Boston University Law Review最新文献

{"title":"How To Study Constitution-Making: Hirschl, Elster, And The Seventh Inning Problem","authors":"Tom Ginsburg","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2997552","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2997552","url":null,"abstract":"It is very difficult to comment on a book with which one fundamentally agrees. Ran Hirschl's magnificent Comparative Matters is not only a deep work of intellectual history, but it also makes a powerful methodological argument. Hirschl calls for integrating the study of comparative constitutional law into a broader field of comparative constitutional studies, in which rigorous but pluralistic social sciences are deployed to help us understand problems. Who could possibly object? Certainly not I.Hirschl's clarion call is to expand our frameworks outward in three ways. First, he asks us to expand our focus geographically, away from the established democracies of Europe and North America; this is something that the field has belatedly begun to do in the last few years with superb results.1 Second, Hirschl wants the field to expand methodologically, away from narrow lawyerly doctrinalism toward truly interdisciplinary inquiry, and he points out the many contributions of social scientists to the endeavor.2 Third, he asks us to expand our temporal framework.3 Hirschl's own methodology of returning to earlier exemplars of comparison, ancient and modern, is itself an example here. Hirschl also points out that, within any particular system, we ought not be limited in our focus on the moment courts decide cases but rather should take a broader frame. Instead we ought to look at moments of constitutionalization, constitution-making and constitutional politics beyond the judiciary. This is another way of expanding the temporal frame, away from the moment of judicial decision.Let's begin with this last point. With apologies for the American parochialism, I have characterized the narrow focus on court decisions the \"Seventh Inning Problem\" in Comparative Constitutional Law.4 The analogy is to a baseball fan who pays overly felicitous attention to a late inning. Imagine yourself as a fan going to watch the Toronto Blue Jays with a good friend; let's call him Shai. You arrive very late, at the top of the seventh inning. You see which team is batting, and so can deduce who is the home team, since the home team in baseball always bats in the bottom half of the inning. You look at the scoreboard and see the score, which allows you to ascertain who is winning and losing. But you do not know how the score came to be that way or why.You proceed to watch the seventh inning. As baseball innings go, the seventh is fairly important-not just in the top ten but somewhat higher. Sometimes a team will score a decisive comeback run; other times a team will shut out the other side and close in on victory. (Indeed, this past October, the aforementioned Toronto Blue Jays played one of the most remarkable and important seventh innings in baseball history, winning the National League Championship Series with a three-run comeback.5) It is also the case that the seventh inning has some aesthetic or theatrical advantages over other innings. The inning is always accompanied by a rousin","PeriodicalId":47323,"journal":{"name":"Boston University Law Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2016-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"68467042","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Cumulative Constitutional Rights","authors":"Kerry Abrams, Brandon L. Garrett","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2642640","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2642640","url":null,"abstract":"Cumulative constitutional rights are ubiquitous. Plaintiffs litigate multiple constitutional violations, or multiple harms, and judges use multiple constitutional provisions to inform interpretation. Yet, judges, litigants, and scholars have often criticized the notion of cumulative rights, including in leading Supreme Court rulings, such as Lawrence v. Texas, Employment Division v. Smith, and Miranda v. Arizona. Recently, the Court attempted to clarify some of this confusion. In its recent landmark opinion in Obergefell v. Hodges, the Court struck down state bans on same-sex marriage by pointing to several distinct but overlapping protections inherent in the Due Process Clause, including the right to individual autonomy, the right to intimate association, and the safeguarding of children, while also noting how the rights in question were simultaneously grounded in equal protection. “The Due Process Clause and the Equal Protection Clause are connected in a profound way,” Justice Anthony Kennedy wrote. What the Court did not do was to explain the connection. To redress harms to injured plaintiffs without creating doctrinal incoherence, courts need to understand the categorically distinct ways in which cumulative constitutional harm can occur and how these forms affect constitutional scrutiny. We argue that cumulative constitutional rights cases can be categorized into three general types and that these types need to be analyzed differently. The first type, aggregate harm, occurs when multiple discrete acts, taken together, add up to a harm of constitutional magnitude, even if each individual act, taken alone, would not. The second type, hybrid rights, occurs