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Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics-Zeitschrift Fur Die Gesamte Staatswissenschaft最新文献

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The Life you do Not Save: Reflections on the Causal Element in the Notion of a Decision's Consequences 你无法拯救的生命:对决定后果概念中因果因素的反思
IF 0.4 4区 经济学
Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics-Zeitschrift Fur Die Gesamte Staatswissenschaft Pub Date : 2020-01-01 DOI: 10.1628/jite-2020-0018
W. Lübbe
{"title":"The Life you do Not Save: Reflections on the Causal Element in the Notion of a Decision's Consequences","authors":"W. Lübbe","doi":"10.1628/jite-2020-0018","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1628/jite-2020-0018","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46932,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics-Zeitschrift Fur Die Gesamte Staatswissenschaft","volume":"16 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2020-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"67506673","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Consumer Misperception in a Hotelling Model: With and Without Price Discrimination 酒店模式中的消费者误解:有无价格歧视
IF 0.4 4区 经济学
Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics-Zeitschrift Fur Die Gesamte Staatswissenschaft Pub Date : 2020-01-01 DOI: 10.1628/jite-2020-0023
N. Persico
{"title":"Consumer Misperception in a Hotelling Model: With and Without Price Discrimination","authors":"N. Persico","doi":"10.1628/jite-2020-0023","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1628/jite-2020-0023","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46932,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics-Zeitschrift Fur Die Gesamte Staatswissenschaft","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2020-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"67506758","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 3
Causality in the Law and in the Social Sciences 法律和社会科学中的因果关系
IF 0.4 4区 经济学
Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics-Zeitschrift Fur Die Gesamte Staatswissenschaft Pub Date : 2020-01-01 DOI: 10.1628/jite-2020-0028
C. Engel, U. Schweizer
{"title":"Causality in the Law and in the Social Sciences","authors":"C. Engel, U. Schweizer","doi":"10.1628/jite-2020-0028","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1628/jite-2020-0028","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46932,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics-Zeitschrift Fur Die Gesamte Staatswissenschaft","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2020-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"67506770","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Endowment Effects in Proposal Rights Contests 求婚权争夺中的赠与效应
IF 0.4 4区 经济学
Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics-Zeitschrift Fur Die Gesamte Staatswissenschaft Pub Date : 2019-12-01 DOI: 10.1628/jite-2021-0018
Youjin Hahn, Chulyoung Kim, Sang‐Hyun Kim
{"title":"Endowment Effects in Proposal Rights Contests","authors":"Youjin Hahn, Chulyoung Kim, Sang‐Hyun Kim","doi":"10.1628/jite-2021-0018","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1628/jite-2021-0018","url":null,"abstract":"When parties negotiate over surplus, incumbents, or agenda-setters, tend to spend more resources than challengers to keep their power in making a proposal. This is often attributed to the fact that incumbents usually have better access to resources. We experimentally investigate whether incumbents spend more resources even when they have no advantage. Specifically, we consider a twostage game where in the first stage, players compete to be recognized as a proposer, and in the second stage, they play an ultimatum bargaining game. Our treatment concerns whether one of the subjects is endowed with proposal right (without any material advantage) in the beginning of the game. We find that subjects who were framed to be incumbents spent significantly more resources to keep the proposal right than others. This suggests that even without any resource advantage, the parties who have the power would incur higher costs to keep it, and thus, the allocation of power is likely to persist. Our finding is new in the sense that the endowment effect does not concern “property right†as in previous studies but “proposal right.â€","PeriodicalId":46932,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics-Zeitschrift Fur Die Gesamte Staatswissenschaft","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2019-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42133975","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Assigning Protection: Can Refugee Rights and State Preferences be Reconciled? 分配保护:难民权利和国家偏好可以调和吗?
