AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY最新文献_第8页

RECENT WORK IN THE EPISTEMOLOGY OF UNDERSTANDING 关于理解的认识论的最新研究

IF 0.8 2区哲学

AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY Pub Date : 2021-01-01 DOI: 10.2307/48616060

Hannon

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引用次数: 22

ANIMALISM IS EITHER FALSE OR UNINTERESTING (PERHAPS BOTH) 动物主义要么是错误的，要么是无趣的(也许两者都有)

IF 0.8 2区哲学

AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY Pub Date : 2021-01-01 DOI: 10.2307/48614005

Duncan

引用次数: 6

GENERALIZED DARWINISM AS MODEST UNIFICATION 作为适度统一的广义达尔文主义

IF 0.8 2区哲学

AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY Pub Date : 2021-01-01 DOI: 10.2307/48600687

Reydon

引用次数: 2

WHENCE THE DEMAND FOR ETHICAL THEORY? 伦理理论的需求从何而来?

IF 0.8 2区哲学

AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY Pub Date : 2021-01-01 DOI: 10.2307/48614001

Damian Cueni, M. Queloz

{"title":"WHENCE THE DEMAND FOR ETHICAL THEORY?","authors":"Damian Cueni, M. Queloz","doi":"10.2307/48614001","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2307/48614001","url":null,"abstract":"Where does the impetus towards ethical theory come from? What drives humans to make values explicit, consistent, and discursively justi(able? This paper situates the demand for ethical theory in human life by identifying the practical needs that give rise to it. Such a practical derivation puts the demand in its place: while (nding a home for it in the public decisionmaking of modern societies, our account also imposes limitations on the demand by presenting it as scalable and contextsensitive. This differentiates strong forms of the demand calling for theory from weaker forms calling for less, and contexts where it has a place from contexts where it is out of place. In light of this, subjecting personal deliberation to the demand turns out to involve a tradeoff. systematization by exercising our judgment in a particular case; nor, according to Williams, does that authority derive from the idea that reason itself demands this kind of systematization. To think that systematization is required either by reason itself or by the need for rational con)ict resolution, Williams maintains, betrays an overly rationalistic conception of rationality.3 But even if we agree with Williams that neither the need to resolve con)icts as such nor reason itself pull us in the direction of ethical theory, it does not necessarily follow that there is no such pull. In “Why Practice Needs Ethical Theory,” Martha Nussbaum has argued that there is a practical demand for ethical theory. Williams, she wryly remarks, conveys the impression of thinking that “when we do away with theory we will be left with people like Bernard Williams”: energetically critical and selfcritical people, not captive to any other theory, and sensitive to distortions in their experience (2000, p. We (nd ourselves with a plurality of values which, even within one person, can con)ict in ways that are not resolvable without loss.1 The need to resolve these con)icts can seem to pull ethical thought in the direction of ethical theory and systematization, notably by demanding that values be made explicit in terms of stateable principles, that they be made consistent by using some of them to overturn others in systematic ways, and that they be rendered as far as possible discursively justi!able. It is this bundle of demands—which we shall call “the Demand” for short—that will be our central concern in this paper.2 Bernard Williams has argued that insofar as we yield to the Demand, there will be a question as to where the resulting regimentation of ethical thought derives its authority from. That authority cannot simply derive from the need to resolve con)icts of values, since we are perfectly capable of rationally resolving con)icts of values without such This content downloaded from 188.154.64.229 on Wed, 31 Mar 2021 10:20:34 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms 136 / AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY 70). But ordinary life, Nussbaum notes, is not like a Henry James novel with liberal poli","PeriodicalId":47459,"journal":{"name":"AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2021-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"69453758","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 6

THE (VIRTUE) EPISTEMOLOGY OF POLITICAL IGNORANCE 政治无知的(美德)认识论

IF 0.8 2区哲学

AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY Pub Date : 2021-01-01 DOI: 10.2307/48616057

Boult

引用次数: 3

PARTS OF SPACETIME 时空的一部分

IF 0.8 2区哲学

AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY Pub Date : 2021-01-01 DOI: 10.2307/48619322

Baron

引用次数: 6

THE MANY FACES OF GENERALIZING THE THEORY OF EVOLUTION 概括进化论的许多方面