Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting最新文献_第8页

Corporate investment decisions with switch flexibility, constraints, and path-dependency 具有开关灵活性、约束性和路径依赖性的企业投资决策

IF 1.7

Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting Pub Date : 2024-01-10 DOI: 10.1007/s11156-023-01234-4

Spiros H. Martzoukos, Nayia Pospori, Lenos Trigeorgis

引用次数: 0

Audit committee equity incentives and stock price crash risk 审计委员会股权激励与股价暴跌风险

IF 1.7

Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting Pub Date : 2023-12-30 DOI: 10.1007/s11156-023-01233-5

{"title":"Audit committee equity incentives and stock price crash risk","authors":"","doi":"10.1007/s11156-023-01233-5","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11156-023-01233-5","url":null,"abstract":"<h3>Abstract</h3> <p>This paper theoretically and empirically investigates whether and how audit committee (AC) equity incentives affect future stock price crash risk. Consistent with our model prediction that equity incentives for ACs contribute to reducing the skewness of return distributions, we document evidence of a negative relationship between AC equity incentives and expected crash risk for a merged sample of 6550 US-listed firms over the 2001–2018 period, even after controlling for a wide range of other firm characteristics, using alternative variable specifications, and addressing potential endogeneity concerns. On average, a one-standard-deviation increase in AC equity incentives is associated with a reduction of 14.09–15.46% in stock price crash risk. Further analysis shows that AC equity incentives affect crash risk through financial reporting quality, the negative relationship between AC equity incentives and future stock price crash risk is more pronounced for firms with weaker external governance and for firms with more financial expertise in the AC, and this negative relationship is mainly driven by option-based equity incentives. Taken together, these findings are consistent with the view that equity-based compensation is critical for inducing greater monitoring efforts from AC members and mitigating managerial incentives to withhold bad news.</p>","PeriodicalId":47688,"journal":{"name":"Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting","volume":"127 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2023-12-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139062373","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

The externality of politically connected directors’ resignations on peers’ cost of debt 有政治关联的董事辞职对同行债务成本的外部影响

IF 1.7

Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting Pub Date : 2023-12-19 DOI: 10.1007/s11156-023-01232-6

Ting Liu, Shaoqing Kang, Lihong Wang

引用次数: 0

Realized higher moments and trading activity 实现更高的时刻和交易活动

IF 1.7

Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting Pub Date : 2023-12-14 DOI: 10.1007/s11156-023-01227-3

Shu-Fang Yuan

引用次数: 0

Optimal dividend decisions with capital infusion in a dynamic nonterminal bankruptcy model 动态非终端破产模型中注入资本的最优股息决策

IF 1.7

Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting Pub Date : 2023-12-11 DOI: 10.1007/s11156-023-01229-1

Shu Zhang, Peimin Chen, Chunchi Wu

引用次数: 0

CEO power and corporate strategies: a review of the literature 首席执行官权力与公司战略：文献综述

IF 1.7

Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting Pub Date : 2023-12-11 DOI: 10.1007/s11156-023-01231-7

Sanjukta Brahma, Fotini Economou

引用次数: 0

Opioid crisis effects on local firms’ risk 阿片类药物危机对当地企业风险的影响

IF 1.7

Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting Pub Date : 2023-12-08 DOI: 10.1007/s11156-023-01208-6

Sabri Boubaker, Zied Ftiti, Yifan Liu, Wael Louhichi

引用次数: 0

Earnings quality and board meeting frequency 盈余质量与董事会会议频率

IF 1.7

Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting Pub Date : 2023-12-03 DOI: 10.1007/s11156-023-01230-8

