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Sentientism Still Under Threat: Reply to Dung 有知觉者仍然受到威胁回复 Dung
IF 0.7 4区 心理学
Journal of Consciousness Studies Pub Date : 2024-04-01 DOI: 10.53765/20512201.31.3.103
François Kammerer
{"title":"Sentientism Still Under Threat: Reply to Dung","authors":"François Kammerer","doi":"10.53765/20512201.31.3.103","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.53765/20512201.31.3.103","url":null,"abstract":"In 'Ethics Without Sentience: Facing Up to the Probable Insignificance of Phenomenal Consciousness' (Kammerer, 2022), I argued that phenomenal consciousness is probably normatively insignificant, and does not play a significant normative role. In 'Preserving the Normative Significance\u0000 of Sentience' (Dung, 2024), Leonard Dung challenges my reasoning and defends sentientism about value and moral status against my arguments. Here I respond to Dung's criticism, pointing out three flaws in his reply. My conclusion is that the view that phenomenal consciousness is distinctively\u0000 significant is still very much under threat.","PeriodicalId":47796,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Consciousness Studies","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2024-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140790365","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Phenomenology and Temporality in Psychopathology: Calibrating Qualitative Phenomenological Methods According to the Timescale of Subjective Reports 精神病理学中的现象学与时间性：根据主观报告的时间尺度校准定性现象学方法
IF 0.7 4区 心理学
Journal of Consciousness Studies Pub Date : 2024-04-01 DOI: 10.53765/20512201.31.3.144
A. Oblak, Dominik Milotić, B. Škodlar, Jurij Bon
{"title":"Phenomenology and Temporality in Psychopathology: Calibrating Qualitative Phenomenological Methods According to the Timescale of Subjective Reports","authors":"A. Oblak, Dominik Milotić, B. Škodlar, Jurij Bon","doi":"10.53765/20512201.31.3.144","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.53765/20512201.31.3.144","url":null,"abstract":"Many methodologies for systematic study of lived experience have been proposed in recent decades. These methods are typically calibrated in terms of the depth and complexity of data collection, and whether they consider reports on pre-reflective experience admissible. Even though it\u0000 has been shown that lived experience occurs at different timescales (elementary, integrative, narrative), contemporary methods tend to focus on momentary experience. We trace the focus on momentary experience to the current cultural milieu and attitudes in the history of psychology. We point\u0000 out the need for studying temporally extended experiences in the field of psychopathology. We propose that lived experiences at different timescales are nested within each other and that this principle can be used to organize data collected with qualitative methods for the study of experience.\u0000 We suggest that temporally extended experiences occur at the narrative level of description (i.e. they consist of experiential reports and sense-making).","PeriodicalId":47796,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Consciousness Studies","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2024-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140791901","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
The Phenomenology of ChatGPT: A Semiotics ChatGPT 的现象学：符号学
IF 0.7 4区 心理学
Journal of Consciousness Studies Pub Date : 2024-04-01 DOI: 10.53765/20512201.31.3.006
Thomas Byrne
{"title":"The Phenomenology of ChatGPT: A Semiotics","authors":"Thomas Byrne","doi":"10.53765/20512201.31.3.006","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.53765/20512201.31.3.006","url":null,"abstract":"This essay comprises a first phenomenological semiotics of ChatGPT. I analyse how we experience the language signs generated by that AI. This task is accomplished in two steps. First, I introduce a conceptual scaffolding for the project, by introducing core tenets of Husserl's semiotics.\u0000 Second, I mould Husserl's theory to develop my phenomenology of the passive and active consciousness of the language signs composed by ChatGPT. On the one hand, by discussing temporality, I demonstrate that ChatGPT can passively demand me to understand its signs. On the other hand, I show\u0000 that a conflict arises between active and passive consciousness when reading ChatGPT. While I actively know that there is no communicating subject, I still passively experience these signs as made by another. I argue that it is this conflict which lends ChatGPT its 'magical' character. I conclude\u0000 by showing how these observations can inform future regulation of AI models.","PeriodicalId":47796,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Consciousness Studies","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2024-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140790310","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Epiphenomenalism and the Evolutionary Role of Pleasure and Pain 表象主义与快乐和痛苦在进化中的作用
IF 0.7 4区 心理学
Journal of Consciousness Studies Pub Date : 2024-04-01 DOI: 10.53765/20512201.31.3.196
