{"title":"Examining Mitigation in the Law of Damages and the Limits of the Compensatory Principle.","authors":"David Winterton","doi":"10.1093/ojls/gqaf039","DOIUrl":"10.1093/ojls/gqaf039","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>In <i>Causation in the Law</i>, Hart and Honoré famously argued that the attribution of responsibility for outcomes within the law is broadly consistent with the ordinary person's non-legal judgments about responsibility, whilst simultaneously drawing an important distinction between 'causal' and non-causal' rules of responsibility attribution. In <i>Mitigation in the Law of Damages</i>, Andrew Summers argues that the theory of 'common-sense causation' Hart and Honoré advanced also persuasively explains the English law of mitigation. In addition to considering the continuing relevance of this analysis today, and noting the need for an improved understanding of legal responsibility's non-causal limits, the present article critically evaluates Summers's descriptive claims. It is argued that while Summers offers a generally compelling rationalisation of the avoidable loss rule, his analysis of the authorities concerned with the relevance of consequential benefits derived from the wrong when assessing damages following civil wrongdoing is substantively incomplete.</p>","PeriodicalId":47225,"journal":{"name":"Oxford Journal of Legal Studies","volume":"46 1","pages":"201-222"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2025-12-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC13017295/pdf/","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"147575862","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Legitimating Corporate Power: Shareholderism versus Stakeholderism.","authors":"Heikki Marjosola","doi":"10.1093/ojls/gqaf037","DOIUrl":"10.1093/ojls/gqaf037","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>This article assesses the legitimising strategies of 'shareholderism' and 'stakeholderism' through the dual lenses of input and output legitimacy widely used in political theory. Here, output legitimacy evaluates corporate decision making by its contribution to societal welfare, whereas input legitimacy requires that corporate decisions reflect the preferences of its legitimate stakeholders. On both fronts, shareholderism and stakeholderism offer incomplete strategies to legitimise corporate authority. Shareholderism, although firmly grounded in state-derived legitimacy, fails to address certain structural problems, such as corporate political power and the geographic mismatch between jurisdictions and capital. Most stakeholderists, by contrast, would have corporate leaders make distributive judgments in place of the majoritarian, yet ineffective, political process. In terms of output legitimacy, their alternative is plausible, but they fail to engage with the participatory requirements of input legitimacy. The emerging proceduralist agenda, drawing on principles such as transparency and stakeholder engagement, offers a thin basis for corporate legitimacy.</p>","PeriodicalId":47225,"journal":{"name":"Oxford Journal of Legal Studies","volume":"46 1","pages":"141-170"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2025-11-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC13017770/pdf/","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"147575829","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Unnecessary Self-defence.","authors":"James Manwaring","doi":"10.1093/ojls/gqaf035","DOIUrl":"10.1093/ojls/gqaf035","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>Self-defence is traditionally said to contain a <i>necessity requirement</i>, according to which defensive force is lawful only if it is necessary. But the necessity requirement is formulated inconsistently, and these inconsistencies substantially alter the scope of the defence. This article explains these inconsistencies. It concludes that it would be preferable to abandon the necessity requirement altogether. This would not leave a problematic gap in the law, because necessity would remain an important consideration when judging whether any use of force was reasonable.</p>","PeriodicalId":47225,"journal":{"name":"Oxford Journal of Legal Studies","volume":"46 1","pages":"87-110"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2025-11-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC13016743/pdf/","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"147522361","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Punishing to Send a Message <sup>†</sup>.","authors":"Angelo Ryu, Trenton Sewell","doi":"10.1093/ojls/gqaf034","DOIUrl":"10.1093/ojls/gqaf034","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>In <i>Punishment for the Greater Good</i>, Adam Kolber defends consequentialism as a better justification for punishment than retributivism. Here, we reject the dichotomy and seek to motivate expressivism as a genuine alternative. According to expressivism, what justifies punishment is its expression of a fitting message. We show how expressivism can be developed to avoid Kolber's objections to retributivism, while having a number of advantages over his preferred consequentialism.</p>","PeriodicalId":47225,"journal":{"name":"Oxford Journal of Legal Studies","volume":"46 1","pages":"66-86"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2025-10-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC13017693/pdf/","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"147575831","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Is Mental Capacity Law Law?","authors":"John Coggon","doi":"10.1093/ojls/gqaf028","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/ojls/gqaf028","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>Abstract-How do you stop hard cases from making bad law? One way is to strip their determination of any distinctly <i>legal</i> reasoning, and deny that they make law at all. This article suggests that is the approach found in the Mental Capacity Act 2005 (MCA). With a focus on best interests determinations within mental capacity adjudication, the following argument challenges the sense (or otherwise) in conceiving of such adjudication as a <i>legal</i> exercise. I argue that MCA cases do not involve the courts in either a law-applying or even a law-making role. Rather, they represent the issuing of a decision that is eminently non-legal in nature, and more reflective of the exercise of an executive or administrative function. This raises questions about the quality and defensibility of mental capacity jurisprudence itself, but also about the meaning of law and the role of the judicial branch.