Deciding Under a Description

IF 0.7 2区哲学 0 PHILOSOPHY

PACIFIC PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY Pub Date : 2024-03-04 DOI:10.1111/papq.12454

Matthew Heeney

引用次数: 0

Abstract

I issue a challenge for the view that deciding‐to‐A is rendered intentional by an intention or other pro‐attitude towards deciding. Either such an attitude cannot rationalize my deciding specifically to A for a reason I take to support doing A, or, fixing for this, cannot accommodate deciding without entertaining alternatives. If successful, the argument motivates the search for an account that does not source the intentionality of deciding in a rationalizing pro‐attitude.

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根据描述做出决定

我对这样一种观点提出质疑，即对 A 的决定是由对决定的意图或其他支持态度所促成的。这种态度要么不能使我出于支持做 A 的理由而专门决定做 A，要么就是，如果把这种态度固定下来，就不能在不考虑其他选择的情况下做出决定。如果论证成功，那么我们就可以寻找一种不把决定的意向性归结为合理化支持态度的解释。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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来源期刊

PACIFIC PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY PHILOSOPHY-

CiteScore

1.80

自引率

0.00%

发文量

期刊介绍： Pacific Philosophical Quarterly is a journal of general philosophy in the analytic tradition, publishing original articles from all areas of philosophy including metaphysics, epistemology, moral philosophy, political philosophy, philosophy of language, philosophy of mind, aesthetics and history of philosophy. Periodically, Pacific Philosophical Quarterly publishes special editions devoted to the investigation of important topics in a particular field.