{"title":"Not All NGOs are Treated Equally: Selectivity in Civil Society Management in China and Russia","authors":"Elizabeth Plantan","doi":"10.5129/001041522x16258376563887","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5129/001041522x16258376563887","url":null,"abstract":"How do autocrats manage civil society? I develop a typology of authoritarian responses to civil society and show how leaders employ selective policies to adjudicate among risks and benefits in the third sector. Using data on laws managing foreign support of civil society in China and Russia, I find evidence of selective implementation that reveals which groups are seen as threatening or beneficial. While there are some similarities across the two countries, I find a divergence in their response to environmental groups, who are selectively repressed or neglected in Russia but selectively encouraged or co-opted in China. Using fieldwork interviews, I conduct a case study to show that while environmental groups in both countries pose some risk, the key difference is their perceived benefit.","PeriodicalId":47960,"journal":{"name":"Comparative Politics","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2021-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"70697618","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Political Discourse and Public Attitudes toward Syrian Refugees in Turkey","authors":"Burcu Pinar Alakoc, G. Goksel, Alan Zarychta","doi":"10.5129/001041522x16263065025324","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5129/001041522x16263065025324","url":null,"abstract":"Sustaining positive attitudes toward refugees is a priority as refugee crises surge worldwide. This study draws on eighty-five in-depth interviews with citizens in four provinces across Turkey. We identified prominent frames from Turkish political discourse and asked individuals to recount their self-narratives of attitude formation about Syrian refugees. We find that most respondents’ narratives included multiple frames, confirming that attitudes are often products of contradictory factors. Furthermore, humanitarianism and shared religion, frames thought to support positive attitudes, did not have such straightforward associations here. Humanitarianism was a positive force early, but had limits as compassion fatigue set in, and respondents described polarizing differences in religious practices rather than shared religion. Our work highlights the importance of examining attitude formation in non-Western settings for understanding views about and supporting societal inclusion of refugees.","PeriodicalId":47960,"journal":{"name":"Comparative Politics","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2021-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"70698085","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Regulatory State Building under Authoritarianism: Bureaucratic Competition, Global Embeddedness, and Regulatory Authority in China","authors":"John K. Yasuda","doi":"10.5129/001041521X16132233742534","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5129/001041521X16132233742534","url":null,"abstract":"The regulator’s existence under authoritarianism is a precarious one. They must carefully address the regime’s desire for safer food, stable financial markets, and cleaner air without antagonizing politically favored firms or generating social unrest. At the same time, they face reputational pressures from their international counterparts to implement global best practices at home. This article highlights how enterprising officials have quietly sought to expand their authority in the context of an authoritarian regulatory state. By focusing on aviation, financial services, food safety, and environmental protection in China, I highlight how agencies, responding to domestic bureaucratic competition and embeddedness in global networks, have led to the emergence of four distinct types of regulatory authority: regulatory command, subversion, coordination, and ensnarement.","PeriodicalId":47960,"journal":{"name":"Comparative Politics","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2021-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"70697352","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"When Judges Defy Dictators: An Audience-Based Framework to Explain the Emergence of Judicial Assertiveness against Authoritarian Regimes","authors":"Yasser Kureshi","doi":"10.5129/001041521X15899127697291","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5129/001041521X15899127697291","url":null,"abstract":"Under what conditions do judiciaries act assertively against authoritarian regimes? I argue that the judiciary coalesces around institutional norms and preferences in response to the preferences of institutions and networks, or \"audiences,\" with which judges interact, and which shape\u0000 the careers and reputations of judges. Proposing a typology of judicial-regime relations, I demonstrate that the judiciary's affinity to authoritarian regimes diminishes as these audiences grow independent from the regime. Using case law research, archival research, and interviews, I demonstrate\u0000 the utility of the audiencebased framework for explaining judicial behavior in authoritarian regimes by exploring cross-temporal variation across authoritarian regimes in Pakistan. This study integrates ideas-based and interest-based explanations for judicial behavior in a generalizable framework\u0000 for explaining variation in judicial assertiveness against authoritarian regimes.","PeriodicalId":47960,"journal":{"name":"Comparative Politics","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2021-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48141361","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Left Behind: Labor Unions and Redistributive Policy under the Brazilian Workers’ Party","authors":"Andrés Schipani","doi":"10.5129/001041522x16280973839810","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5129/001041522x16280973839810","url":null,"abstract":"How do leftist governments negotiate the trade-off between courting union support and maintaining the business sector’s trust? Scholars have argued that leftist parties will remain accountable to their labor base when powerful unions have strong ties to centralized leftist parties. However, I argue that strong party-union ties and party leadership centralization may, in fact, insulate leftist presidents against redistributive pressures from below. When party-union ties allow labor leaders to develop careers as professional politicians, these leaders become more responsive to the party’s goals than to their union base. Further, a centralized party organization can exclude unions and leftist factions from the design of redistributive policies. To test my argument, I use a case study of Brazil under the administration of the Worker’s Party (PT).","PeriodicalId":47960,"journal":{"name":"Comparative