where a plaintiff claims a single action has violated rights under multiple constitutional provisions. If a court were to apply the proper level of scrutiny to the claims individually, however, none would result in redress. As a result, hybrid rights cases should not ordinarily result in relief. The third type, which we term intersectional rights, occur when the action violates more than one constitutional provision but is only cognizable when the provisions are read to inform and bolster one another. Our aim in this Essay is to provide a framework courts can use to analyze cumulative constitutional rights. While courts should be open to conducting a cumulative analysis, when constitutional rights are mutually reinforcing, those relationships should be clearly set out and defined.","PeriodicalId":47323,"journal":{"name":"Boston University Law Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2016-04-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"68237446","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Reflections of an Empirical Reader (Or: Could Fleming Be Right This Time?)","authors":"Gary Lawson","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2685410","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2685410","url":null,"abstract":"Professor Jim Fleming’s new book, Fidelity to Our Imperfect Constitution: For Moral Readings and Against Originalisms, purports to critique all forms of originalism from the perspective of Professor Fleming’s “moral reading” of, or “philosophic approach” to, the Constitution. I propose a somewhat different opposition: empirical reading versus moral reading. Empirical reading is necessarily originalist, but it focuses directly on the need to ground interpretation in theories of concepts, language, and communication. In this short comment, I outline the research agenda for a theory of empirical reading, explore the extent to which empirical readings and moral readings of the Constitution are compatible (spoiler alert: it’s an empirical question), and situate empirical reading within the development of originalist theory.","PeriodicalId":47323,"journal":{"name":"Boston University Law Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2015-11-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"68255098","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Public Enforcement of Patent Law","authors":"Megan M. La Belle","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2666835","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2666835","url":null,"abstract":"Law enforcement in the modern regulatory state is largely a joint enterprise. In areas such as securities, antitrust, civil rights, and environmental law, enforcement responsibilities are allocated between public and private actors. Patent law, on the other hand, is enforced almost exclusively through private lawsuits. Considering patent law’s constitutionally-mandated public purpose — “to promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts�? — this privatization of patent enforcement is troubling. In recent years, there has been some movement away from this purely private enforcement regime for patent law. The Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission, for example, have involved themselves in certain patent matters that implicate antitrust law. While heading in the right direction, these regulators alone cannot adequately enforce patent law due to their limited jurisdiction, resources, and expertise. This Article thus proposes a more robust public enforcement mechanism for patent law. It argues that Congress should arm the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (PTO), the agency responsible for reviewing patents ex ante, with broad powers to police patent validity ex post. The PTO is best situated to lead this effort because of the agency’s expertise, institutional resources, and enhanced powers under the America Invents Act. Moreover, charging the PTO with the responsibility for policing patents should serve to dispel allegations of agency capture and institutional bias toward patent owners.","PeriodicalId":47323,"journal":{"name":"Boston University Law Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2015-09-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"68246274","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Shareholder Litigation by Contract","authors":"Verity Winship","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2575668","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2575668","url":null,"abstract":"This Article is about the future of shareholder litigation. Calibrating the amount and form of shareholder litigation is one of the most vexing problems in corporate and securities litigation. An emerging — and controversial — approach is to limit shareholder litigation through terms in corporate charters and bylaws. This Article provides a much-needed framework for courts and legislatures to evaluate these provisions. It develops a theory of corporate contract procedure that looks to the structure and content of substantive corporate law to define the reach of procedural terms. The Article concludes first that state corporate law lends itself to the type of tailored procedure proposed here because substantive corporate law is structured primarily as a set of default rules. Tailored procedure would mirror this enabling structure. At the same time, substantive corporate