John Wright
{"title":"Epiphenomenalism and the Evolutionary Role of Pleasure and Pain","authors":"John Wright","doi":"10.53765/20512201.31.3.196","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.53765/20512201.31.3.196","url":null,"abstract":"One possible challenge for epiphenomenalism arises from the theory of evolution: if the mental has no causal powers, how might it have evolved? The aim of this paper is to argue that, contrary to some arguments advanced by other philosophers, most particularly William Robinson and Joseph\u0000 Corabi, considerations from the theory of evolution do pose a genuine difficulty for epiphenomenalism.","PeriodicalId":47796,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Consciousness Studies","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2024-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140772924","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Ideal Type and Essential Type — They Need Each Other 理想型和基本型--它们彼此需要
IF 0.7 4区 心理学
Journal of Consciousness Studies Pub Date : 2024-04-01 DOI: 10.53765/20512201.31.3.171
Jae Ryeong Sul
{"title":"Ideal Type and Essential Type — They Need Each Other","authors":"Jae Ryeong Sul","doi":"10.53765/20512201.31.3.171","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.53765/20512201.31.3.171","url":null,"abstract":"In light of the ongoing validity crisis in psychiatric classification, phenomenologically oriented psychiatric study has gained traction. This paper assesses two modes of investigation proposed by phenomenologists in studying mental disorders: the ideal type approach and the essential\u0000 type approach. Despite the recent suggestion that they are antithetical approaches, I argue that they should constantly constrain and inform each other. In short, I advance a mutual complementarity thesis. Having established this thesis, I conclude by demonstrating how this proposal can function\u0000 as an heuristic strategy for effectively facilitating the recently proposed psychiatric research initiative, i.e. the ontological project of phenomenological psychopathology.","PeriodicalId":47796,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Consciousness Studies","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2024-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140770007","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Psychological Epiphenomenalism 心理表象主义
IF 0.7 4区 心理学
Journal of Consciousness Studies Pub Date : 2024-04-01 DOI: 10.53765/20512201.31.3.120
Darryl Mathieson
{"title":"Psychological Epiphenomenalism","authors":"Darryl Mathieson","doi":"10.53765/20512201.31.3.120","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.53765/20512201.31.3.120","url":null,"abstract":"Researchers in the psychological sciences have put forward the thesis that various sources of psychological, cognitive, and neuroscientific evidence demonstrate that being conscious of our mental states does not make any difference to our behaviour. In this paper, I argue that the evidence\u0000 marshalled in support of this view — which I call psychological epiphenomenalism — is subject to major objections, relies on a superficial reading of the relevant literature, and fails to engage with the more precise ways in which philosophers understand mental states to be conscious.\u0000 I then appeal to work on implementation intentions to demonstrate that an intention's being 'access conscious' enhances its functional role, which makes it more likely that we will successfully carry out our intended behaviour. The result is that consciousness in at least one relevant sense\u0000 is not epiphenomenal, with further work remaining to be done to show how other kinds of consciousness cause behaviour too.","PeriodicalId":47796,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Consciousness Studies","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2024-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140766454","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
How Exactly Does Panpsychism Help Explain Consciousness? 泛灵论究竟如何帮助解释意识？
IF 0.7 4区 心理学
Journal of Consciousness Studies Pub Date : 2024-04-01 DOI: 10.53765/20512201.31.3.056
Philip Goff
{"title":"How Exactly Does Panpsychism Help Explain Consciousness?","authors":"Philip Goff","doi":"10.53765/20512201.31.3.056","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.53765/20512201.31.3.056","url":null,"abstract":"There has recently been a revival of interest in panpsychism as a theory of consciousness. The hope of the contemporary proponents of panpsychism is that the view enables us to integrate consciousness into our overall theory of reality in a way that avoids the deep difficulties that\u0000 plague the more conventional options of physicalism on the one hand and dualism on the other. However, panpsychism comes in two forms — strong and weak emergentist — and there are arguments that seem to show that weak emergentist panpsychism faces problems analogous to those of\u0000 physicalism whilst strong emergentist panpsychism faces problems analogous to those of dualism. In this