《落后:巴西工人党领导下的工会与再分配政策》

IF 2 2区 社会学 Q2 POLITICAL SCIENCE
Andrés Schipani
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引用次数: 4

摘要

左翼政府如何在争取工会支持和维持商界信任之间权衡取舍?学者们认为,当强大的工会与集权的左翼政党有紧密联系时,左翼政党将继续对其劳工基础负责。然而,我认为,强大的政党联盟关系和党的领导层集中化,实际上可能会使左翼总统免受来自下层的再分配压力。当政党与工会的关系允许劳工领袖发展成为职业政治家时,这些领导人会对党的目标更敏感,而不是对他们的工会基础更敏感。此外,中央集权的政党组织可以将工会和左翼派别排除在再分配政策的设计之外。为了验证我的论点,我使用了一个巴西劳工党(PT)执政时期的案例研究。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Left Behind: Labor Unions and Redistributive Policy under the Brazilian Workers’ Party
How do leftist governments negotiate the trade-off between courting union support and maintaining the business sector’s trust? Scholars have argued that leftist parties will remain accountable to their labor base when powerful unions have strong ties to centralized leftist parties. However, I argue that strong party-union ties and party leadership centralization may, in fact, insulate leftist presidents against redistributive pressures from below. When party-union ties allow labor leaders to develop careers as professional politicians, these leaders become more responsive to the party’s goals than to their union base. Further, a centralized party organization can exclude unions and leftist factions from the design of redistributive policies. To test my argument, I use a case study of Brazil under the administration of the Worker’s Party (PT).
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来源期刊
Comparative Politics
Comparative Politics POLITICAL SCIENCE-
CiteScore
4.60
自引率
4.30%
发文量
33
期刊介绍: Comparative Politics, an international journal presenting scholarly articles devoted to the comparative analysis of political institutions and processes,communicates new ideas and research findings to social scientists, scholars, students, and public and NGO officials. The journal is indispensable to experts in universities, research organizations, foundations, embassies, and policymaking agencies throughout the world.
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