Law & Policy最新文献_第10页

Critical coverage: How the media criticize supreme courts—Evidence from Israel 批评性报道:媒体如何批评最高法院——来自以色列的证据

IF 1.3 3区社会学

Law & Policy Pub Date : 2021-01-21 DOI: 10.1111/lapo.12160

Bryna Bogoch, Yifat Holzman-Gazit

引用次数: 0

Beyond evidence: Anticipatory regimes in law 证据之外:法律中的预见性制度

IF 1.3 3区社会学

Law & Policy Pub Date : 2020-12-10 DOI: 10.1111/lapo.12159

Elen Stokes

引用次数: 6

The paradox of regulatory discretion 监管自由裁量权的悖论

IF 1.3 3区社会学

Law & Policy Pub Date : 2020-10-27 DOI: 10.1111/lapo.12158

Despoina Mantzari, Francesca Pia Vantaggiato

{"title":"The paradox of regulatory discretion","authors":"Despoina Mantzari, Francesca Pia Vantaggiato","doi":"10.1111/lapo.12158","DOIUrl":"10.1111/lapo.12158","url":null,"abstract":"Regulatory authorities in the utilities sector typically employ economic evidence and analysis to make expert discretionary judgments under uncertainty. However, economic analysis does not provide clear answers regarding policy outcomes. This exposes regulators to environmental uncertainty, that is, uncertainty regarding the reactions of other actors in the institutional system to their decisions. When policy outcome and environmental uncertainty are high, discretion takes center stage. Will regulators pursue the course of action suggested by economic analysis and their expert judgment or not? What explains this choice? To answer these questions, we carry out a comparative analysis of three British regulatory authorities in the utilities sector: the Office of Communications, the Office of Gas and Electricity, and the Water Services Regulation Authority. We consider two key sectoral and organizational characteristics: the extent of market competition, and statutory discretion. We rely on interview evidence and documentary analysis and a principal–agent framework. Our analysis reveals a paradox: when environmental and policy outcome uncertainty are high, the higher the regulatory discretion, the lower the role of economic expertise in regulatory decisions. Our findings call for a normative reflection on the role of expertise in regulated sectors.","PeriodicalId":47050,"journal":{"name":"Law & Policy","volume":"42 4","pages":"382-403"},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2020-10-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1111/lapo.12158","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44770418","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 5

Rethinking nongovernmental organizations: Neoliberalism, “nonstate” actors, and the politics of recognition in the United States 重新思考非政府组织:新自由主义、“非国家”行为体和美国的承认政治

IF 1.3 3区社会学

Law & Policy Pub Date : 2020-10-12 DOI: 10.1111/lapo.12157

Jara M. Carrington

引用次数: 0

Can a leopard change its spots? Strategic behavior versus professional role conception during Ukraine's 2014 court chair elections 江山易改本性难移?2014年乌克兰法院主席选举中的战略行为与职业角色概念

IF 1.3 3区社会学

Law & Policy Pub Date : 2020-10-09 DOI: 10.1111/lapo.12156

Maria Popova

{"title":"Can a leopard change its spots? Strategic behavior versus professional role conception during Ukraine's 2014 court chair elections","authors":"Maria Popova","doi":"10.1111/lapo.12156","DOIUrl":"10.1111/lapo.12156","url":null,"abstract":"Do judges respond to institutional and strategic incentives or do they strictly follow dominant professional role conceptions? This article weighs in by exploring whether an ideational shift toward judicial empowerment and independence can germinate from institutional reforms. Ukraine's 2014 Euromaidan revolution and the comprehensive judicial reform adopted in its wake provide a test of the competing theoretical accounts. A judicial lustration law sacked all incumbent court chairs, who had been appointed by the executive, and gave Ukrainian judges the right to elect new chairs via secret ballot. I analyze this radical step toward judicial self-government using an original data set with individual- and court-level data. The key finding is that less than a fifth of Ukrainian judges embraced their newly granted agency and elected a new chair for their court, whereas the overwhelming majority followed dominant professional norms of deference and reelected the sacked court chairs. This finding holds for all rungs of the judicial hierarchy and for all regions of Ukraine. Even protégés of ousted president Yanukovych won the secret ballot vote by their peers more often than they lost it. Beyond Ukraine, these results suggest that empowering individual judges in the highly hierarchical structure of a civil law judiciary is unlikely to lead to a judicial behavior shift, at least in the short run.","PeriodicalId":47050,"journal":{"name":"Law & Policy","volume":"42 4","pages":"365-381"},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2020-10-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1111/lapo.12156","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42917680","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 5

The devil is in the details: How arbitration system design and training facilitate and inhibit repeat-player advantages in private and state-run arbitration hearings 细节决定成败:仲裁制度的设计和培训如何促进和抑制私人和国有仲裁听证会中的重复参与者优势

IF 1.3 3区社会学

Law & Policy Pub Date : 2020-10-03 DOI: 10.1111/lapo.12155

Shauhin A. Talesh, Peter C. Alter

{"title":"The devil is in the details: How arbitration system design and training facilitate and inhibit repeat-player advantages in private and state-run arbitration hearings","authors":"Shauhin A. Talesh, Peter C. Alter","doi":"10.1111/lapo.12155","DOIUrl":"10.1111/lapo.12155","url":null,"abstract":"This article demonstrates that arbitration system design and the training that arbitrators receive shape the extent to which repeat players gain advantages in arbitration hearings. While prior arbitration research does suggest that arbitrator training matters, this is the first article to show how it matters, as we observe actual arbitration hearings in private and state-run arbitration systems in two states. Our comparative analysis links three literatures interested in how seemingly interest-neutral institutions, like disputing forums, serve in practice to reinforce dominant norms, values, and hierarchies: (1) sociolegal studies of repeat-player advantages in disputing, (2) studies of occupational socialization in educational settings, and (3) neoinstitutional organizational sociology studies of how managerial values influence the way in which organizations construct law. We bridge these literatures by showing how arbitrator system design and the occupational socialization that arbitrators receive in private arbitration are primary mechanisms through which managerial values influence the arbitration process, ultimately providing a pathway for repeat-player advantages in hearings. Because our analysis compares two distinct arbitration systems, we identify variation in these processes and offer preliminary but tangible policy recommendations for the design and implementation of arbitration systems that best protect civil and consumer rights within arbitral forums that the Supreme Court continually upholds.","PeriodicalId":47050,"journal":{"name":"Law & Policy","volume":"42 4","pages":"315-343"},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2020-10-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1111/lapo.12155","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48017852","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 1

How Free Is Sow Stall Free? Incremental Regulatory Reform and Industry Co-optation of Activism 母猪栏有多自由?渐进式监管改革与激进主义的行业合作

IF 1.3 3区社会学

Law & Policy Pub Date : 2020-07-06 DOI: 10.1111/lapo.12154

RACHEL Carey, Christine Parker, Gyorgy Scrinis

引用次数: 8

The Politics of Symbolic Laws: State Resistance to the Allure of Sex Offender Residence Restrictions 象征性法律的政治:国家对性犯罪者居住限制诱惑的抵制

IF 1.3 3区社会学

Law & Policy Pub Date : 2020-06-29 DOI: 10.1111/lapo.12153

Monica Williams, Erin B. Comartin, Robert D. Lytle

引用次数: 0

“They Think I'm a Lawyer”: Undocumented College Students as Legal Brokers for Their Undocumented Parents “他们以为我是律师”:无证大学生为无证父母充当法律经纪人