economies 摩擦经济中的声誉、学习和项目选择
IF 1.3 3区 经济学
Economic Theory Pub Date : 2024-05-27 DOI: 10.1007/s00199-024-01579-4
Farzad Pourbabaee
{"title":"Reputation, learning and project choice in frictional economies","authors":"Farzad Pourbabaee","doi":"10.1007/s00199-024-01579-4","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-024-01579-4","url":null,"abstract":"<p>I introduce a dynamic model of learning and random meetings between a long-lived agent with unknown ability and heterogeneous projects with observable qualities. The outcomes of the agent’s matches with the projects determine her posterior belief about her ability (i.e., her reputation). In a self-type learning framework with endogenous outside option, I find the optimal project selection strategy of the agent, that determines what types of projects the agent with a certain level of reputation will accept. Sections of the optimal matching set become <i>increasing intervals</i>, with different cutoffs across different types of the projects. Increasing the meeting rate has asymmetric effects on the sections of the matching sets: it unambiguously expands the section for the high type projects, while on some regions, it initially expands and then shrinks the section of the low type projects.</p>","PeriodicalId":47982,"journal":{"name":"Economic Theory","volume":"4 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2024-05-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141170485","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
A measure of social loss for production economies with externalities 具有外部性的生产经济的社会损失衡量标准
IF 1.3 3区 经济学
Economic Theory Pub Date : 2024-05-14 DOI: 10.1007/s00199-024-01574-9
Maria Gabriella Graziano, Vincenzo Platino
{"title":"A measure of social loss for production economies with externalities","authors":"Maria Gabriella Graziano, Vincenzo Platino","doi":"10.1007/s00199-024-01574-9","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-024-01574-9","url":null,"abstract":"<p>In this paper we consider a production economy and adopt a cooperative approach to equilibrium analysis which allows each individual to cooperate with others and to form a coalition whose members have access to the available technologies. We investigate the behavior of the core defined with respect to preferences (<i>preferences-core</i>) and with respect to resources (<i>resources-core</i>). We introduce a <i>measure of social loss</i> with respect to the core of the production economy which characterizes the corresponding core allocations. Our definition of the core requires that coalitions proposing a deviation take into account the consequences that changes in production plans may have for the counter-coalitions (<i>considerate dominance</i>). Our characterization holds in the presence of consumption externalities and an optimistic or a pessimistic attitude of coalition agents with respect to the behavior of outsiders.</p>","PeriodicalId":47982,"journal":{"name":"Economic Theory","volume":"7 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2024-05-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140937026","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Optimal labor income taxation with the dividend effect 具有红利效应的最优劳动所得税
IF 1.3 3区 经济学
Economic Theory Pub Date : 2024-05-13 DOI: 10.1007/s00199-024-01578-5
Alexey Kushnir, Robertas Zubrickas
{"title":"Optimal labor income taxation with the dividend effect","authors":"Alexey Kushnir, Robertas Zubrickas","doi":"10.1007/s00199-024-01578-5","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-024-01578-5","url":null,"abstract":"<p>The unequal distribution of dividends implies the unequal distribution of the profit share of workers’ product of labor. In a Mirrleesian framework when dividends cannot be expropriated, we show that a progressive distribution of dividends creates a positive dividend effect on labor income taxes. Our numerical simulations show the dividend effect to be approximately four percentage points. We analyze the dividend effect under different market structures and its interplay with other forms of taxation.\u0000</p>","PeriodicalId":47982,"journal":{"name":"Economic Theory","volume":"42 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2024-05-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140936833","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Auctions with resale at a later date 日后转售的拍卖
IF 1.3 3区 经济学
Economic Theory Pub Date : 2024-05-08 DOI: 10.1007/s00199-024-01577-6
Sanyyam Khurana
{"title":"Auctions with resale at a later date","authors":"Sanyyam Khurana","doi":"10.1007/s00199-024-01577-6","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-024-01577-6","url":null,"abstract":"<p>In this paper, we consider fixed time delays in auctions with resale. The time delay may impact the bidders’ valuations of the object. In particular, the auction’s winner may obtain some value by depleting the object, either by consuming it or exploiting it, over the interim period and the loser may lose some value by virtue of the object being depleted by the winner. Our main result is that fixed time delays lead to asymmetric bid distributions. For a special family of probability distributions, we show that the first-price auction is revenue superior to the second-price auction.</p>","PeriodicalId":47982,"journal":{"name":"Economic Theory","volume":"30 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2024-05-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140888011","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Prudent aggregation of quasi-hyperbolic experts 审慎聚集准双曲面专家
IF 1.3 3区 经济学
Economic Theory Pub Date : 2024-05-08 DOI: 10.1007/s00199-024-01575-8
Bach Dong-Xuan, Philippe Bich, Bertrand Wigniolle
{"title":"Prudent aggregation of quasi-hyperbolic experts","authors":"Bach Dong-Xuan, Philippe Bich, Bertrand Wigniolle","doi":"10.1007/s00199-024-01575-8","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-024-01575-8","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Imagine a cohort of economic experts appraising long-term projects through the quasi-hyperbolic discounting criterion. The parameters (long-run and short-run discount rates) used by each expert may differ, which implies different policy recommendations. Subsequently, a decision maker is faced with the task of selecting an efficient aggregation from these varied opinions. This paper proposes a solution to reconcile these conflicting recommendations, taking into account the decision maker’s adoption of a “prudent” behavior.\u0000</p>","PeriodicalId":47982,"journal":{"name":"Economic Theory","volume":"40 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2024-05-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140936909","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Social aspiration reinforcement learning in Cournot games 库诺博弈中的社会愿望强化学习
