MONISTPub Date : 2021-01-19DOI: 10.1093/MONIST/ONAA023
David Builes
{"title":"The World Just Is the Way It Is","authors":"David Builes","doi":"10.1093/MONIST/ONAA023","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/MONIST/ONAA023","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 What is the relationship between objects and properties? According to a standard view, there are primitive individuals (or ‘particulars’, or ‘substrata’) that ‘instantiate’ or ‘have’ various properties. According to a rival view, objects are mere ‘bundles’ of properties. While there are a number of reasons to be skeptical of primitive individuals, there are also a number of challenges that the bundle theorist faces. The goal of this paper is to formulate a view about the relationship between objects and properties that avoids many of the problems inherent in both of these views. The view I will end up defending implies a particularly radical version of Monism, and it collapses the object-property distinction altogether.","PeriodicalId":47322,"journal":{"name":"MONIST","volume":"104 1","pages":"1-27"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2021-01-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48197058","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
MONISTPub Date : 2021-01-19DOI: 10.1093/MONIST/ONAA025
Mattia Riccardi
{"title":"Nietzschean Monism? A Pandispositionalist Proposal","authors":"Mattia Riccardi","doi":"10.1093/MONIST/ONAA025","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/MONIST/ONAA025","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 I argue that Nietzsche puts forward a pandispositionalist view that can be seen as the conjunction of two basic claims: that powers are the basic constituents of reality, on the one hand, and that the only properties things possess are relational qua dispositional, on the other hand. As I believe that such a view is, at least in part, motivated by his rejection of Kant’s notion of things in themselves, I start by sketching the metaphysics of Kant’s transcendental idealism (section 2) and by presenting Nietzsche’s critical reaction to it (section 3). After that, I start to work out Nietzsche’s pandispositionalist view by considering first the case of physical reality (section 3) and second that of psychological reality (section 5). I then argue that in both cases that view does not conflict with Nietzsche’s naturalism (section 6). In the last part of the paper I explore how his notion of will to power fits into such a pandispositionalist picture. Here, I shall argue, some serious tension does arise, for the claim that Nietzsche sometimes makes to the effect that the will to power is a fundamental physical force seems to clash with central aspects of his mature thought (section 7). However, whereas he repeatedly entertains that claim in his unpublished notes, it is far from clear that he ever meant to endorse it in his published work. Thus, I conclude that the available textual evidence only justifies attributing to Nietzsche the kind of pandispositionalist view spelled out in the first sections of the present paper, and not also the further claim that the will to power is a fundamental physical force (section 8).","PeriodicalId":47322,"journal":{"name":"MONIST","volume":"104 1","pages":"108-124"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2021-01-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"61077760","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
MONISTPub Date : 2021-01-19DOI: 10.1093/MONIST/ONAA026
Donovan Wishon
{"title":"Radical Empiricism, Neutral Monism, and the Elements of Mind","authors":"Donovan Wishon","doi":"10.1093/MONIST/ONAA026","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/MONIST/ONAA026","url":null,"abstract":"Neutral monism is the view that both ‘mind’ and ‘matter’ are grounded in a more fundamental form of reality that is intrinsically neither mental nor material. It has often been treated as an odd fringe theory deserving of at most a footnote in the broader philosophical debates. Yet such attitudes do a grave disservice to its sophistications and significance for late nineteenth and early twentieth-century philosophy of mind and psychology. This paper sheds light on this neglected view by situating it within broader historical monist debates about the mind and bringing attention to one of its central internal disputes regarding ‘mental chemistry’. By taking a closer look at how Ernst Mach, William James, and Bertrand Russell address the question of whether and how our mental episodes are composed of more basic elements, it highlights deep differences among their conceptions of the fundamental ‘neutral stuff’ and its relations to ‘mind’ and ‘matter’.","PeriodicalId":47322,"journal":{"name":"MONIST","volume":"104 1","pages":"125-151"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2021-01-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1093/MONIST/ONAA026","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43232624","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
MONISTPub Date : 2021-01-19DOI: 10.1093/MONIST/ONAA024
E. Miller
{"title":"Non-Piecemeal Pluralism","authors":"E. Miller","doi":"10.1093/MONIST/ONAA024","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/MONIST/ONAA024","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 I argue that Schaffer fails to provide a non-question-begging argument for priority monism. Despite his suggestion to the contrary, Humean pluralists need not, and plausibly do not, endorse his tiling constraint on metaphysically basic objects. Moreover, the distinction between supervenience—of the sort at issue in Humean doctrine—and metaphysical necessitation—of the sort at issue in Schaffer’s tiling constraint—points toward an alternative treatment of the phenomena initially inspiring Schafferian monism. There is an important possibility, one that Humeans can or should embrace, that Schaffer overlooks when drawing his monistic conclusion.","PeriodicalId":47322,"journal":{"name":"MONIST","volume":"104 1","pages":"91-107"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2021-01-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1093/MONIST/ONAA024","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45904731","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
MONISTPub Date : 2021-01-01DOI: 10.1093/monist/onaa032
Stephanie Collins, Niels de Haan
{"title":"Interconnected Blameworthiness","authors":"Stephanie Collins, Niels de Haan","doi":"10.1093/monist/onaa032","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/monist/onaa032","url":null,"abstract":"This paper investigates agents’ blameworthiness when they are part of a group that does harm. We analyse three factors that affect the scope of an agent’s blameworthiness in these cases: shared intentionality, interpersonal influence, and common knowledge. Each factor involves circumstantial (and some resultant) luck. The more each factor is present, the greater is the scope of each agent’s vicarious blameworthiness for the other agents’ contributions to the harm. We then consider an agent’s degree of blameworthiness, as distinct from her scope of blameworthiness. We suggest that an agent mostly controls her degree of blameworthiness—but even here, luck constrains what possible degrees of blameworthiness are open to her.","PeriodicalId":47322,"journal":{"name":"MONIST","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2021-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1093/monist/onaa032","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"61077767","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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