Politics","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2021-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"70697683","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Executive Agency and State Capacity in Development: Comparing Sino-African Railways in Kenya and Ethiopia","authors":"Yuanxu Wang","doi":"10.5129/001041522x16225661565091","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5129/001041522x16225661565091","url":null,"abstract":"Why do infrastructure projects that are similar in nature develop along starkly different trajectories? This question sheds light on the varying state capacity of developing countries. Divergent from structural explanations that stress external agency and institutional explanations that emphasize bureaucratic capacity, I propose a political championship theory to explain the variance in states capacity of infrastructure delivery. I argue that when a project is highly salient to leaders’ survival, leaders commit to the project; leaders with strong authority build an implementation coalition, leading to higher effectiveness. I trace the process of the Standard Gauge Railway in Kenya and Addis-Djibouti Railway in Ethiopia, relying on over 180 interviews. This research highlights the individual agency within structural and institutional constraints, a previously understudied area in state capacity.","PeriodicalId":47960,"journal":{"name":"Comparative Politics","volume":"31 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2021-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"70697779","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Resisting Equality: Subnational State Capture and the Unequal Distribution of Inequality","authors":"L. González, Marcelo Nazareno","doi":"10.5129/001041522X16185909705013","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5129/001041522X16185909705013","url":null,"abstract":"Inequality is unequally distributed across the territory, and national averages obscure this variation. Pockets of very high inequality persist at the subnational level of government, even when national governments implement large scale redistributive policies. This study investigates which factors at the subnational level may help explaining differences in income inequality across units. The main claim is that in subnational units where local economic elites capture provincial states by occupying relevant positions in their governments have lower taxes on land, spend less in social programs, have more repression of federal labor rights, and, as a consequence, have higher inequality. The study uses a large-N analysis of original panel data for Argentina, presents a comparative study of two cases, and explores some comparative implications in the conclusions.","PeriodicalId":47960,"journal":{"name":"Comparative Politics","volume":"36 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2021-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"70697389","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Managing Ethnic Minorities with State Non-Repression in Interwar Poland","authors":"Daniel Fedorowycz","doi":"10.5129/001041521X16113368270026","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5129/001041521X16113368270026","url":null,"abstract":"Why were most ethnic minority organizations in interwar Poland permitted and sometimes encouraged by the state, when the ruling titular ethnic group pursued discriminatory policies against the same minority groups, faced hostility from these groups, and had the capacity to repress their organizations? Current literature focuses on repression as the main strategy deployed by states to manage these relationships. This article, on the other hand, asks why states allow minority organizations to operate. Using the logic of divide and rule, this article demonstrates that, in the case of multi-ethnic states, a state may prefer a plurality of organizations representing a certain minority ethnic group, particularly if the group is restive, in order to ensure that a united opposition cannot legitimately threaten the state’s political survival.","PeriodicalId":47960,"journal":{"name":"Comparative Politics","volume":"113 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2021-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"70697479","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Going Out or Opting Out? Capital, Political Vulnerability, and the State in China’s Outward Investment","authors":"Meg Rithmire","doi":"10.5129/001041522x16244682037327","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5129/001041522x16244682037327","url":null,"abstract":"How do state-business relations interact with outward investment in authoritarian regimes? This article focuses on the importance of domestic political status and specifically business’ vulnerability to the state in explaining the dynamics of China’s outward investments. I present three types of domestic capital whose economic and political logics differ as they go abroad: tactical capital pursues political power and prestige, competitive capital pursues commercial goals, and crony capital seeks refuge from the state and asset expatriation. The Chinese regime’s approach to outward investment, which I characterize as mobilization campaigns adjusted over time and combined with targeted domestic regulation, endeavors to treat these different kinds of capital differently, deploying and disciplining tactical capital, enabling competitive capital, and constraining crony capital.","PeriodicalId":47960,"journal":{"name":"Comparative Politics","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2021-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"70698005","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Voting for a Killer: Efraín Ríos Montt’s Return to Politics in Democratic Guatemala","authors":"Regina Bateson","doi":"10.5129/001041522X16123600891620","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5129/001041522X16123600891620","url":null,"abstract":"From 1982 to 1983, General Efraín Ríos Montt presided over an especially bloody period of the Guatemalan civil war. Under Ríos Montt’s watch, the state killed approximately 75,000 of its own citizens. Yet less than a decade later, the former dictator emerged as one of the most popular politicians in newly democratic Guatemala. How did a gross human rights violator stage such an improbable comeback? Using process tracing, I argue that Ríos Montt’s trajectory is best explained by his embrace of populism as his core political strategy. This analysis deepens our knowledge of an important case, while shedding light on broader questions about how and when actors with profoundly undemocratic values can hijack democracy for their own ends.","PeriodicalId":47960,"journal":{"name":"Comparative Politics","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2021-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"70697567","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}