日后转售的拍卖

IF 1.2 3区经济学 Q3 ECONOMICS

Economic Theory Pub Date : 2024-05-08 DOI:10.1007/s00199-024-01577-6

Sanyyam Khurana

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引用次数: 0

摘要

在本文中，我们考虑了转售拍卖中的固定时间延迟。时间延迟可能会影响竞拍者对物品的估价。特别是，拍卖的获胜者可能会在这段时间内通过消耗或利用物品而获得一些价值，而失败者可能会因为物品被获胜者消耗而失去一些价值。我们的主要结果是，固定的时间延迟会导致不对称的出价分布。对于一个特殊的概率分布族，我们证明第一价格拍卖的收益优于第二价格拍卖。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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Auctions with resale at a later date

In this paper, we consider fixed time delays in auctions with resale. The time delay may impact the bidders’ valuations of the object. In particular, the auction’s winner may obtain some value by depleting the object, either by consuming it or exploiting it, over the interim period and the loser may lose some value by virtue of the object being depleted by the winner. Our main result is that fixed time delays lead to asymmetric bid distributions. For a special family of probability distributions, we show that the first-price auction is revenue superior to the second-price auction.

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来源期刊

Economic Theory ECONOMICS-

CiteScore

2.50

自引率

23.10%

发文量

期刊介绍： The purpose of Economic Theory is to provide an outlet for research - in all areas of economics based on rigorous theoretical reasoning, and - on specific topics in mathematics which is motivated by the analysis of economic problems. Economic Theory''s scope encompasses - but is not limited to - the following fields. - classical and modern equilibrium theory - cooperative and non-cooperative game theory - macroeconomics - social choice and welfare - uncertainty and information, intertemporal economics (including dynamical systems) - public economics - international and developmental economics - financial economics, money and banking - industrial organization Economic Theory also publishes surveys if they clearly picture the basic ideas at work in some areas, the essential technical apparatus which is used and the central questions which remain open. The development of a productive dialectic between stylized facts and abstract formulations requires that economic relevance be at the forefront. Thus, correct, and innovative, mathematical analysis is not enough; it must be motivated by - and contribute to - the understanding of substantive economic problems. Officially cited as: Econ Theory