IF 1.3 3区 经济学
Economic Theory Pub Date : 2024-05-08 DOI: 10.1007/s00199-024-01560-1
Enrique Fatas, Antonio J. Morales, Ainhoa Jaramillo-Gutiérrez
{"title":"Social aspiration reinforcement learning in Cournot games","authors":"Enrique Fatas, Antonio J. Morales, Ainhoa Jaramillo-Gutiérrez","doi":"10.1007/s00199-024-01560-1","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-024-01560-1","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We offer theoretical and experimental evidence showing that <i>social aspiration learning</i> converges to the Walrasian outcome in Cournot games. Reinforcement learning converges to the competitive outcome because the Walrasian quantity is the only action that never yields profits below the average profits in the market. Using data from laboratory experiments, we show that when provided with information about average market profits, they positively (negatively) reinforce actions that yield payoffs above (below) the average payoffs in the market. When provided with both rivals’ individual performance and average market profits, both heuristics (imitation and social learning) are combined by subjects and prices and profits are driven further into competitive levels, closer to the Walrasian quantity. Subjects’ tendency to adjust their choices following the social learning heuristics survives and they adopt it as frequently as imitation when both predictions collide.</p>","PeriodicalId":47982,"journal":{"name":"Economic Theory","volume":"20 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2024-05-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140889749","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
The range of collective accuracy for binary classifications under majority rule 多数规则下二元分类的集体准确率范围
IF 1.3 3区 经济学
Economic Theory Pub Date : 2024-04-20 DOI: 10.1007/s00199-024-01570-z
Lu Hong, Scott E. Page
{"title":"The range of collective accuracy for binary classifications under majority rule","authors":"Lu Hong, Scott E. Page","doi":"10.1007/s00199-024-01570-z","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-024-01570-z","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Many decisions and actions can be framed as binary classification problems in which an outcome function maps states of the world into one of two outcomes and in which individuals use models (interpreted signals) to classify the state. For this class of binary classification problems, we fully characterize the range of possible group accuracies as a function of group size, average individual accuracy and diversity (average pairwise disagreement) or groups using majority rule. Our characterization yields five implications (i) the range of possible collective accuracies can be large, especially for groups of low accuracy individuals, (ii) up to moderate levels of diversity, the maximal collective accuracy gain equals the maximal collective accuracy loss, (iii) possible group accuracy set-wise improves in the average accuracy of their members, (iv) larger groups increase the range of possible collective accuracies unless diversity is high, and (v) for groups to be guaranteed to be more accurate than their average member, diversity must be high.</p>","PeriodicalId":47982,"journal":{"name":"Economic Theory","volume":"64 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2024-04-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140629183","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
How strength asymmetries shape multi-sided conflicts 实力不对称如何塑造多方冲突
IF 1.3 3区 经济学
Economic Theory Pub Date : 2024-04-17 DOI: 10.1007/s00199-024-01569-6
Sebastian Cortes-Corrales, Paul M. Gorny
{"title":"How strength asymmetries shape multi-sided conflicts","authors":"Sebastian Cortes-Corrales, Paul M. Gorny","doi":"10.1007/s00199-024-01569-6","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-024-01569-6","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Governments and multilateral organisations often attempt to influence multi-sided violent conflicts by supporting or undermining one of the conflicting parties. We investigate the (intended and unintended) consequences of strengthening or weakening an agent in a multi-sided conflict. Using a conflict network based on Franke and Öztürk (J Public Econ 126:104–113, 2015), we study how changing the strength of otherwise symmetric agents creates knock-on effects throughout the network. Increasing or decreasing an agent’s strength has the same unintended consequences. Changes in the strength of an agent induce a relocation of conflict investments: Distant conflicts are carried out more fiercely. In line with previous results, asymmetry reduces aggregate conflict investments. In the case of bipartite networks, with two conflicting <i>tacit groups with aligned interests</i>, agents in the group of the (now) strong or weak agent face more intense conflicts. Furthermore, in conflicts where the (now strong or weak) agent is not involved, the probabilities of winning remain unchanged compared to the symmetric case.\u0000</p>","PeriodicalId":47982,"journal":{"name":"Economic Theory","volume":"36 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2024-04-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140617374","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
The public provision of goods in democracies: Do age and inequality matter? 民主国家的公共产品供应：年龄和不平等重要吗？
IF 1.3 3区 经济学
Economic Theory Pub Date : 2024-04-13 DOI: 10.1007/s00199-024-01572-x
Anirban Mitra
{"title":"The public provision of goods in democracies: Do age and inequality matter?","authors":"Anirban Mitra","doi":"10.1007/s00199-024-01572-x","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-024-01572-x","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We build a multi-dimensional model of political decision-making with endogenous political parties to analyse the effect of inequality and demography on public spending. Voters differ in terms of income and age. Political competition determines in equilibrium the tax rate and the allocation of revenue between income redistribution and two forms of public spending—a capital good and a neutral good. All agents value the neutral good equally but the young like capital spending more than the old do. We show that the effect of age (resp., inequality) on equilibrium public spending can go in any direction based on the underlying level of inequality (resp., age). Our findings reconcile a large body of seemingly contradictory stylised empirical findings in public economics.</p>","PeriodicalId":47982,"journal":{"name":"Economic Theory","volume":"47 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2024-04-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140576574","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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