{"title":"Kierkegaard on the Relationship Between Practical and Epistemic Reasons for Belief","authors":"Z Quanbeck","doi":"10.1111/papq.12456","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/papq.12456","url":null,"abstract":"On the dominant contemporary accounts of how practical considerations affect what we ought to believe, practical considerations either <i>encroach</i> on epistemic rationality by affecting whether a belief is epistemically justified, or constitute distinctively practical reasons for belief which can only affect what we ought to believe by <i>conflicting</i> with epistemic rationality. This paper argues that Søren Kierkegaard offers a promising alternative view on which practical considerations can affect what we ought to believe without either encroaching on or (necessarily) conflicting with epistemic rationality by determining which among the epistemically permitted outright doxastic attitudes one should all-things-considered adopt.","PeriodicalId":47097,"journal":{"name":"PACIFIC PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY","volume":"120 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2024-04-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140574452","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Epistemic Conflicts and the Form of Epistemic Rules","authors":"Aleks Knoks","doi":"10.1111/papq.12453","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/papq.12453","url":null,"abstract":"While such epistemic rules as ‘If you perceive that , you ought to believe that ’ and ‘If you have outstanding testimony that , you ought to believe that ’ seem to be getting at important truths, it is easy to think of cases in which they come into conflict. To avoid classifying such cases as dilemmas, one can hold either that epistemic rules have built‐in unless‐clauses listing the circumstances under which they don't apply or, alternatively, that epistemic rules are contributory. This paper explores both responses from a formal perspective, drawing on a simple defeasible logic framework.","PeriodicalId":47097,"journal":{"name":"PACIFIC PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY","volume":"70 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2024-03-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140151653","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Deciding Under a Description","authors":"Matthew Heeney","doi":"10.1111/papq.12454","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/papq.12454","url":null,"abstract":"I issue a challenge for the view that deciding‐to‐A is rendered intentional by an intention or other pro‐attitude towards deciding. Either such an attitude cannot rationalize my deciding specifically to A for a reason I take to support doing A, or, fixing for this, cannot accommodate deciding without entertaining alternatives. If successful, the argument motivates the search for an account that does not source the intentionality of deciding in a rationalizing pro‐attitude.","PeriodicalId":47097,"journal":{"name":"PACIFIC PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY","volume":"226 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2024-03-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140032741","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Social Change, Solidarity, and Mass Agency","authors":"Kevin Richardson","doi":"10.1111/papq.12455","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/papq.12455","url":null,"abstract":"Critics of social injustice argue that the agent of transformative social change will (or should) be a mass agent; namely, an agent that is large, complex, and geographically dispersed. Traditional theories of collective agency emphasize the presence of shared intentions and common knowledge, but mass agents are too large for such cohesion. To make sense of mass agency, I suggest a new approach. On the solidarity theory of mass agency, a mass agent is composed of (a) organizers who intend to fight for social change and (b) supporters who are in solidarity with organizers.","PeriodicalId":47097,"journal":{"name":"PACIFIC PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY","volume":"3 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2024-02-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140019008","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Counterfactual Decision Theory Is Causal Decision Theory","authors":"J. Dmitri Gallow","doi":"10.1111/papq.12451","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/papq.12451","url":null,"abstract":"The role of causation and counterfactuals in causal decision theory is vexed and disputed. Recently, Brian Hedden (2023) argues that we should abandon causal decision theory in favour of an alternative: counterfactual decision theory. I argue that, pace Hedden, counterfactual decision theory is not a competitor to, but rather a version of, causal decision theory – the most popular version by far. I provide textual evidence that the founding fathers of causal decision theory (Stalnaker, Gibbard, Harper, Lewis, Skyrms, Sobel, and Joyce) all endorse counterfactual decision theories. I additionally discuss why these theories came to be called ‘causal’, rather than ‘counterfactual’. And I argue that, properly understood, causal decision theory escapes Hedden's objections.","PeriodicalId":47097,"journal":{"name":"PACIFIC PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY","volume":"256 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2024-02-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139751572","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Responses