law provides the (few) mandatory provisions that would limit procedural contracting under this framework. One implication of connecting procedure and substance is that limits depend on the area of law at issue. The connection provides a rationale for the greater use of procedural provisions in disputes over state corporate law. In legal areas characterized by mandatory terms, however, including in securities litigation, the framework provides a basis for resisting their use.","PeriodicalId":47323,"journal":{"name":"Boston University Law Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2015-09-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"68210686","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Class-Based Adjudication of Title VII Claims in the Age of the Roberts Court","authors":"Michael C. Harper","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2563157","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2563157","url":null,"abstract":"INTRODUCTIONTitle VII's most significant set of amendments, the Civil Rights Act of 1991,1 was in substantial part a response to decisions of the Rehnquist Court issued during its 1988-89 term, including the especially controversial Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio.2 While the Roberts Court also has issued a number of opinions interpreting employment discrimination laws contrary to the advocacy of civil rights proponents,3 its decisions on substantive employment discrimination law have been mixed4 and have not provoked a cry for a new set of comprehensive amendments.None of the Roberts Court's interpretations of substantive law, however, seems to have the potential of doing as much damage to the promise of the amended Title VII as do several rulings of the Roberts Court on procedural issues. These rulings include the Court's application of Rule 23,5 the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (\"FRCP\") governing class actions, to a Title VII case, Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes.6 They also include the Court's interpretation of the Federal Arbitration Act (\"FAA\")7 in a series of decisions, including ATT at least without further restrictive interpretations, Rule 23 still affords plaintiffs and conscientious federal judges the flexibility to utilize class actions to press a broad range of both systemic disparate treatment and disparate impact claims.13Unfortunately, in my view, the importance of the Wal-Mart decision is also limited for Title VII class actions, as it is for other kinds of class actions, by the Court's recent decisions in cases dealing with the arbitration of consumer misrepresentation and antitrust claims rather than discrimination claims. Through these decisions, including Concepcion and Italian Colors, the Roberts Court in effect offered any business outside the transportation industry the option of arbitration as a bar against collective actions brought by any economically subordinate parties, including employees, upon whom the business can impose agreements.14 These decisions, in tandem with the Court's earlier application of the FAA to employment contracts,15 empower most employers to preclude not only class-based litigation, but also class-based arbitration.This Essay proceeds as follows. Part I traces the development of Title VII class actions for both disparate treatment and disparate impact claims. Part II examines the predictability and manageable impact of the primary holding of the Wal-Mart decision: its application of Rule 23(a)(2)'s conditioning of certification on the existence of a common issue of fact or law. Part III provides a parallel assessment of the Court's pronouncement on the limits of Rule 23(b)(2) class actions. While this assessment acknowledges the importance of the Court's pronouncements on (b)(2), including troublesome dicta limiting the use of litigation models, the assessment concludes that these pronouncements do not provide insurmountable barriers to Title VII class actions. …","PeriodicalId":47323,"journal":{"name":"Boston University Law Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2015-02-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"68204781","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Second Amendment: Not Constitutional Dysfunction, But Necessary Safeguard","authors":"Robert J. Cottrol","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.3403105","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.3403105","url":null,"abstract":"When Jim Fleming asked me to participate in this Symposium, and more specifically to be part of the Second Amendment panel, I must confess that I was a bit puzzled. There are many parts of our political and constitutional system that are arguably dysfunctional, meaning that our late-eighteenth century Constitution prevents the achievement of policy results that are desirable in our early-twenty-first century present. I do not see, however, the Second Amendment as one of those constitutional features. As a result, this Essay challenges two assumptions: first, that the Second Amendment historically has provided much of a barrier to a desirable policy result, radical gun control or perhaps more accurately gun prohibition; and second, that such a result is indeed desirable.For the first proposition, it is fair to say that until the 2008 case of District of Columbia v. Heller1 and its 2010 companion McDonald v. City of Chicago,2 