{"title":"Law by Algorithm","authors":"Ernest Lim","doi":"10.1093/ojls/gqad009","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/ojls/gqad009","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 This review article offers a critical analysis of Horst Eidenmüller and Gerhard Wagner’s Law by Algorithm by focusing on four major sets of issues that are covered in this important work: (i) separate legal personality for artificial intelligence (AI) systems; (ii) the exploitation and protection of consumers; (iii) liability; and (iv) online dispute resolution. On separate legal personality, it is shown that neither unbundled products nor difficulties in proving that the systems resulted in damage or losses necessarily justify giving legal personality to AI systems. On consumer protection, it is argued that exploitation of consumers can be regulated by consumer protection legislation provided that reforms are made to remove enforcement hurdles. On liability, the issues arising from product liability legislation and problems associated with proving causation are critically examined. On online dispute resolution, smart contracts and self-driving contracts are distinguished, and a distinction is drawn between AI-assisted and AI-substitutionary adjudication.","PeriodicalId":47225,"journal":{"name":"Oxford Journal of Legal Studies","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2023-05-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44126511","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Choice of Law Meets Private Law Theory","authors":"Hanoch Dagan, Sagi Peari","doi":"10.1093/ojls/gqad008","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/ojls/gqad008","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Choice of law can, and often should, be an important feature of an autonomy-enhancing law as it expands the possible frameworks within which people can govern their affairs. The theory of choice of law we develop in this article builds on three core notions that dominate existing doctrine: states, party autonomy and what we loosely refer to as ‘limitations’; but it releases choice of law from its subordination to private international law (or its interstate equivalent in federal contexts). As a free-standing concept, choice of law belongs to private law’s empowering sections and thus participates in the obligation of liberal states to proactively promote people’s self-determination. This foundation of the field refines its three fundamental notions in a way that facilitates their peaceable cohabitation. It also recalibrates the boundaries of choice-of-law doctrine, clarifies its prescriptions and offers grounds for its reform.","PeriodicalId":47225,"journal":{"name":"Oxford Journal of Legal Studies","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2023-05-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43947053","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Towards Non-essentialism – Tracking Rival Views of Legitimacy as a Right to Rule","authors":"Matthias Brinkmann, Johan Vorland Wibye","doi":"10.1093/ojls/gqad006","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/ojls/gqad006","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 It is common in the literature to claim that legitimacy is the right to rule and that, accordingly, Hohfeldian rights analysis can be used to understand the concept. However, we argue that authors in the legitimacy literature have not generally realised the full potential of Hohfeldian analysis. We discuss extant approaches in the literature that conceptually identify legitimacy with one particular Hohfeldian incident, or, more rarely, a determinate set of incidents. Against these views, and building on parallel debates in property theory, we suggest that Hohfeldian analysis pushes one towards the claim that legitimacy possesses no determinate essence. We provide a rationale for this novel view and disarm a series of objections.","PeriodicalId":47225,"journal":{"name":"Oxford Journal of Legal Studies","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2023-04-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49529385","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Theorising Evidence Law.","authors":"Paul Roberts","doi":"10.1093/ojls/gqad007","DOIUrl":"10.1093/ojls/gqad007","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>What does it mean for a specialist department of legal studies, such as the Law of Evidence, to have, or to acquire, 'philosophical foundations'? In what sense are the theoretical foundations of procedural scholarship and teaching distinctively or uniquely <i>philosophical</i>? The publication of <i>Philosophical Foundations of Evidence Law</i> (OUP, 2021), edited by Christian Dahlman, Alex Stein and Giovanni Tuzet, presents a valuable opportunity to reflect on these existential questions of disciplinary constitution, methodology and design. This review article critically examines the volume's idiosyncratic selection of topics, structural taxonomy, epistemological priorities, and enigmatic thesis that modern evidence law is turning from rules to reasons as its organising intellectual framework. Whilst the volume is impressively interdisciplinary and cosmopolitan in authorship and outlook, some doubts are expressed about its implicit US orientation, limited engagement with institutional or doctrinal details, and marginalisation of normative criminal jurisprudence.</p>","PeriodicalId":47225,"journal":{"name":"Oxford Journal of Legal Studies","volume":"43 3","pages":"629-649"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2023-04-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://ftp.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pub/pmc/oa_pdf/76/4b/gqad007.PMC10550279.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41147735","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Abusive Unconstitutional Constitutional Amendments: Indonesia, the Pancasila and the Spectre of Authoritarianism","authors":"Ignatius Yordan Nugraha","doi":"10.1093/ojls/gqad002","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/ojls/gqad002","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 This article explores how an unconstitutional constitutional amendments doctrine could be abused to advance an illiberal or even authoritarian agenda, with Indonesia as a case study. In Indonesia, there is a pervasive belief that the five fundamental principles of the state (the Pancasila) are the ‘basic norm’ of the Indonesian legal order. Based on this understanding, it has been argued that all positive laws, including constitutional amendments, must be consistent with the Pancasila. At the same time, there is a danger lurking behind this idea. The four amendments to the 1945 Constitution, which have ushered in a new era of democracy, have been claimed to be repugnant to the Pancasila. Consequently, a future authoritarian president could invoke this doctrine to revert to the original 1945 Constitution, which has enabled two authoritarian regimes in the past. Nevertheless, this threat could be minimised by applying the concepts of constituent and constituted powers.","PeriodicalId":47225,"journal":{"name":"Oxford Journal of Legal