</p>","PeriodicalId":47225,"journal":{"name":"Oxford Journal of Legal Studies","volume":"45 4","pages":"1019-1046"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2025-09-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC12688651/pdf/","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145726533","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Carefully Tailored: Doctrinal Methods and Empirical Contributions.","authors":"Stefan Theil","doi":"10.1093/ojls/gqaf029","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/ojls/gqaf029","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>Doctrinal research is the distinct methodological approach of lawyers and a core contribution of legal studies to human knowledge. Yet, lawyers do not often explain their doctrinal research methods and by implication struggle to articulate where empirical research can make helpful contributions. The articles suggests that doctrinal research is characterised by three core features that make specific assumptions about law: (i) legal sources are the exclusive avenue for altering rules and principles of law; (ii) legal sources are intelligible, coherent and consistent; and (iii) the success of any doctrinal account is contingent on legal sources alone. On this basis, we can appreciate that empirical contributions are essential: (i) to an accurate understanding of the law; (ii) to critiques, because the law lacks frameworks to evaluate its own operation; and (iii) to surveying legal sources. However, this insight comes with a word of caution: not all empirical methods are well suited to providing doctrinally relevant insights and there are some sophisticated pitfalls to avoid along the way.</p>","PeriodicalId":47225,"journal":{"name":"Oxford Journal of Legal Studies","volume":"45 4","pages":"1047-1075"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2025-08-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC12688654/pdf/","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145726984","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Correction to: Law, Philosophy and the Susceptible Skins of Living Beings.","authors":"","doi":"10.1093/ojls/gqaf032","DOIUrl":"10.1093/ojls/gqaf032","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>[This corrects the article DOI: 10.1093/ojls/gqaf022.].</p>","PeriodicalId":47225,"journal":{"name":"Oxford Journal of Legal Studies","volume":"45 4","pages":"1076"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2025-08-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC12688652/pdf/","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145726145","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Protecting Negligence Claimants' Decisions: An Argument of Doctrinal Coherence in Non-pecuniary Loss.","authors":"Andrew J Bell","doi":"10.1093/ojls/gqaf025","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/ojls/gqaf025","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>Various heads of non-pecuniary loss recovery in negligence cast doubt on the explanatory capacity of the traditional twin categories of pain and suffering and loss of amenity. This includes, in particular, loss of congenial employment and loss of reproductive autonomy. The central arguments of this piece are that we can construct from these, based on the existing law, a third category of non-pecuniary loss for personal injury; and that recognising this allows us to rationalise, expand and develop the claims more coherently, rather than castigating them as exceptional extras. The article demonstrates that, alongside pain and suffering and losses of amenity, the courts have already accepted 'loss of a protected decision' in these contexts. From that base, the argument considers with more conceptual coherence whether further instances of this category can be accepted in the healthcare and other contexts.</p>","PeriodicalId":47225,"journal":{"name":"Oxford Journal of Legal Studies","volume":"45 4","pages":"950-979"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2025-07-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC12688653/pdf/","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145726560","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"A Fundamental Rethinking of Freedom of Speech.","authors":"András Koltay","doi":"10.1093/ojls/gqaf027","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/ojls/gqaf027","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>Paul Wragg's book, <i>Free Speech Theory: A Radical Restatement</i>, is arguably the most important work on free speech theory since Frederick Schauer's now-classic <i>Free Speech: A Philosophical Enquiry</i>. The theoretical issues of freedom of speech have hitherto been dominated in the international arena by the US literature, which builds on the First Amendment jurisprudence as its starting point. Now, an essential European work digs deep into the question and, moving away from legal positivism, seeks an answer to the question: 'What is free speech?' Wragg gives a new, revelatory interpretation of John Stuart Mill's oft-quoted essay, 'On Liberty'. The author argues forcefully in defence of 'irrationality', which is the keyword of the book. For him, the very essence of free speech is the protection of irrational speech, that is, speech regarded as worthless by traditional free speech justifications. This is not to unleash foolishness and irresponsibility, but to protect the freedom and autonomy of the individual. Wragg follows the greatest liberal English traditions, as his ideal is the individual responsible for themself.</p>","PeriodicalId":47225,"journal":{"name":"Oxford Journal of Legal Studies","volume":"45 4","pages":"1011-1018"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2025-07-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC12688657/pdf/","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145726990","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Towards An Agency Turn in Animal Law.","authors":"Visa A J Kurki, Paulina Siemieniec","doi":"10.1093/ojls/gqaf024","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/ojls/gqaf024","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>The article proposes an agency turn in animal law, following in the footsteps of the political agency turn in animal ethics. The law currently operates on the assumption that animals are passive non-agents, which is reflected in the nature of their legal representation as voiceless and incompetent. We challenge this assumption by identifying three alternative standards for legally representing animals and their interests in the decision-making processes that affect them. According to the: (i) Interest Representation Standard, the best interests of animals are considered; (ii) Listening Standard, animals have a voice, and their input is solicited; and (iii) Empowerment Standard, animals are enabled to make decisions with legal effect. Each standard involves a varying degree of human and animal involvement in legal decision making. It is argued that scholars should reassess the assumption that animals are passive, and seriously consider the extent to which animal law could move towards an agency-affirming paradigm.</p>","PeriodicalId":47225,"journal":{"name":"Oxford Journal of Legal Studies","volume":"45 4","pages":"923-949"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2025-07-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC12688658/pdf/","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145726574","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}