the federal courts had been essentially absent from the business of looking at the Second Amendment and seriously asking what protection it provides, as well as what limitations it places on individuals' rights to have arms. This was not, as some have erroneously insisted, because there was some universal agreement that the Amendment, which speaks of a well-regulated militia and the right of the people to keep and bear arms, applied only to militias and not to individuals in their private capacities. Before Heller, the Supreme Court had recognized the individual nature of the right to arms on those rare occasions when it had referenced this right or the right to have arms generally - including Chief Justice Taney's discussion of the rights of citizens and the implications of citizenship in Dred Scott; Chief Justice Waite's examination of the distinctions between federal restrictions and state and private action in Cruikshank; Justice Wood's refusal to apply the Second Amendment to state action in Presser v. Illinois; and Justice McReynolds's opinion in United States v. Miller, which is best read as recognizing an individual's right to have arms while also reaffirming the by-then long recognized principle that some arms are within the ambit of constitutional protection and others are not.3 The individual nature of the right was a largely unquestioned principle in the Court's jurisprudence. Indeed as late as 1961 in Justice John Marshal Harlan II's dissent in Poe v. Ullman, it was considered rather unremarkable.4Still the Second Amendment would not receive definitive recognition, including a recognition that it provided real limitations on firearms regulation, until Heller, some 217 years after its initial adoption. This lack of judicial engagement occurred for two reasons. The first reason is the intellectually haphazard way the Court has gone about the business of incorporation or applying the Bill of Rights to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. There is strong evidence that the drafters and ratifiers of the Fourteen","PeriodicalId":47323,"journal":{"name":"Boston University Law Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2014-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"68590775","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"The New Constitution of the United States: Do We Need One and How Would We Get One?","authors":"J. Beermann","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2353376","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2353376","url":null,"abstract":"Government in the United States has some serious problems. At the federal level, is the problem of gridlock. The United States Congress seems unable or unwilling to do anything about anything (although it must have done something to run up more than $16 trillion in debts). Forget about addressing problems such as global warming, income inequality, failing schools, economic stimulus or you name it. How bad is it, really? Has the United States become ungovernable, and is the Constitution to blame? In my view, it’s a mixed bag. Some aspects of the United States government work very well, others are disastrous and still others muddle along, could be better but function just fine. Further, it is difficult to pin some of government’s difficulties on any particular constitutional provision when the alternatives might be just as problematic. In this essay, I highlight examples in each of these categories and look at factors that might help us understand why things work as they do. Suggestions for change will be offered, often without considering political feasibility.","PeriodicalId":47323,"journal":{"name":"Boston University Law Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2013-11-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"68132075","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"After the Tiers: Windsor, Congressional Power to Enforce Equal Protection, and the Challenge of Pointillist Constitutionalism","authors":"William D. Araiza","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2310586","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2310586","url":null,"abstract":"The Supreme Court’s June 2013 opinion in United States v. Windsor is remarkable for its bypassing of standard equal protection doctrine. In striking down section 3 of the Defense of Marriage Act as unconstitutional discrimination against gays and lesbians, Windsor failed to broach the question whether sexual orientation constitutes a suspect class; indeed, it failed even to perform the “fit” analysis that doctrine demands. Instead, the Court examined the statute and accompanying legislative materials and concluded that section 3 violated the Equal Protection Clause’s core command that government action not be based on animus against a disfavored group.Windsor’s unusually direct methodology conflicts with the Court’s jurisprudence governing Congress’s power to enforce the Equal Protection Clause. That jurisprudence, requiring that there be “congruence and proportionality” between enforcement legislation and the constitutional violation the law targets, has relied heavily on the suspect class status of the benefitted group. Until very recently, the results of the congruence and proportionality inquiry were predictable; legislation that enforced the equal protection rights of suspect or quasi-suspect classes would enjoy deferential judicial