Nikos Vafeas, Adamos Vlittis

{"title":"Earnings quality and board meeting frequency","authors":"Nikos Vafeas, Adamos Vlittis","doi":"10.1007/s11156-023-01230-8","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11156-023-01230-8","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We propose that corporate directors are in greater need of soft information about the firm when the quality of hard accounting information is low. We further propose that board meetings constitute a key opportunity for corporate directors to gather soft information about the firm, and empirically investigate the relationship between financial reporting quality and the board's soft information gathering, as revealed by board meeting frequency. Consistent with expectations, we find that boards meet more frequently when accruals quality is low. We further find that the proportion of outside directors, insider ownership, and SOX regulation moderate this relationship. The evidence is reinforced by analysis of management earnings forecasts, financial restatements, and internal control weaknesses and is robust to several alternative earnings quality specifications. Additional empirical tests suggest that our results are incremental to the alternative explanation of increased meeting frequency to address problems in the reporting process per se. We conclude that corporate directors seek more frequent board meetings as an alternative information source to low earnings quality.</p>","PeriodicalId":47688,"journal":{"name":"Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting","volume":"331 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2023-12-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138516443","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

The impact of the Paycheck Protection Program on the risk-taking behaviour of US banks 薪水保护计划对美国银行冒险行为的影响

IF 1.7

Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting Pub Date : 2023-12-01 DOI: 10.1007/s11156-023-01223-7

Stefano Filomeni

{"title":"The impact of the Paycheck Protection Program on the risk-taking behaviour of US banks","authors":"Stefano Filomeni","doi":"10.1007/s11156-023-01223-7","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11156-023-01223-7","url":null,"abstract":"<p>The economic impact of the COVID-19 pandemic placed many small businesses across the US in financial distress. In response to this, in March 2020 the US government introduced, as part of the CARES Act, the Paycheck Protection Program (PPP) intended to provide relief to small businesses and to preserve jobs during the pandemic. The latter resulted in three waves of funding distributed to small businesses through SBA approved lenders, mainly represented by US banks. By using a panel dataset of 4610 banks over the period Q1 2019–Q4 2020 and by employing a difference-in-differences approach (DiD), I investigate whether participation in the Paycheck Protection Program affected community banks’ credit risk-taking behaviour in the post-PPP period, compared to their non-community banking counterparts in the US. I find that the Paycheck Protection Program led community banks to decrease their risk appetite outside of the program relative to non-community banks, consistent with their greater exposure to the commercial real estate sector, heavily hit by the pandemic. My results are robust to a battery of robustness tests and identification strategies. In this research article, I offer novel evidence on the indirect impact of the Paycheck Protection Program as a government-funded stimulus program administered through banks by investigating the indirect effect of the Paycheck Protection Program on the risk-taking of US community banks that dominate lending of PPP loans as a result of their competitive advantage in soft information-intensive small business lending. Such evidence is informative to policymakers as they weigh the merits of various program options to combat the economic damage imposed by the COVID-19 pandemic and as they consider the design of economic stimulus programs in response to future economic crises.</p>","PeriodicalId":47688,"journal":{"name":"Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2023-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138516490","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Chalk it up to experience: CEO general ability and earnings management 将其归结为经验:首席执行官的一般能力和盈余管理

IF 1.7

Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting Pub Date : 2023-11-30 DOI: 10.1007/s11156-023-01228-2

Leila Zbib, Kourosh Amirkhani, Douglas Fairhurst

{"title":"Chalk it up to experience: CEO general ability and earnings management","authors":"Leila Zbib, Kourosh Amirkhani, Douglas Fairhurst","doi":"10.1007/s11156-023-01228-2","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11156-023-01228-2","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We provide evidence that firms managed by CEOs with high general ability, or broad experience in their background, are more likely to utilize discretionary accruals to manage earnings than CEOs with focused experience. Cross-sectional variation suggests that the mechanism underlying the increased use of discretionary accruals is generalist CEOs’ increased willingness to bear the risk inherent in managing earnings given their enhanced tolerance for failure stemming from outside career options. Importantly, the practice is more pronounced for CEOs of firms with suspect earnings. To better control for unobservable variation between generalists and specialists, we use a propensity score-match sample and entropy balancing to adjust the sample to balance differences between firms with generalists and firms with specialists and firm fixed effects. The evidence suggests that the diversity of CEOs’ experience influences incentives to manage earnings. The increased trend to hire generalist CEOs may be coupled with an unintended increase in the use of discretionary accruals, largely stemming from the outside employment options of these executives.</p>","PeriodicalId":47688,"journal":{"name":"Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting","volume":"102 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2023-11-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138516489","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0