That Matter","authors":"Sebastian Köhler","doi":"10.1111/papq.12452","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/papq.12452","url":null,"abstract":"We are all familiar with judgements about the persistence of people. Furthermore, we tend to structure certain attitudes and practices around such judgements because we think that personal identity <i>matters</i> for the relevant practical concerns. Response-dependence views try to accommodate that personal identity matters by letting relevant attitudes and practices <i>determine</i> the personal identity relation for a particular person. This paper argues that genuine response-dependence views are not well positioned to accommodate the connection between personal identity and what matters. Rather, if we accept such a connection, this supports normative-facts-first views, according to which relevant <i>normative</i> facts determine personal identity.","PeriodicalId":47097,"journal":{"name":"PACIFIC PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY","volume":"31 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2024-02-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139751449","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"A Regularity Theory of Causation","authors":"Holger Andreas, Mario Günther","doi":"10.1111/papq.12447","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/papq.12447","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper, we propose a regularity theory of causation. The theory aims to be reductive and to align with our pre‐theoretic understanding of the causal relation. We show that our theory can account for a wide range of causal scenarios, including isomorphic scenarios, omissions, and scenarios which suggest that causation is not transitive.","PeriodicalId":47097,"journal":{"name":"PACIFIC PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY","volume":"32 6","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2024-01-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139444002","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Does Pornography Presuppose Rape Myths?","authors":"Richard Kimberly Heck","doi":"10.1111/papq.12448","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/papq.12448","url":null,"abstract":"Rae Langton and Caroline West argue that pornography silences women by presupposing misogynistic attitudes, such as that women enjoy being raped. More precisely, they claim that a somewhat infamous pictorial, ‘Dirty Pool’, makes such presuppositions, and that it is typical in this respect. I argue for four claims. (1) There are empirical reasons to doubt that women are silenced in the way that Langton and West claim they are. (2) There is no evidence that very much pornography makes the sorts of presuppositions that Langton and West's explanation of silencing requires it to make. (3) Even ‘Dirty Pool’, for all its other problems, does not make such presuppositions. (4) Langton and West misread ‘Dirty Pool’ because they do not take proper account of the fact that pornography often traffics in sexual fantasy. The broader lesson is that we need to read pornography more sensitively if we are to understand its capacity to shape socio-sexual norms (for good or for ill).","PeriodicalId":47097,"journal":{"name":"PACIFIC PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY","volume":"22 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2024-01-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139373722","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Utilitarian's Guide to Dreams","authors":"Adam Piovarchy","doi":"10.1111/papq.12449","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/papq.12449","url":null,"abstract":"Unpleasant dreams occur much more frequently than many people realise. If one is a hedonistic utilitarian – or, at least, one thinks that dreams have positive or negative moral value in virtue of their experiential quality – then one has considerable reason to try to make such dreams more positive. Given it is possible to improve the quality of our dreams, we ought to be promoting and implementing currently available interventions that improve our dream experiences, and conducting research to find new, more effective interventions.","PeriodicalId":47097,"journal":{"name":"PACIFIC PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY","volume":"711 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2023-12-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138579381","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Matter of Coincidence","authors":"Justin Mooney","doi":"10.1111/papq.12450","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/papq.12450","url":null,"abstract":"The phasalist solution to the puzzle of the statue and the piece of clay claims that <i>being a statue</i> is a phase sortal property of the piece of clay, just like <i>being a child</i> is a phase sortal property of a human being. Some philosophers reject this solution because it cannot account for cases where the statue seems to gain and lose parts that the piece of clay does not. I rebut this objection by arguing, contrary to the prevailing view, that the piece of clay is not mereologically constant and might even be highly mereologically flexible.","PeriodicalId":47097,"journal":{"name":"PACIFIC PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY","volume":"15 4","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2023-11-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138527024","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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