Studies","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2023-02-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42829361","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"From the Inside Out: The Coercive Power of Deportation and the Erosion of the Liberal Democratic State","authors":"Asha Kaushal","doi":"10.1093/ojls/gqad001","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/ojls/gqad001","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Deportation is the expulsion of a non-citizen from the territory of a state by force or coercion. Largely because it is perceived to be a necessary extension of the state’s immigration power, deportation carries the same prerogative force, benefits from the same sweeping ambit of executive discretion and is subject to the same diminished scrutiny. Deportation is, however, a distinct legal phenomenon. Present on state territory, deportees are simultaneously subject to the state’s laws by virtue of their territorial presence and excluded from the state’s liberal democratic values of legality and fundamental rights by virtue of their status. Deportation practices create spaces inside the state where these values do not reach. As a ‘spectacular state power’ that acts inside the state, deportation bears a higher justificatory burden. The failure of states to adequately discharge this justificatory burden interrupts the integrity of legality on the inside and erodes their liberal democratic character.","PeriodicalId":47225,"journal":{"name":"Oxford Journal of Legal Studies","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2023-02-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44749473","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Areas of Law: Three Questions in Special Jurisprudence.","authors":"Tarunabh Khaitan, Sandy Steel","doi":"10.1093/ojls/gqac025","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/ojls/gqac025","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>This article addresses three fundamental questions about a key phenomenon in special jurisprudence, 'areas of law': (i) what is an area of law; (ii) what are the consequences of dividing law into distinct areas; and (iii) what constitutes the foundations of an area of law. It claims that (i) 'an area of law' is a set of legal norms that are intersubjectively recognised by the legal complex as a subset of legal norms in a given jurisdiction; (ii) the sub-division of law into multiple areas matters to the content and scope of legal doctrine, to law's perceived legitimacy and possibly to its effectiveness; and (iii) the search for the normative foundations of an area of law is typically an inquiry into its 'aims' or 'functions'. This article systematically articulates, explains and answers these three questions <i>generally</i>, ie in relation to areas of law <i>as such</i>.</p>","PeriodicalId":47225,"journal":{"name":"Oxford Journal of Legal Studies","volume":"43 1","pages":"76-96"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC10013092/pdf/","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"9492041","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Express and Implied Terms.","authors":"Frederick Wilmot-Smith","doi":"10.1093/ojls/gqac023","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/ojls/gqac023","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>Contract terms can be express or implied. But what does that mean? I argue that the distinction can be illuminated by reference to the philosophy of language. Express terms are best understood by reference to the truth-conditional content of the parties' agreement; implied terms are derived from express terms by a process of reasoning, albeit one aimed at establishing the parties' commitments.</p>","PeriodicalId":47225,"journal":{"name":"Oxford Journal of Legal Studies","volume":"43 1","pages":"54-75"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC10013091/pdf/","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"9476280","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Parliament's Constitution: Legislative Disruption of Implied Repeal.","authors":"Asif Hameed","doi":"10.1093/ojls/gqad004","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/ojls/gqad004","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>UK constitutional law establishes priority rules governing the relations among legal sources. According to the implied repeal rule, a later statute is preferred to and repeals an earlier statute where the two cannot stand together. There is a vast literature testing the rule's application in future-facing scenarios: whether Parliament in enacting legislation is capable of legally binding its successors. This article instead adopts a backward-facing perspective, focusing on past enactments. I examine Parliament's legislative power to disrupt how implied repeal applies to earlier, inconsistent statutes. This sheds light on Parliament's capacity to shape the constitution's architecture-here, by rearranging priority relations among existing statutes. I juxtapose the technique against the doctrine of constitutional statutes, and also address the implications for the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty. Nor is the technique simply of academic interest. A backward-facing reprioritising regime has already been established in the legislation governing UK withdrawal from the EU. Lastly, the argument may be generalised to encompass other legislatures that also enjoy powers to disrupt the implied repeal rule normally operating among past statutes.</p>","PeriodicalId":47225,"journal":{"name":"Oxford Journal of Legal Studies","volume":"43 2","pages":"429-455"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC10243923/pdf/","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"9964566","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Official Story of the Law.","authors":"William Baude, Stephen E Sachs","doi":"10.1093/ojls/gqac028","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/ojls/gqac028","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>A legal system's 'official story' is its shared account of the law's structure and sources, which members of its legal community publicly advance and defend. In some societies, however, officials pay lip service to this shared account, while privately adhering to their own unofficial story instead. If the officials enforce some novel legal code while claiming fidelity to older doctrines, then which set of rules-if either-is the law? We defend the legal relevance of the official story, on largely Hartian grounds. Hart saw legal rules as determined by social rules accepted by a particular community. We argue that this acceptance requires no genuine normative commitment; agreement or compliance with the rules might even be feigned. And this community need not be limited to an official class, but includes all who jointly accept the rules. Having rejected these artificial limits, one can take the official story at its word.</p>","PeriodicalId":47225,"journal":{"name":"Oxford Journal of Legal Studies","volume":"43 1","pages":"178-201"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC10013094/pdf/","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"9476278","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}