review, while legislation enforcing the rights of nonsuspect classes would receive a skeptical judicial reception. While recent cases potentially call this template into question, it remains for now a basic feature of the Court’s Enforcement Clause doctrine.Windsor, by abjuring suspect class and even “fit” analysis, undermines the Court’s approach to the enforcement power. This Article examines the challenge Windsor poses to the Court’s Enforcement Clause doctrine. It argues that Windsor requires the Court to reconsider its approach to the congruence and proportionality standard. In particular, it argues that Windsor’s more particularized equal protection methodology requires the Court to consider how Congress may legitimately translate such judicial pointillism into enforcement legislation’s inevitably broader brushstrokes.It is urgent that the Court consider a new approach to the enforcement power. Congress either has enacted or is poised to enact several significant pieces of enforcement legislation benefitting groups whose suspect class status has not been determined and likely never will. Unless the Court is prepared to exclude Congress from participating in the equality projects the Court itself has embarked on, the Court needs to consider how to harmonize its newfound interest in constitutional pointillism with enforcement legislation’s broader brushstrokes.This Article suggests such an approach, one that recognizes Congress’s institutional competence and legitimacy to make broad judgments about the same sort of animus the Court found through its more precisely targeted inquiry in Windsor. This approach would not immunize enforcement legislation from judicial review. As explained in this Article, however, ","PeriodicalId":47323,"journal":{"name":"Boston University Law Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2013-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"68089606","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Bullying Prevention and Boyhood","authors":"Katharine B. Silbaugh","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3682122","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3682122","url":null,"abstract":"IntroductionA desire to reduce bullying in schools and to create safer and healthier school cultures has driven an anti-bullying movement characterized by significant reform in school programs and practices, as well as legislative reform and policy articulation in every state. A desire to improve school outcomes for boys has generated a number of programmatic proposals and responses in public and private education. Most notably, single-sex programming in public schools has been facilitated by the 2006 change to Title IX regulations setting out the criteria for permissible single-sex public school programs.1 These two recent movements in K-12 schooling spring from new urgency around each social problem: bullying and boys' relatively worse school outcomes. This new urgency has shaped new research questions in both cases. The discourse includes both grave concerns about these primary social problems, as well as backlash questions such as whether these issues are really new or worse than before and whether the reforms are worsening the problems they seek to address. This Essay asks how the two movements interact and suggests that they may be at cross-purposes in some significant ways.Attempts to intervene on the \"boy question\" ordinarily begin with ideas about boys' differences and the need to understand, accept, and support boys for who they are: rough-and-tumble players with Attention Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD) who are hunters rather than gatherers and are noncompliant, competitive, and physically charged. In other words, attempts to intervene on the \"boy question\" tend to honor gender stereotypes and masculinities and to approach them without the judgments against boyhood that are allegedly part of the education system.2Attempts to intervene on the bullying problem, on the other hand, begin with a different idea. They begin with the premise that gender stereotyping can be terribly dangerous to the wellbeing and sense of belonging of large swaths of children who do not conform perfectly to normative boy or girl behavior. These children will be disciplined into understanding the parameters of a gender stereotype by their peers. Children are most often bullied based on characteristics that can be understood to be gender nonconformity. Gender nonconformity ranges from the more obvious cases of bullying LGBT or \"questioning\" youth to more subtle but nonetheless gendered characteristics like appearance or athletic ability. The best practices in anti-bullying work focus on establishing a culture of inclusion without regard to conformity and work to disrupt stereotype expectations.3 In particular, this school-climate work contains a social-emotional learning component that teaches social-competence skills. These skills include learning to identify and communicate about feelings directly, rather than channeling the feelings into either aggressive or self-destructive behavior.4 Unwittingly, this bullying reform agenda seeks to create school cultu","PeriodicalId":47323,"journal":{"name":"Boston University Law Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2013-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"68622434","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}