{"title":"Monetary policy objectives and economic outcomes: What can we learn from a wavelet-based optimal control approach?","authors":"Patrick M. Crowley, David Hudgins","doi":"10.1111/manc.12391","DOIUrl":"10.1111/manc.12391","url":null,"abstract":"<p>It has recently been widely recognized that monetary policy objectives change through time as our understanding of monetary policy and its impact on the macroeconomy evolves. In recent years there has been an extensive review of the framework for monetary policy at major central banks around the world, given the practical problems that have been encountered with inflation targets. This paper is a contribution to this debate, in that the aim of this paper is to evaluate the consequences of adopting different monetary policy objectives in the U.S. macroeconomic policy setting. To accomplish this, we first decompose U.S. macroeconomic data using a time-frequency domain technique, namely discrete wavelet analysis. We then model the behavior of the U.S. economy over each wavelet frequency range and use our estimated parameters to construct a tracking model. To illustrate the usefulness of this approach, we simulate jointly optimal fiscal and monetary policy with different short-term monetary targets: an inflation target, a money growth target, an interest rate target, and a real economic growth target. The results show that the most effective monetary policy targets to achieve economic growth are either inflation targets or economic growth targets.</p>","PeriodicalId":47546,"journal":{"name":"Manchester School","volume":"90 2","pages":"144-170"},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2021-11-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"80204064","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Competition and the negative expected social value of cost-reducing innovation","authors":"Anzhou Zhang","doi":"10.1111/manc.12388","DOIUrl":"10.1111/manc.12388","url":null,"abstract":"<p>I study an R&D race among outside entities to a cost-reducing innovation of a certain magnitude and the subsequent patent licensing by the winner. The target is to study whether the expected social value of the innovation is positive or not. Sufficient conditions under which it is negative or positive are provided. I also find non-monotonic effects of the innovation's magnitude and the number of incumbent firms on the expected social value.</p>","PeriodicalId":47546,"journal":{"name":"Manchester School","volume":"90 1","pages":"59-76"},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2021-11-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/manc.12388","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"76733501","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Mariola Sánchez, José Antonio Belso-Martínez, María José López-Sánchez, Adrián Nerja
{"title":"Incentives to exclusive and non-exclusive technology licensing under partial vertical integration","authors":"Mariola Sánchez, José Antonio Belso-Martínez, María José López-Sánchez, Adrián Nerja","doi":"10.1111/manc.12387","DOIUrl":"10.1111/manc.12387","url":null,"abstract":"<p>In this paper, we compare the scenarios of exclusive licenses and cross-licenses under the existence of partial vertical integration. To do this, a successive duopoly model is proposed, with two technology owners and two firms competing in a differentiated product market. Each technology owner has a share in one of the competing firms, so that competition is also extended to the upstream R&D sector. Thus, this model represents a mixed case to what is normally analyzed in the literature. We explore the implications of the size of innovation and the degree of vertical integration in technology diffusion. In equilibrium, patent holders’ decisions might not be aligned.</p>","PeriodicalId":47546,"journal":{"name":"Manchester School","volume":"90 2","pages":"171-189"},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2021-11-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"74083185","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The real consequences of policy-driven exchange rate cycles: A stylized comparison of East Asia and Latin America","authors":"Arslan Razmi","doi":"10.1111/manc.12390","DOIUrl":"10.1111/manc.12390","url":null,"abstract":"<p>I develop the implications for capital accumulation, the trade balance, and real exchange rate cycles of different policy preferences, focusing in particular on broad stylized features of major Latin American and East Asian economies. Recent development literature has renewed interest in real exchange rate policy and the desirability of avoiding overvaluations. Political science literature, on the other hand, has emphasized the role of factors such as the influence of the manufacturing sector and the nature of the work force in shaping exchange rate policy. I formalize and relate some of these insights in a simple, dynamic, developing country framework with policy makers who intertemporally optimize and voters/audiences that are myopic. Given the choice between assigning greater weight to: (1) raising immediate worker purchasing power or (2) generating wage increases and manufacturing employment <i>over time</i>, I show that developing countries where policy makers choose the former are more likely to experience cycles with overvaluation, trade deficits, and abrupt (postponed) devaluations. Moreover, these cyclical differences may help explain differences in structural evolution over longer periods of time.</p>","PeriodicalId":47546,"journal":{"name":"Manchester School","volume":"90 2","pages":"190-212"},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2021-11-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"75175093","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Monetary rewards in employee referral programs","authors":"Emre Ekinci","doi":"10.1111/manc.12389","DOIUrl":"10.1111/manc.12389","url":null,"abstract":"<p>This paper examines the conditions under which employee referrals serve as a screening function when there is a conflict of interest between the firm and the current employees concerning referral recruitment. In particular, I consider two potential mechanisms that lead to a conflict of interest: the employee’s social connection with the applicant and her promotion prospects. Specifically, I posit that the employee will have an incentive to refer low-ability applicants if she has a strong social connection with them or if she faces the possibility of competing against her own referral to earn a promotion at the firm. Taking these potential sources for conflicting interests, I investigate the extent to which the firm can make use of financial incentives (fixed fees and bonuses) to align incentives of the employee with those of the firm.