PHILOSOPHY & SOCIAL CRITICISM最新文献_第2页

The constitution as a law of lawmaking: Comments on Frank Michelman’s constitutional essentials 宪法是制定法律的法律：对弗兰克-米歇尔曼《宪法要义》的评论

IF 0.7 3区哲学

PHILOSOPHY & SOCIAL CRITICISM Pub Date : 2024-07-30 DOI: 10.1177/01914537241263284

Oliver Gerstenberg

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Democracy’s ruling hand 民主之手

IF 0.7 3区哲学

PHILOSOPHY & SOCIAL CRITICISM Pub Date : 2024-07-23 DOI: 10.1177/01914537241263258

Steven L Winter

{"title":"Democracy’s ruling hand","authors":"Steven L Winter","doi":"10.1177/01914537241263258","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/01914537241263258","url":null,"abstract":"The claim of liberal constitutionalism is that a text-like object or a ‘diplomatically abstract’ set of principles can work a deflection of disagreements within a pluralist polity. But this project assumes both that pluralism remains amenable to reason and that reason is a capacity independent of the profound differences of meaning, value, and forms of life that shape those disagreements. Neither assumption is correct. Differences in norms, values, and forms of life inevitably undergird and structure differences in meaning, perception, and interpretation. Consequently, a constitution (even when written and accompanied by judicial review) will necessarily unfold in an ongoing process of political cooperation and contestation. Legitimacy can arise only from the practice of democracy itself – that is, self-governance under conditions that realistically accord equal recognition and respect to all participants. Law is not some abstract entity or prior fixation, special and above. It is not, as Michelman once said, ‘an autonomous force’ that provides ‘an external untouchable rule of the game’. It is just another social institution or performative practice that does (or does not) reflect our democratic nomos. To be committed, as a strong democrat, to the rule of law is to be committed to the idea that we make the rules by which we govern ourselves. Equal voice, equal power, and equal law are just self-government. They are internal to – that is, constitutive of – the game. They are not untouchable; indeed, they are being manhandled every day. But they nevertheless describe a democratic constitution that fully legitimates itself in its performance.","PeriodicalId":46930,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHY & SOCIAL CRITICISM","volume":"38 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2024-07-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141773387","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

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Adorno’s negative dialectics and its debt to Nietzsche: Could Nietzsche be the originator of Adorno’s negative dialectics? 阿多诺的否定辩证法及其与尼采的渊源：尼采会是阿多诺否定辩证法的鼻祖吗？

IF 0.7 3区哲学

PHILOSOPHY & SOCIAL CRITICISM Pub Date : 2024-07-22 DOI: 10.1177/01914537241265116

Nektarios Kastrinakis

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The fluidity of political legitimacy: On Michelman’s Constitutional Essentials 政治合法性的流动性：论米歇尔曼的《宪法要义

IF 0.7 3区哲学

PHILOSOPHY & SOCIAL CRITICISM Pub Date : 2024-07-18 DOI: 10.1177/01914537241263290

Andrew Koppelman

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Constitution as recommendation 作为建议的《组织法

IF 0.7 3区哲学

PHILOSOPHY & SOCIAL CRITICISM Pub Date : 2024-06-24 DOI: 10.1177/01914537241263289

Mark Tushnet

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Political liberalism, public reason and the Goldilocks problem: On Michelman’s Constitutional Essentials 政治自由主义、公共理性与 "金发姑娘 "问题：论米歇尔曼的《宪法要义

IF 0.7 3区哲学

PHILOSOPHY & SOCIAL CRITICISM Pub Date : 2024-06-24 DOI: 10.1177/01914537241263254

Kenneth Baynes

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The enduring significance of reciprocity 互惠的持久意义

IF 0.7 3区哲学

PHILOSOPHY & SOCIAL CRITICISM Pub Date : 2024-06-24 DOI: 10.1177/01914537241264105

David M Rasmussen

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Has the owl flown with regard to ‘the constitutional theory of political liberalism’? 政治自由主义的宪法理论 "的猫头鹰飞了吗？

IF 0.7 3区哲学

PHILOSOPHY & SOCIAL CRITICISM Pub Date : 2024-06-21 DOI: 10.1177/01914537241263287

Sanford Levinson

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The Luxembourg symposium on frank Michelman’s constitutional essentials (Oxford university press, 2022) 关于弗兰克-米歇尔曼《宪法要义》的卢森堡研讨会（牛津大学出版社，2022 年）

IF 0.7 3区哲学

PHILOSOPHY & SOCIAL CRITICISM Pub Date : 2024-06-20 DOI: 10.1177/01914537241263275

Johan van der Walt

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Political legitimacy in Rawls’ early and late political liberalism – Two diverging interpretations 罗尔斯早期和晚期政治自由主义中的政治合法性--两种不同的解释

IF 0.7 3区哲学

PHILOSOPHY & SOCIAL CRITICISM Pub Date : 2024-06-20 DOI: 10.1177/01914537241263324

Silje A Langvatn

{"title":"Political legitimacy in Rawls’ early and late political liberalism – Two diverging interpretations","authors":"Silje A Langvatn","doi":"10.1177/01914537241263324","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/01914537241263324","url":null,"abstract":"This article assesses Frank I. Michelman’s constitution-centered and proceduralist interpretation of Rawls’ conception of political legitimacy and argues that it merits attention because it highlights the institutional aspects of Rawls’ understanding of political legitimacy for constitutional democracies. However, the article also questions Michelman’s interpretation of Rawls’ ‘liberal principle of legitimacy’ (LPL) and the later ‘idea of political legitimacy based on the criterion of reciprocity’ (ILBR). As Michelman rightly points out, for the exercise of political power to be legitimate in a constitutional democracy, it must be in accordance with a constitution that is itself legitimate or reasonably acceptable to free and equal citizens. Yet, the article argues that Rawls’ two legitimacy formulations are attempts to make an additional point: Namely that when democratic citizens exercise political power in ‘the fundamental political issues’, or in issues that shape the basic justice of society or the essentials of the constitution itself, they must respect the ideal of public reason – or ensure themselves and other citizens that their exercise of political power is in accordance with the underlying basic political-moral ideas of persons and society that make the constitution itself acceptable to them. The LPL and the ILBR are conceptions of political legitimacy, not in the sense of setting up a criterion for when a specific law is legitimate, but in the sense of outlining civic or “office-specific” constraints that citizens and public officials must put on their reasoning and exercise of political power in the fundamental political issues for the practice of a constitutional democracy to be legitimate, or well-ordered, reasonably just, and stable for the right reasons – in the long run. The article also discusses why Rawls saw the need to reformulate the LPL, and how the later ILBR assigns a new significance to citizens’ actual use of public reason and their intersubjective deliberation.","PeriodicalId":46930,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHY & SOCIAL CRITICISM","volume":"34 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2024-06-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141521264","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0