Democratization最新文献

{"title":"Why do democratic societies tolerate undemocratic laws? Sorting public support for the national security act in South Korea","authors":"Christopher Green, Steven Denney","doi":"10.1080/13510347.2023.2258082","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/13510347.2023.2258082","url":null,"abstract":"This study investigates why anti-democratic laws persist in democratic societies, focusing on South Korea's National Security Act (NSA). Enacted in 1948, the NSA restricts freedom of expression and movement to deter pro-North Korea behaviour. Despite being at odds with the tenets of running contrary to liberal democracy, the Act remains in place. Existing public opinion data indicates modest to strong support for the law, but measurement concerns leave much to be desired. Using a choice-based conjoint, we test the impact of democratic norms and national security rationales on various policy propositions related to the NSA, including its abolition. Results show widespread support for the Act, driven by both democratic norms and security concerns. Progressives are more likely to support revisions limiting the scope of the Act on the basis that it safeguards democracy, but they agree with conservatives that it should not be abolished. This research contributes to understanding South Korea's post-democratic transition and the balance between national security and democracy more broadly.","PeriodicalId":47953,"journal":{"name":"Democratization","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135386124","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Reneging and the subversion of protest-driven policy change in autocracies","authors":"Sasha de Vogel","doi":"10.1080/13510347.2023.2260759","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/13510347.2023.2260759","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACTIn autocracies, low-capacity protest campaigns that lack material and political resources are common, but these weaknesses make them vulnerable to reneging – the deliberate failure to implement concessions as promised. Reneging is critical to how and whether protests actually influence policy. Why are some autocratic concessions to low-capacity campaigns undermined by reneging? I argue concessions are most likely to be implemented when they matter least for meaningfully altering policy. Concessions that provide isolated conflict resolution without constraining state actors elsewhere are more likely to be implemented, while reneging affects concessions that would constrain state agents elsewhere. I find support for this argument using an original dataset of low-capacity protest campaigns in Moscow, Russia, from 2013 to 2018, which includes a novel approach to concessions data. Additionally, I show that reneging is less likely when the campaign demobilizes after the concession, though the effect on constraining concessions is limited. I also address why campaigns about some issues, like labour disputes, experience less reneging, and show that concessions from higher levels of government are just as prone to reneging as lower levels. This article advances scholarship on authoritarian responsiveness and non-violent political control by highlighting reneging as an overlooked response to protest.KEYWORDS: Authoritarianisminstitutionscollective actionprotestcredible commitmentRussia AcknowledgementsI am grateful for the feedback of two anonymous reviewers as well as Santiago Anria, Mark Beissinger, Candelaria Garay, Mai Hassan, Pauline Jones, Andrew Little, Jessica Rich, Graeme Robertson, and Tongtong Zhang, as well as participants in the 2022 authoritarianism mini-conference at WPSA and the Jordan Center – HSE University Joint Lecture Series.Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).Notes1 To differentiate from larger and more transformative social movements, I adopt Tilly's (2004, 3) definition of a campaign is a “sustained, organized public effort making collective claims on target authorities” linking a group of claimants (protesters), the object of their claim and a public.2 Lipsky, “Protest as a Political Resource.”3 O’Brien and Li, Rightful Resistance; Cai, Collective Resistance; Chen, Social Protest; Li, “Fragmented Authoritarianism”; and Elfstrom, “Two Steps Forward.”4 Earl, “Tanks, Tear Gas”; Davenport, “State repression”; Chenoweth and Stephan, Why Civil Resistance; and Davenport and Inman, “The State of State Repression.”5 Muller and Opp, “Rational Choice”; Lichbach, “Deterrence or Escalation?”; Cai, Collective Resistance.6 Ginkel and Smith, “So You Say.”7 Rasler, “Concessions, Repression.”8 Klein and Regan, “Dynamics of Political Protests.”9 Lust-Okar, Structuring Conflict.10 Hummel, “Sideways Concessions.”11 Guriev and Treisman, “Informational Autocrats”; Hassan et al, “Political Control.”1","PeriodicalId":47953,"journal":{"name":"Democratization","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135719500","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Corruption and digital authoritarianism: political drivers of e-government adoption in Central Asia","authors":"Katrina Keegan","doi":"10.1080/13510347.2023.2255146","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/13510347.2023.2255146","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACTWhy do some autocratic countries embrace digital authoritarianism and others do not? The literature describes the political benefits of e-government for autocrats, but not the political costs. This study theorizes that e-government helps autocrats reduce the threat of revolution from the public, but its anti-corruption properties increase the threat of a coup from elites. Analysis of three Central Asian cases, based on original interviews and open-source research, and a global statistical analyses establish a causal link between politics and digitalization. When elites are powerful, they resist e-government reforms that threaten their corruption income, and autocrats overcome this resistance only if the public threat outweighs the elite threat.KEYWORDS: e-governmentdigital governmentdigital authoritarianismauthoritarian politicscorruptionanti-corruption reformgovernanceCentral Asia AcknowledgementsI am immensely grateful to Nargis Kassenova, Sarah Hummel, and Alexandra Vacroux for their invaluable advice, feedback, and support throughout the research and writing process. This research would not have been possible without my interviewees, who generously gave me their time and expertise, and to whom I extend my deepest thanks. I would also like to thank Matt Andrews and Steve Worthington for their feedback on specific sections.Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).Notes1 See, for example: Knox and Janenova, “The e-Government Paradox”; Gobel, “The Information Dilemma”; Ma et al., “E-government in China.”2 Park and Kim, “E-government as an Anti-corruption Tool,” and Bertot et al., “Using ICTs to Create a Culture of Transparency.”3 See, for example: Stier, “Political Determinants of E-government”; Kneuer and Harnisch, “Diffusion of e-Government;” Kardan and Sadeghiani, “Is e-Government a Way to e-Democracy?”4 This work builds on the simplified model of authoritarian politics developed in Svolik, The Politics of Authoritarian Rule.5 Wintrobe, “The Tinpot and the Totalitarian.”6 Maerz, “The Electronic Face of Authoritarianism.”7 Chen et al., “Sources of Authoritarian Responsiveness”; Yan and Xin, “Reforming Governance Under Authoritarianism.”8 Polyakova and Meserole, “Exporting Digital Authoritarianism.”9 de Mesquita et al., “Political Competition and Economic Growth.”10 Ledeneva, Can Russia Modernise; Hale, Patronal Politics.11 The only discussion of corruption-driven resistance to e-government I could find in the literature were two brief mentions in Warf, e-Government in Asia, 7 and 122.12 Of course, this is not the only reason an e-government reform could fail: a lack of resources, human capital, and technological infrastructure could all impede reforms.13 Kyrgyzstan’s regime type is most debatable, but many international measures, like that of Freedom House, classify it as authoritarian during the period of study. Kyrgyzstan’s unique manifestation of authoritarianism, particularly its powerful p","PeriodicalId":47953,"journal":{"name":"Democratization","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135719460","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Explaining judges’ opposition when judicial independence is undermined: insights from Poland, Romania, and Hungary","authors":"Leonardo Puleo, Ramona Coman","doi":"10.1080/13510347.2023.2255833","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/13510347.2023.2255833","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACTOver the past decade, governing parties in Central and Eastern Europe have dismantled liberal democracy, violating the rule of law and limiting the power of judges. This article examines the opposition to these transformations, focusing on the role of judges in Poland, Hungary, and Romania. Drawing on an original survey, as well as a set of interviews with judges, the article shows that while in Poland judges have developed a unified opposition to the government in defending their independence, in Romania, in contrast, governmental measures have polarized judges into a divided opposition, while their mobilization has been rather non-existent in Hungary. Why do judges oppose governmental action limiting judicial independence in some contexts but not in others? The article shows that the nature and the sequencing of domestic transformations, coupled with ideational factors and interests-based calculations, explain judges’ opposition at the collective and individual levels.KEYWORDS: Rule of lawjudicial independencejudges professional associationHungaryPolandRomania Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).Notes1 Ioannidis and von Bogdandy, “Systemic Deficiency in the Rule of Law”; Pech and Scheppele, “Illiberalism Within: Rule of Law Backsliding”; Bodnar, “Polish Road Toward an Illiberal State”; Kelemen, “The European Union’s Authoritarian Equilibrium”; Closa, “The politics of Guarding the Treaties.”2 Scheppele, “Autocratic Legalism.”3 Bugarič and Ginsburg, “The Assault on Postcommunist Courts.”4 Bugarič and Kuhelj, “Varieties of Populism in Europe”; Sadurski, Poland’s Constitutional Breakdown.5 Zielonka, “Counter-Revolution. Liberal Europe in Retreat.”6 Gerring and Cojocaru, “Case-Selection: A Diversity of Methods and Criteria,” 397–8.7 Burbank and Friedman, Judicial Independence at the Crossroads.8 Helmke, Courts Under Constraints; Pereira, Political (In) Justice; Moustafa, The Struggle for Constitutional Power; Hilbink, Judges Beyond Politics in Democracy and Dictatorship; Ginsburg and Moustafa, Rule by Law: The Politics of Courts.9 Bojarski, “Civil Society Organizations for and with the Courts and Judges”; Matthes, “Judges as Activists: How Polish Judges Mobilise.”10 Gersdorf and Pilich “Judges and Representatives of the People.”11 O’Donnel and Schmitter, Transitions from Authoritarian Rule, 1.12 Goodin, Institutions and Their Design.13 March and Olsen, “The New Institutionalism.”14 Ibid.15 Dahl, Political Oppositions in Western Democracies.16 Brack and Weinblum, “Political Opposition: Towards a Renewed Research Agenda,” 74.17 Segal, “What’s Law Got to Do With It.”18 Dezaley and Garth, “Dealing with Virtue. International Commercial Arbitration.”19 Ginsburg and Moustafa, “Rule by Law: The Politics of Courts,” 14–17.20 Hilbink, Judges Beyond Politics in Democracy and Dictatorship, 27.21 Pizzorno, “La Corruzione Nel Sistema Politico,” 63.22 Segal, “Judicial Behaviour,” 277.23 Hilbink, Judges Beyond","PeriodicalId":47953,"journal":{"name":"Democratization","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135015029","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Political trust and democracy: the critical citizens thesis re-examined","authors":"Andrew Dawson, Isabel L. Krakoff","doi":"10.1080/13510347.2023.2257607","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/13510347.2023.2257607","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT This article empirically assesses competing perspectives of the relationship between democracy and political trust. We conduct multilevel analyses on a cross-national panel dataset of 82 countries for the period 1990–2020. The findings suggest that there is a strong, negative relationship between democracy and political trust that cannot easily be dismissed as an artifact of model misspecification or response bias. Moreover, we re-examine the critical citizens thesis by disaggregating political trust into trust in partisan and “non-partisan” institutions to test the claim that well-functioning democracies contain and channel distrust