paper, I will develop a new hybrid of the strong and weak emergentist forms of panpsychism, a view according to which subjects of experience are strongly emergent but their phenomenal properties\u0000 are weakly emergent. I will argue that this hybrid view manages to avoid the challenges facing both physicalism and dualism, and the analogues of those challenges that seem to undermine standard forms of panpsychism.","PeriodicalId":47796,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Consciousness Studies","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2024-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140785491","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Pure Consciousness, Intentionality, Selflessness, and the Philosophers' Syndrome 纯粹意识、意向性、无私和哲学家综合症
IF 0.7 4区 心理学
Journal of Consciousness Studies Pub Date : 2024-04-01 DOI: 10.53765/20512201.31.3.083
Richard H. Jones
{"title":"Pure Consciousness, Intentionality, Selflessness, and the Philosophers' Syndrome","authors":"Richard H. Jones","doi":"10.53765/20512201.31.3.083","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.53765/20512201.31.3.083","url":null,"abstract":"An examination of analytic philosophers' approaches to and critiques of the intelligibility of experiences of 'pure consciousness', non-intentionality, and selflessness in light of mystical experiences. Whether neuroscience can determine whether experiences of 'pure consciousness' are\u0000 possible is also examined.","PeriodicalId":47796,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Consciousness Studies","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2024-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140793325","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
The Nested States Model: An Empirical Framework for Integrating Brain and Mind 嵌套状态模型：整合大脑与思维的实证框架
IF 0.7 4区 心理学
Journal of Consciousness Studies Pub Date : 2024-04-01 DOI: 10.53765/20512201.31.3.028
George H. Denfield, Evan J. Kyzar
{"title":"The Nested States Model: An Empirical Framework for Integrating Brain and Mind","authors":"George H. Denfield, Evan J. Kyzar","doi":"10.53765/20512201.31.3.028","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.53765/20512201.31.3.028","url":null,"abstract":"Philosophy of mind has made substantial progress on biologically-rooted approaches to understanding the mind and subjectivity through the enactivist perspective, but research on subjectivity within neuroscience has not kept apace. Indeed, we possess no principled means of relating experiential\u0000 phenomena to neurophysiological processes. Here, we present the Nested States Model as a framework to guide empirical investigation into the relationship between subjectivity and neurobiology. Building on recent work in phenomenology and philosophy of mind, we develop an account of experiential\u0000 states as layered, or nested. We argue that this nested structure is also apparent in brain activity. The recognition of this structural homology — that both experiential and brain states can be characterized as systems of nested states — brings our views of subjective mental states\u0000 into broad alignment with our understanding of general principles and properties of brain activity. This alignment enables a more systematic approach to formulating specific hypotheses and predictions about how the two domains relate to one another.","PeriodicalId":47796,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Consciousness Studies","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2024-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140786251","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
The 'No-Supervenience' Theorem and its Implications for Theories of Consciousness 无超验 "定理及其对意识理论的启示
IF 0.7 4区 心理学
Journal of Consciousness Studies Pub Date : 2024-02-01 DOI: 10.53765/20512201.31.1.138
Catherine M. Reason
{"title":"The 'No-Supervenience' Theorem and its Implications for Theories of Consciousness","authors":"Catherine M. Reason","doi":"10.53765/20512201.31.1.138","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.53765/20512201.31.1.138","url":null,"abstract":"The 'no-supervenience' theorem (Reason, 2019; Reason and Shah, 2021) is a proof that no fully self-aware system can entirely supervene on any objectively observable system. I here present a simple, non-technical summary of the proof and demonstrate its implications for four separate\u0000 theories of consciousness: the 'property dualism' theory of David Chalmers; the 'reflexive monism' of Max Velmans; Galen Strawson's 'realistic monism'; and the 'illusionism' of Keith Frankish. It is shown that all are ruled out in their current form by the no-supervenience theorem, except\u0000 for Chalmers' theory, which I show requires humans to behave irrationally.","PeriodicalId":47796,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Consciousness Studies","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2024-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139874477","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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