IF 0.4 4区 经济学
Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics-Zeitschrift Fur Die Gesamte Staatswissenschaft Pub Date : 2019-04-05 DOI: 10.1628/JITE-2019-0007
U. Becker
{"title":"Assigning Protection: Can Refugee Rights and State Preferences be Reconciled?","authors":"U. Becker","doi":"10.1628/JITE-2019-0007","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1628/JITE-2019-0007","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46932,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics-Zeitschrift Fur Die Gesamte Staatswissenschaft","volume":"1 1","pages":"46"},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2019-04-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"76605362","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
More Rights, Less Income?: An Economic Analysis of the New Copyright Law in Germany 更多权利，更少收入?德国新版权法的经济分析
IF 0.4 4区 经济学
Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics-Zeitschrift Fur Die Gesamte Staatswissenschaft Pub Date : 2019-01-01 DOI: 10.1628/JITE-2019-0029
Michael Karas, Roland Kirstein
{"title":"More Rights, Less Income?: An Economic Analysis of the New Copyright Law in Germany","authors":"Michael Karas, Roland Kirstein","doi":"10.1628/JITE-2019-0029","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1628/JITE-2019-0029","url":null,"abstract":"The German copyright law was reformed in the end of 2016 with the purpose of ensuring reasonable pecuniary compensation to authors. It proposes an option which entitles authors to negotiate copyright transfers with an additional publisher after a vesting period of ten years. The results of a two-stage bargaining model show that the proposed copyright system may actually harm authors, as publishers may internalize a potential impairment on profits from increased competition within contract negotiations. This paper also demonstrates that the publisher's willingness to invest into an author's career is strictly decreasing as the level of expected rivalry increases.","PeriodicalId":46932,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics-Zeitschrift Fur Die Gesamte Staatswissenschaft","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2019-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"67506397","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Contract, Renegotiation, and Holdup: An Optimal Contract when Interim Renegotiation Is Possible 契约、重新谈判与拖延:可能进行中期重新谈判时的最优契约
IF 0.4 4区 经济学
Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics-Zeitschrift Fur Die Gesamte Staatswissenschaft Pub Date : 2019-01-01 DOI: 10.1628/jite-2019-0033
D. Göller
{"title":"Contract, Renegotiation, and Holdup: An Optimal Contract when Interim Renegotiation Is Possible","authors":"D. Göller","doi":"10.1628/jite-2019-0033","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1628/jite-2019-0033","url":null,"abstract":"I consider a canonical bilateral trade setting in which the agents can exert non-verifiable investments, before they play a revelation mechanism and subsequently advance to the trading stage, where they take nondurable actions. Watson (2007) has demonstrated in a similar setting that the set of implementable outcomes is largest (i) when renegotiation can be ruled out, (ii) decreases when renegotiation takes place before the mechanism is played, and (iii) is the smallest when renegotiation takes place after the play of the mechanism. The present paper seeks to clarify the meaning of the second statement. More precisely, I show that the agents can often attain the first best in case (ii), which implies that the fact that the set of implementable outcomes in situation (ii) is smaller compared to situation (i) may not matter much from an efficiency perspective.","PeriodicalId":46932,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics-Zeitschrift Fur Die Gesamte Staatswissenschaft","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2019-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"67506418","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Digital Piracy under a Graduated Response Policy 分级响应政策下的数字盗版
IF 0.4 4区 经济学
Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics-Zeitschrift Fur Die Gesamte Staatswissenschaft Pub Date : 2019-01-01 DOI: 10.1628/JITE-2018-0016
Michael Arnold, Eric Darmon, Sylvain Dejean, T. Pénard
{"title":"Digital Piracy under a Graduated Response Policy","authors":"Michael Arnold, Eric Darmon, Sylvain Dejean, T. Pénard","doi":"10.1628/JITE-2018-0016","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1628/JITE-2018-0016","url":null,"abstract":"Graduated response policies (e.g., three-strikes laws) are often adopted to deter repeated criminal activity. In 2009 France passed the Hadopi three-strikes law targeting digital piracy. We model the individual intertemporal decision to engage in illegal activity before and after receiving each strike and, contingent on this decision, the level of illegal content acquisition (piracy) within each stage. We find that monitoring efforts typically believed to deter criminal activity can have unintended results. For example, an increase in the probability of detection can increase piracy. An increase in the punishment is the only policy that unambiguously deters illegal activity.","PeriodicalId":46932,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics-Zeitschrift Fur Die Gesamte Staatswissenschaft","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2019-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"67506332","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 3
Limited Liability, Liability Cap, and Pretrial Negotiation 有限责任、责任上限和审前谈判
IF 0.4 4区 经济学
Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics-Zeitschrift Fur Die Gesamte Staatswissenschaft Pub Date : 2019-01-01 DOI: 10.1628/jite-2019-0027
H. Jeong, Jeong‐Yoo Kim
{"title":"Limited Liability, Liability Cap, and Pretrial Negotiation","authors":"H. Jeong, Jeong‐Yoo Kim","doi":"10.1628/jite-2019-0027","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1628/jite-2019-0027","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46932,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics-Zeitschrift Fur Die Gesamte Staatswissenschaft","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2019-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"67506375","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Microfinance and Prosocial Behaviors: Experimental Evidence of Public-Good Contributions in Uganda 小额信贷和亲社会行为:乌干达公共物品贡献的实验证据
IF 0.4 4区 经济学
Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics-Zeitschrift Fur Die Gesamte Staatswissenschaft Pub Date : 2019-01-01 DOI: 10.1628/jite-2018-0010
Bryan C. McCannon, Zachary B Rodriguez
{"title":"Microfinance and Prosocial Behaviors: Experimental Evidence of Public-Good Contributions in Uganda","authors":"Bryan C. McCannon, Zachary B Rodriguez","doi":"10.1628/jite-2018-0010","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1628/jite-2018-0010","url":null,"abstract":"Microfinance is an important component of the fight against poverty. We ask whether access to microfinance loans by the poor relates to their prosocial behaviors. A lab-in-the-field study in southern, rural Uganda is done. A public-good game is used to measure subjects' willingness to free-ride. We document higher levels of contributions by those who have previously received a microloan. We explore potential explanations such as differing social-norm assessments, measurable income effects, or sample selection bias. Receiving a microloan continuesto have an independent effect on prosociality. The results suggest that exposureto microfinance correlates with social preferences.","PeriodicalId":46932,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics-Zeitschrift Fur Die Gesamte Staatswissenschaft","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2019-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"67506075","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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