</p>","PeriodicalId":47546,"journal":{"name":"Manchester School","volume":"90 1","pages":"35-58"},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2021-11-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/manc.12389","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"74193399","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The determinants of aggregate fluctuations: The role of firm-borrowing channels","authors":"Nicholas Apergis, Sayantan Ghosh Dastidar","doi":"10.1111/manc.12385","DOIUrl":"10.1111/manc.12385","url":null,"abstract":"<p>The paper examines the empirical relationship between firm-borrowing channels and aggregate fluctuations for the 100 largest US firms over 2000–2018. The motivation for this study originates from the general consensus in macroeconomics that microeconomic shocks to firms cannot generate significant aggregate fluctuations. The analysis extends Gabaix's 2011 baseline model by incorporating measures for “bank shocks” at the firm-level. In addition to supporting the granular hypothesis, the econometric results indicate that bank shocks have a weak impact on GDP fluctuations, whereas non-bank loans exert a strong impact on the same. The above findings survive certain robustness checks associated with the presence of oil and monetary shocks, as well as with the firms’ location factor.</p>","PeriodicalId":47546,"journal":{"name":"Manchester School","volume":"90 1","pages":"20-34"},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2021-10-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/manc.12385","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"86910277","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Partial acquisition and patent licensing in an asymmetric duopoly","authors":"Shuai Niu, Meiling Wang","doi":"10.1111/manc.12386","DOIUrl":"10.1111/manc.12386","url":null,"abstract":"<p>This paper analyzes partial ownership arrangements in a heterogenous-goods duopoly market with subsequent two-part tariff licensing. The equilibrium under patent licensing is inefficient in the sense that there is an excessive concentration of production in the licensor. A partial ownership arrangement, under which the low-cost firm holds a partial interest in the high-cost firm, decreases the competitive incentives of the low-cost firm. In addition, it decreases the equilibrium royalty rate under patent licensing. Both effects contribute to the improvement of the production distribution in the duopoly market. Consequently, a partial acquisition occurring before patent licensing may be both profitable and welfare-improving.</p>","PeriodicalId":47546,"journal":{"name":"Manchester School","volume":"90 1","pages":"92-105"},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2021-10-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"89403130","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"A reply to “Estimating a bilateral J-curve between the UK and the euro area: An asymmetric analysis”","authors":"Nektarios A. Michail","doi":"10.1111/manc.12383","DOIUrl":"10.1111/manc.12383","url":null,"abstract":"<p>In 2018, I published an article in this journal aiming to examine whether the UK could potentially benefit from the depreciation of the pound following the Brexit decision. During this year's issue, a study by Bahmani-Oskooee and Karamelikli (2021) suggested that the findings of said article were based on sign misinterpretation. In this article, I explain that the misunderstanding that has arisen is due to an incorrect definition of a variable in the appendix. When the revised definition is taken into consideration, the conclusions reached still hold.</p>","PeriodicalId":47546,"journal":{"name":"Manchester School","volume":"89 6","pages":"658-661"},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2021-09-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1111/manc.12383","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"82368728","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Asymmetric input contracts under price leadership","authors":"Marc Escrihuela-Villar, Walter Ferrarese","doi":"10.1111/manc.12382","DOIUrl":"10.1111/manc.12382","url":null,"abstract":"<p>This paper considers a vertically related industry where an upstream supplier simultaneously and independently negotiates linear tariffs with two asymmetrically capacity constrained downstream retailers endowed with (possibly) asymmetric bargaining powers over the purchase of an input. We introduce price leadership as the type of downstream competition. An increase in the upstream supplier’s bargaining power toward the large firm induces a positive externality on the small firm’s tariff. We also obtain that, <i>a priori</i> the small firm may end up (i) demanding a larger stock of the input and (ii) paying less for it. Our model also proves useful to show that the well-known countervailing buyer power hypothesis could not hold because an integrated downstream firm might negotiate a better input price without any pass-through to the final consumers. We mainly relate our analysis to the UK grocery market and to the recent empirical evidence regarding its functioning.</p>","PeriodicalId":47546,"journal":{"name":"Manchester School","volume":"90 1","pages":"77-91"},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2021-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1111/manc.12382","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"77599151","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Advertising in an oligopoly with differentiated goods under general demand and cost functions: A differential game approach","authors":"Masahiko Hattori, Yasuhito Tanaka","doi":"10.1111/manc.12376","DOIUrl":"10.1111/manc.12376","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We present an analysis of advertising activities in a dynamic oligopoly with differentiated goods using a differential game approach under general demand and cost functions. The main conclusion is that the memoryless closed-loop solution and the feedback solution are equivalent when there is no spillover effect of advertising activities. We also show that the comparison of the open-loop solution and the memoryless closed-loop solution depends on whether the firms’ outputs are strategic substitutes or strategic complements.</p>","PeriodicalId":47546,"journal":{"name":"Manchester School","volume":"89 6","pages":"619-639"},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2021-08-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"73677944","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}