into the more partisan political institutions to keep distrust from generalizing to the entire political system. The results fail to find a statistically significant difference of the effect of democracy on trust between partisan and non-partisan institutions, suggesting that low political trust within democracies may be a more acute problem than much of the literature suggests.","PeriodicalId":47953,"journal":{"name":"Democratization","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135148661","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"To manipulate and legitimise: government officials explain why non-democracies enact and enforce permissive civil society laws","authors":"Anthony J. DeMattee","doi":"10.1080/13510347.2023.2242789","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/13510347.2023.2242789","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Civil society is a bulwark against autocratic rule; its erosion contributes to democratic recession worldwide. Scholars and activists are calling attention to repressive laws non-democratic governments enact to undermine civil society organizations (CSOs). Yet, non-democratic governments do not only enact repressive laws; they also enact permissive, quasi-democratic legal rules. Evidence from case studies suggests that non-democratic governments enact such rules as part of a broader strategy to stabilize the regime. This article adds a within-case comparative study of Kenya’s four CSO regulators to the growing evidence showing that non-democracies can choose to manipulate civil society rather than repress it. The government’s words and documentation provide evidence: I triangulate elite interviews with elected officials and bureaucrats with archival data from government libraries and four CSO regulators. I find that the government enacts permissive legal rules and then uses several control and consultation tactics collectively, separately, and episodically to manipulate CSOs and legitimise the regime.","PeriodicalId":47953,"journal":{"name":"Democratization","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135878257","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Populism and civil–military relations","authors":"Hakkı Taş","doi":"10.1080/13510347.2023.2255976","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/13510347.2023.2255976","url":null,"abstract":"Scholars largely view populism as a democratic game and study it through the lens of civilian mass politics, thereby, dismissing the role of the military elite. Nevertheless, populist mobilization may introduce new dynamics into the political landscape of countries that have a long history of politically active militaries. This article scrutinizes the degree and type of civilian control of the military in populist settings. It primarily contends that incumbent populists tend to limit the veto power of the military. However, civilianization in populist regimes does not occur through a consistent reform agenda geared towards democratic governance of the security sector. Populists instead seek to gain personal control of the military through individual, communal, or ideological ties to civilian leadership. The personal model does not aim to hinder the military’s political influence. On the contrary, it politicizes the army and seeks to use it under civilian authority towards shared goals. However, populism operates on shaky ground due to the institutional decay it causes.","PeriodicalId":47953,"journal":{"name":"Democratization","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135878086","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Securitization, fear politics, and the formation of an opposition alliance in competitive authoritarian regimes","authors":"Ethem Ilbiz, Christian Kaunert","doi":"10.1080/13510347.2023.2252346","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/13510347.2023.2252346","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT This article examines how opposition parties with diverse ideologies can form alliances in competitive authoritarian regimes despite the securitization strategy used by authoritarian incumbents. Using Turkey as a case study, the article demonstrates that an authoritarian leader may associate terrorism with opposition parties and may disseminate this fear to manipulate moderate voters and prevent coalition formation between niche parties. By analysing public speeches of political actors in Turkey, the study argues that if opposition parties recognize the vulnerabilities of the regime and believe that forming an alliance would gain support from the masses and encourage cross-party voting, then the securitization strategy would not deter them from forming a pre-electoral alliance. However, the failure of the securitization strategy to prevent opposition parties from forming an alliance does not guarantee opposition victory in elections. The securitization strategy employed by the authoritarian regime can still be utilized to effectively empower the authoritarian leader, enabling them to win elections by capitalizing on fear and depicting the opposition alliance as a security threat and a potential source of instability if they were to come into power.","PeriodicalId":47953,"journal":{"name":"Democratization","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135936327","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Demographic structure and voting behaviour during democratization: evidence from Malaysia’s 2022 election","authors":"Sebastian Dettman, Thomas B. Pepinsky","doi":"10.1080/13510347.2023.2254707","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/13510347.2023.2254707","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":47953,"journal":{"name":"Democratization","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135981812","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"The great experiment: why diverse democracies fall apart and how they can endure","authors":"Áron Hajnal","doi":"10.1080/13510347.2023.2253433","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/13510347.2023.2253433","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":47953,"journal":{"name":"Democratization","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":3.2,"publicationDate":"2023-09-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47007554","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}