ERKENNTNIS最新文献_第7页

Correction: Epistemic Blame and the Normativity of Evidence 纠正:认识上的指责与证据的规范性

2区哲学

ERKENNTNIS Pub Date : 2023-10-28 DOI: 10.1007/s10670-023-00743-x

Sebastian Schmidt

引用次数: 0

Wissenschaftsfreiheit, Moralische Kritik und die Kosten des Irrtums 科学自由，道德批评，错误的代价

2区哲学

ERKENNTNIS Pub Date : 2023-10-13 DOI: 10.1007/s10670-023-00715-1

Tim Henning

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引用次数: 0

Not a Good Fix: Constitutivism on Value Change and Disagreement 不是一个好的解决方案:价值变化和分歧的构成主义

2区哲学

ERKENNTNIS Pub Date : 2023-10-13 DOI: 10.1007/s10670-023-00742-y

Michael Klenk, Ibo van de Poel

引用次数: 0

Junk, Numerosity, and the Demands of Epistemic Consequentialism 垃圾、数量和认知结果主义的要求

2区哲学

ERKENNTNIS Pub Date : 2023-10-13 DOI: 10.1007/s10670-023-00741-z

Michal Masny

引用次数: 0

The Value of Evidence and Ratificationism 证据与批准主义的价值